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Dear Reader:
T his is Old Dominion University’s 22nd annual State of the Region Report. While it represents the work of many people connected in various ways to the university, the report does not constitute an official viewpoint of Old Dominion, its president, Brian O. Hemphill, Ph.D., the Board of Visitors, the Strome College of Business or the generous donors who support the activities of the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy.
Over the past year, we have endured the depths of the COVID-19 pandemic, the introduction of vaccines and a return to a semblance of normality in Hampton Roads. 
Even as the economy recovers in the region, Virginia and the nation, we cannot forget that some have been left behind. Invigorating growth that raises the fortunes of all is 
the challenge that lies before us. This task will involve difficult discussions about how to diversify our economy in the coming years.
Hampton Roads plays a significant role in national security, provides college education to thousands of Virginians and is culturally diverse. Given these realities and the 
fact that many residents live in one community and work in another, solutions to our regional challenges will require conversations and policies that span jurisdictional 
boundaries. If there is an overarching lesson to be learned from the pandemic, it is simply that we are all in this together. 
The 2021 State of the Region Report is divided into seven chapters:
Shock and Awe? COVID-19, Vaccines and the Recovery  
The COVID-19 pandemic shook the Hampton Roads economy. One in 10 
workers were unemployed at the height of the pandemic, 4 in 10 small 
businesses were forced to reduce hours and thousands of residents left the 
labor force entirely. Yet, in the midst of the pandemic, housing prices and trade 
volumes through the Port of Virginia continued to rise. We explore the economic 
recovery and discuss whether Hampton Roads can rely on defense spending in 
the coming decade.
Bounce Back? The Pandemic and Tourism in Hampton Roads 
Nearly 1 in 5 workers in the Hampton Roads hospitality and leisure sector 
lost their jobs in 2020. Even as the sector started to recover, employers found 
themselves in need of employees to fill available positions. Now, with tourists 
returning to the region, we look at how traditional hotels and short-term rentals 
fared over the last 18 months.
Earn While You Learn: 
The Apprentice School at Newport News Shipbuilding  
The Apprentice School at Newport News Shipbuilding is not only one of the 
nation’s premier schools for educating and training workers, but it also stands as 
an example of how 21st-century learning can occur in the region. In this chapter, 
we look at the apprenticeship model and delve into the unique aspects of The 
Apprentice School that have made it successful.
All In: Casinos, Online Betting and 
the Future of Gambling in Hampton Roads 
In 1987, Virginia voters approved the state lottery, bringing legalized gambling 
to the Commonwealth. Fast forward to 2021: Virginians can now buy lottery 
tickets online, place sports bets on their phones and wager in historical horse 
racing parlors. Now, with casinos opening soon in Norfolk and Portsmouth, as 
well as Bristol, Danville and, likely, Richmond, we discuss the benefits and costs 
of casinos in Hampton Roads.
Whither Old Dominion University? 
The University of Virginia, Virginia Tech and College of William & Mary 
historically have played important roles in the Commonwealth. They have 
set impressive records in admitting and graduating talented students who 
(predictably) do well after they leave these campuses. Nevertheless, the future 
viability and cohesion of the Commonwealth in this century will more likely be 
determined on campuses like Old Dominion University, for it is there that the 
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critical social mobility challenge is being addressed in a meaningful way. We 
explore what the future may hold for ODU.
Bad News: The Decline of Local Journalism  
Local journalism is in peril. Newspapers all over the country are reducing 
coverage, cutting staff, abandoning physical newsrooms or shuttering operations 
altogether. The United States has lost fully one-fourth of its newspapers since 
2004, including 70 dailies and more than 2,000 weeklies and other nondaily 
papers. Hampton Roads has not escaped these cutbacks. We discuss the future of 
local journalism in Hampton Roads.
Securing Release: Cash Bail in Hampton Roads  
On any given day in 2019, on average, there were more pretrial inmates per 
100,000 residents in Hampton Roads than in Virginia or the United States. To 
secure their release from jail, many inmates must provide collateral in the form of 
a secured bond. Now, with momentum building for reducing or eliminating cash 
bail in the Commonwealth, we estimate the costs and benefits of cash bail reform 
for cities and counties in Hampton Roads.
The Strome College of Business and Old Dominion University continue to provide support for the State of the Region Report. However, it would not appear without the vital 
backing of the private donors whose names appear below. They believe in Hampton Roads and the power of rational discussion to improve our circumstances but are not 
responsible for the views expressed in the report.
Richard F. Barry III 
The Aimee and Frank Batten Jr. Foundation
Jane Batten
R. Bruce Bradley
Lucy and Ramon Breeden Foundation
Chartway Federal Credit Union
Arthur A. Diamonstein
Dragas Family Foundation 
Helen Dragas 
David and Susan Goode
Hampton Roads Chamber of Commerce
Thomas Lyons
Patricia and J. Douglas Perry
Dr. Jitendra Swarup
The following individuals were instrumental in the writing, editing, design and dissemination of the report:
Vinod Agarwal Addie Gregory Tim Komarek Janet Molinaro
Barbara Blake Elizabeth Janik Feng Lian Brendan O’Hallarn
Steve Daniel Nikki Johnson Sharon Lomax Hannah White
Ashley DeSilva James V. Koch Christian Manty Jake Zalewski
All 22 State of the Region Reports are available at www.ceapodu.com. A limited number of printed copies of the 2021 report are available for purchase for $50 each. If 
you have comments or suggestions, please email us at rmcnab@odu.edu. 
Sincerely,
Robert M. McNab
Director of the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy 
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Shock and Awe? 
COVID-19, Vaccines 
and the Recovery
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SHOCK AND AWE? COVID-19, VACCINES AND THE RECOVERY
I have therefore determined, not only to inoculate all the Troops now here, that have not had it, but shall order Doctor 
Shippen to inoculate the Recruits as fast as they come into Philadelphia.
– Gen. George Washington, Feb. 5, 1777
U
pon taking command of the Continental Army in 1775, Gen. George Washington faced two foes: the British and smallpox. As the Continental Army 
laid siege to British-held Boston, smallpox ravaged its troops and evidence mounted that the British, who were largely immune due to the endemic nature 
of the disease in England, were working to infect soldiers and civilians alike. Washington ordered infected soldiers and civilians be held in quarantine, 
but as the battlefield broadened, smallpox continued to spread. At the Battle of Quebec in December 1775, the Continental Army was so weakened 
by smallpox that it had to retreat from the field of battle. By February 1777, Washington had seen enough. He wrote to John Hancock, president of the Second 
Continental Congress, that he was ordering the inoculation of troops under his command.1 The need was palpable. John Adams estimated in 1777 that for every 
soldier killed in battle, disease killed 10.
Washington ordered vaccination preparations to begin in secret because the 
political and social climate was not conducive to a public campaign. In 1776, 
at the height of the smallpox epidemic, the Continental Congress had passed 
an ordinance prohibiting Continental Army surgeons from inoculating soldiers. 
A number of states and localities had also passed laws prohibiting vaccination 
of soldiers and civilians. As the Washington-ordered inoculations continued in 
1777 and into 1778 (almost always in secret, as soldiers required a month of 
convalescence), smallpox mortality rates in the Continental Army dropped from 
between 10% and 60% to less than 2%. Dr. Benjamin Rush, surgeon general 
to the Continental Army and a signer of the Declaration of Independence, 
observed in 1781: “The small-pox which once proved equally fatal to 
thousands, has been checked in its career, and in a great degree subdued by 
the practice of inoculation.”1
Jean-Baptiste Alphonse Karr, a 19th-century French critic, journalist and 
novelist, noted, “The more things change, the more they are the same.” 
1   Smallpox inoculation at the time required a surgeon to lance a smallpox pustule and then insert the infected 
blade underneath the skin of an uninfected person. This crude form of inoculation typically resulted in a milder 
form of smallpox; however, some inoculated individuals contracted a more severe form of the disease and 
died as a result of the inoculation. See: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5463674/.
COVID-19 vaccinations dramatically reduced infections, hospitalizations 
and deaths in Hampton Roads, Virginia and the United States in the first six 
months of 2021. Yet, vaccine hesitancy and resistance continue to challenge 
public health efforts and the economic recovery. Disinformation, amplified by 
social media and certain cable news networks, not only undermines efforts 
to improve public health, but also threatens the core tenets of the American 
experiment in democracy. Even with these challenges, however, Hampton 
Roads is poised to grow faster in 2021 than at any time in the previous 
decade, and conditions are favorable for continued growth in 2022.
Over the last 18 months, our region experienced a historical 
economic shock that, at its peak, left 1 in 10 workers 
unemployed, 4 in 10 small businesses reducing hours and 
many schools shifting to virtual instruction. These challenges 
sparked difficult conversations about why Hampton Roads 
failed to keep pace with the Commonwealth and the nation 
over the previous decade. Would a recovery find Hampton 
Roads again in envy of its peers?
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Now, with an economic recovery before us, will we move 
beyond meetings to boost economic growth, or will we return 
to the behaviors of the past? As the pandemic has so aptly 
shown us, we will rise or fall together.
In this chapter, we examine Hampton Roads’ recovery from the COVID-19 
pandemic and the prospects for continued growth in 2022. We highlight the 
rebound in labor markets, the benefits of increasing vaccination rates in the 
region and the emergence of the COVID-19 delta variant, which has led to 
rising infections, primarily among the unvaccinated. We explore the impacts 
of COVID-19 on the region’s residents and discuss whether the plans for 
recovery are sufficient. Lastly, we consider how changes in the national security 
environment may pose the next challenge for growth in Hampton Roads. 
The Pandemic, Variants 
And Vaccines
In October 2020, Hampton Roads and Virginia appeared to have weathered 
the summer surge in COVID-19 infections, hospitalizations and deaths. Within 
two months, however, the region, Commonwealth and nation would enter a 
dark winter, with deaths surging nationally to an average of 3,000 a day. In 
Hampton Roads, the seven-day rolling average of residents testing positive for 
COVID-19 peaked at 1,437 on Jan. 20, 2021, more than three times that of 
the previous peak observed in July 2020 (Graph 1).
Yet, even as infections surged in the fall of 2020, clinical trials of the Pfizer/
BioNTech and Moderna COVID-19 vaccines provided hope. With emergency 
use authorization from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, vaccinations 
started in late December 2020, although demand far outstripped initial supply. 
An aggressive pivot toward greater production and distribution of these 
vaccines (and eventually the Johnson & Johnson vaccine) in early 2021 marked 
an inflection point in the course of the pandemic. By late spring, Americans 
12 and older could go to pharmacies, doctors’ offices, vaccination clinics and 
even public schools to receive a free COVID-19 shot without significant delay. 
In late summer, booster shots were available for the immunocompromised and 
would soon be available for those 12 and older.
In Hampton Roads, the seven-day rolling average of positive COVID-19 tests 
fell from 1,437 on Jan. 20, 2021, to 65 on June 1, 2021, a decline of 95%. 
By the end of June, the seven-day average had fallen further to 36. However, 
the good news would not last as the COVID-19 delta variant gained traction 
in the region, Commonwealth and nation. By the end of July, the seven-day 
rolling average of cases in Hampton Roads had risen to 226.  
A continuing (and unfortunate) theme of the COVID-19 pandemic is that 
Black residents of Hampton Roads have borne a disproportionate burden of 
the public health crisis. While Black residents comprised 30% of the region’s 
population in 2019, they accounted for 33.8% of positive COVID-19 tests, 
50.9% of hospitalizations and 44.6% of COVID-19 deaths (Graph 2). White 
residents, who made up 55% of the Hampton Roads population in 2019, 
accounted for approximately 40.8%, 37.6% and 48.4% of the region’s positive 
tests, hospitalizations and deaths, respectively, from COVID-19.
Why have we observed a high toll among Black residents in the region 
and Commonwealth? First, Black workers are more likely to be employed in 
occupations that are at higher risk of exposure. Second, as we note below, 
Black vaccination rates through the first eight months of 2021 lagged those of 
other races in the region and Virginia. Third, inequities in access and provision 
of health care can also negatively influence the course of the disease in Black 
residents.2
There was, however, a significant difference from the previous wave that 
peaked in January 2021: the availability of safe and effective vaccines. 
While COVID-19 vaccines are fiercely debated on social media and have 
become conflated in the minds of some with political identity, data provide a 
stark picture of the impact of the virus on the vaccinated and unvaccinated 
populations. 
Data from the Virginia Department of Health illustrate these 
stark differences. Between Jan. 17 and Aug. 13, 2021, 
2   See our discussion of vaccinations and employment by race in this chapter. For a national perspective, see 
https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/latest-data-on-covid-19-vaccinations-race-ethnicity.
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fully vaccinated individuals accounted for 0.09%, 0.005% 
and 0.001% of reported cases, hospitalizations and deaths 
in the Commonwealth. In July, the rates of infection and 
hospitalization from COVID-19 in Virginia were 35 times lower 
among the fully vaccinated. Rates of hospitalization were 20 
times lower among the fully vaccinated when compared to the 
not fully vaccinated. 
While vaccinations can reduce future inequities from COVID-19, there have 
been troubling lags in vaccination rates across Hampton Roads. Graph 3 
displays the percentage of the population in Virginia and selected Hampton 
Roads cities and counties who were fully vaccinated as of March 1, June 1 and 
Aug. 1, 2021. Of the 16 cities and counties in the Virginia portion of Hampton 
Roads, four (Mathews County, Poquoson, James City County and York County) 
had vaccination rates that were higher than the Commonwealth average.  
Graph 4 illustrates the share of the population by race in Hampton Roads 
and Virginia that were fully vaccinated by Aug. 6, 2021. Asian residents 
were more likely to be vaccinated than their counterparts in the region but 
lagged the Commonwealth average. White residents of Hampton Roads were 
almost as likely to be fully vaccinated as the average for whites across the 
Commonwealth, while Black residents of the region were approximately 5 
percentage points behind the state’s average. Hispanic residents of the region 
were far less likely to be fully vaccinated relative to the share of the Hispanic 
population in Virginia.
In the early phases of the vaccination campaign, a likely explanation for the 
disparity in vaccination rates had to do with differences in median household 
income as well as personal and professional networks. However, given that the 
COVID-19 vaccines are free, the lower rates of vaccinations in Hampton Roads 
are a matter of concern. If vaccination rates continue to lag among residents, 
they remain vulnerable to the scourge of COVID-19.
Given the proven benefits of the vaccines to individual and 
public health, working to educate residents and reduce vaccine 
hesitancy and resistance is key to sustaining a regional 
recovery. Unvaccinated people represent an opportunity for 
the virus to mutate and undermine vaccine efficacy, especially 
with the rise of more infectious variants of the virus. Those 
who remain unvaccinated by choice also present a challenge 
to employers, since they pose an undue risk to co-workers and 
customers who cannot be vaccinated. One need only recall 
the impact of COVID-19 on our tourism industry to understand 
how a sustained outbreak among the unvaccinated could 
undermine the prospects for a sustained recovery in Hampton 
Roads.
The good news is that as the number of vaccinations has 
increased, public opinion polls have seen robust declines 
in vaccine hesitancy. However, there is a fraction of the 
population that has hardened its hostility. Disinformation 
persists through social media and certain cable news 
networks, which have served as platforms for anti-vaccination 
rhetoric. Breaching these walls of mistrust requires concerted 
and sustained effort from trusted agents in the community. 
Unfortunately, we have ample evidence of Jonathan Swift’s 
observation: “Falsehood flies, and truth comes limping 
after it.”
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GRAPH 1
SEVEN-DAY ROLLING AVERAGE OF POSITIVE TESTS FOR COVID-19: HAMPTON ROADS 
APRIL 1, 2020-JULY 31, 2021
Sources: Virginia Department of Health and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Virginia portion of the Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News MSA.
ECONOMY CHAPTER GRAPHS 
GRAPH 1 
Seven-Day Rolling Average of Positive Tests for COVID-19: Hampton Roads 
April 1, 2020-July 31, 2021 
 
Sources: Virginia Department of Health and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Virginia portion of the Virginia Beach-Norfolk-
Newport News MSA. 
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GRAPH 2
DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION AND COVID-19 DEATHS: HAMPTON ROADS,* 
JUNE 15, 2020-JULY 31, 2021
Sources: Virginia Department of Health and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Population data are from the 2019 American Community Survey 1-year estimates. COVID-19 data, from the 
Virginia Department of Health, cover the health districts of Chesapeake, Hampton, Norfolk, the Peninsula, Portsmouth, Virginia Beach and Western Tidewater. *Data at the city and county level are not available prior to June 15, 2020.
GRAPH 2 
Distribution of Population and COVID-19 Deaths By Race: 
Hampton Roads, June 15, 2020-July 31, 2021* 
 
Sources: Virginia Department of Health and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Population data are from the 2019 American Community 
Survey 1-year estimates. COVID-19 data, from the Virginia Department of Health, cover the health districts of Chesapeake, Hampton, Norfolk, the Peninsula, Portsmouth, Virginia Beach 
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GRAPH 3
PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION FULLY VACCINATED: VIRGINIA AND SELECTED CITIES IN HAMPTON ROADS, 
MARCH 1, 2021, JUNE 1, 2021, AND AUG. 1, 2021
Sources: Virginia Department of Health, COVID-19 Vaccine Summary; U.S. Census Bureau 2019 Population Estimates; and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Doses administered by federal 
agencies within Virginia are not included, since the federal government does not provide information regarding location and demographics. “Fully vaccinated” equates to one dose of the Johnson & Johnson vaccine or two shots of either 
the Pfizer/BioNTech or Moderna vaccine. The percentage fully vaccinated is estimated using the total population of each geographical area.
GRAPH 3 
Percentage of Population Fully Vaccinated: Virginia and Selected Cities in Hampton Roads, 
March 1, 2021, June 1, 2021, and Aug. 1, 2021 
 
 
Sources: Virginia Department of Health, COVID-19 Vaccine Summary; U.S. Census Bureau 2019 Population Estimates; and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Doses administered 
by federal agencies within Virginia are not included, since the federal government does not provide information regarding location and demographics. “Fully vaccinated” equates to one dose of the Johnson & Johnson 
vaccine or two shots of either the Pfizer/BioNTech or Moderna vaccine. The percentage fully vaccinated is estimated using the total population of each geographical area. 
4.3% 3.9%



























01-Mar 01-Jun 01-Aug■ 
THE STATE OF THE REGION  |  HAMPTON ROADS 202110
GRAPH 4
SHARE OF POPULATION FULLY VACCINATED: 
VIRGINIA AND HAMPTON ROADS, AS OF AUG. 6, 2021
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau 2019 Population Estimates, Virginia Department of Health and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. The data do not include doses administered by federal agencies or 
out-of-state residents; 326,154 out of 4,431,177 observations do not include race information and are excluded from the analysis. The percentage fully vaccinated is estimated using the total population of each geographical area. 
GRAPH 4 
Share of Population Fully Vaccinated by Race: 
Virginia and Hampton Roads, as of ug. 6, 2021 
 
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau 2019 Population Estimates, Virginia Department of Health and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. The data do 
not include doses administered by federal agencies or out-of-state residents; 326,154 out of 4,431,177 observations do not include race information and are excluded from the analysis. 
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A Weak Recovery? Labor 
Force And Employment In 
Hampton Roads
The labor market in Hampton Roads is typically seasonal; that is, the number 
of people in the labor force looking for work or actively employed peaks in 
the summer and reaches its lowest point in the winter. In 2019, however, labor 
markets appeared to be gaining steam by the fall and into the winter of 2020. 
As illustrated in Graph 5, the civilian labor force and individual employment in 
Hampton Roads peaked at 874,900 and 852,600 individuals, respectively, in 
February 2020. 
This positive upswing was soon dashed, however, by the 
emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic, social distancing 
measures and a rapid decline in domestic and international 
tourism. By May 2020, the civilian labor force was 5% 
smaller than in February 2020, while individual employment 
had declined by approximately 12.2%. The labor force and 
employment rebounded to some extent during the summer of 
2020, but the recovery plateaued in the fall. At the beginning 
of 2021, the civilian labor force and individual employment in 
Hampton Roads were 5% and 8.5% lower, respectively, than in 
February 2020. Even though economic expectations improved 
in the spring of 2021, the civilian labor force continued to 
contract – a troubling development. 
The headline unemployment rate is equal to the ratio of the number of 
unemployed people in the labor force to the overall labor force. The number 
of unemployed in Hampton Roads declined from a high of 109,046 in April 
2020 to 40,191 in June 2021. Over the same period, the civilian labor force 
declined from 853,762 to 824,884. After peaking at 12.8% in April 2020, 
the unemployment rate in Hampton Roads steadily declined, falling to 4.9% in 
June 2021 (Graph 6).
The decline in the unemployment rate in Hampton Roads in 2021 is the result 
of two factors: an increase in individual employment (good) and a decline 
in the civilian labor force (bad). From January to June 2021, unemployment 
has fallen by 10,417 individuals but only 4,448 individuals were gainfully 
employed. The remaining 5,969 left the labor force. A declining labor force is 
not a sign of a robust regional economic recovery.
If the 50,057 workers who left the labor force since February 
2020 had remained in it as unemployed individuals, the 
region’s unemployment rate in June 2021 would have been 
10.9%, 2.2 times higher than the reported unemployment rate.
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GRAPH 5
CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE AND INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYMENT: 
HAMPTON ROADS, JANUARY 2019-JUNE 2021
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are seasonally adjusted.
GRAPH 5 
Civilian Labor Force and Individual Employment: 
Hampton Roads, January 2019-June 2021 
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GRAPH 6
HEADLINE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE (U3): 
HAMPTON ROADS, JANUARY 2019-JUNE 2021
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are seasonally adjusted. 
GRAPH 6 
Headline Unemployment Rate (U3): 
Hampton Roads, January 2019-June 2021 
 


































































































































































Employers in some sectors of the region reported difficulties in finding workers 
to fill available positions in the spring and summer of 2020. The leisure and 
hospitality sector appeared to be the most challenged by this development. 
Nationally, as well as in Virginia, online job postings surged past prepandemic 
levels. As more people in the labor force were employed, employers faced 
increasing difficulties to fill open positions. The question was: Where were all 
the workers?
A confluence of factors likely explains the apparent shortage of workers 
in lower-wage sectors. First, some workers left the labor force entirely. The 
absence of these individuals meant that employers were competing for a 
smaller pool of labor. Second, national evidence suggests that a greater 
proportion of women left the labor force or transitioned to part-time 
employment. Remote and hybrid schooling, coupled with constraints on the 
availability of child care, limited the ability of some to work full time, if at 
all. Third, some workers were (and remain) concerned about contracting the 
coronavirus. 
Finally, expanded unemployment benefits may have influenced some workers 
on the margin. Recent findings from the National Bureau of Economic Research 
suggest that expanded unemployment benefits played a role in reducing job 
applications; a 10% increase in benefits contributed to a 3.6% decline in 
applications. For some workers, expanded benefits disincentivized work. Why? 
During the first eight months of 2021, full unemployment benefits in Virginia 
amounted to $678 a week ($378 regular plus $300 expanded) or $16.95 an 
hour. 
In the summer of 2021, some states opted out of expanded unemployment 
benefits entirely, eliminating any financial incentive to remain on 
unemployment. Other states, including Virginia, reimposed job search 
stipulations, requiring individuals receiving unemployment to apply for two 
or more jobs a week. As one might have expected, states that discontinued 
expanded unemployment saw declines in unemployment insurance claims. 
Yet, anecdotal complaints from employers in these states continued regarding 
difficulties in attracting and retaining employees in low-wage positions. 
Perhaps the only certainty is that this question will generate a large body of 
academic research in the coming decade.
As the unemployment rolls continue to shrink, our focus will need to shift to 
bringing back workers who have left the labor force entirely. Fully opening 
public schools, increasing child care availability and convincing the reluctant 
among us to get vaccinated will be necessary for this to occur. The recovery 
may be on the way, but it is not complete.
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Unemployment Claims In 
Hampton Roads
When discussing unemployment claims, it is important to 
make the distinction between initial and continued claims. 
Initial claims represent the number of people who have filed 
a request for unemployment benefits after separation from 
an employer. Continued claims, or what is known as insured 
unemployment, reflect those who have already filed their 
initial claim, had the claim accepted by the government and 
continue to file claims to receive benefits for the current week 
of unemployment. In other words, continued claims represent 
the number of insured unemployed people, while initial claims 
reflect the number of initial requests for unemployment 
benefits in a given week.
In the spring of 2020, Congress passed, and President 
Trump signed into law, the Pandemic Unemployment 
Assistance (PUA) and Pandemic Emergency Unemployment 
Compensation (PEUC) programs. The PUA program 
provided up to 79 weeks of unemployment benefits for the 
self-employed, freelancers and independent contractors who 
would not typically qualify for regular state unemployment 
benefits. The PEUC program provided an additional 13 weeks 
of unemployment benefits for those who exhausted their state 
benefits. A number of states ended participation in these 
programs in the summer of 2021 and authorization for these 
programs lapsed in September 2021. Data for PUA and PEUC 
filings were only available at the state and federal levels.
In 2007, before the full impact of the Great Recession was felt in Hampton 
Roads, an average of 2,733 initial unemployment claims were filed monthly 
(Graph 7). Even though the recession was officially over in 2009, average 
monthly initial unemployment claims continued to rise in the region, reaching 
8,257 in 2010. In retrospect, while the Great Recession was significant, its 
economic shock paled in comparison to the COVID-19 pandemic. Average 
monthly claims were 3.4 times higher in 2020 than in 2010 
and 13.2 times higher than in 2019.
In August 2007, 2,872 initial unemployment claims were filed in Hampton 
Roads. Three years later, monthly initial unemployment claims peaked at 
10,600. In other words, it took 36 months for the level of initial claims to rise 
from its prerecessionary low to its recessionary peak. In February 2020, 1,961 
monthly initial unemployment claims were filed in Hampton Roads. Two months 
later, monthly initial claims rocketed to 76,723, an increase of 3,812% (Graph 
8). The adjectives “unprecedented” and “historic” seem inadequate to describe 
the magnitude of the shock this had on labor markets in Hampton Roads.
If there is a modicum of good news, it is that initial claims and continued claims 
have generally trended downward in 2021. While one can think of initial 
claims as representing “turbulence” in the regional economy, continued claims 
represent “slack.” An individual receiving continued unemployed benefits 
remains in the labor force and, as of the last week of May in Virginia, must 
actively search for employment each week.3 
Graph 9 illustrates the change in weekly continued claims for unemployment 
benefits in Hampton Roads from March 14, 2020, to July 31, 2021. Continued 
claims increased from 4,315 for the week ending March 14, 2020, to 88,436 
for the week ending May 16, 2020. At the peak, more than 1 in 10 workers 
in the region were receiving unemployment benefits. As Hampton Roads 
reopened in the summer of 2020, continued claims fell sharply, dropping 
to 13,936 at the end of December 2020. While continued claims remained 
above the prepandemic level during the first half of 2021, there has been 
measured progress in reducing the number of workers in the region receiving 
unemployment benefits.
3   In March 2020, Virginia Gov. Ralph Northam temporarily waived the requirement that unemployed 
individuals must actively search for work. This requirement came back into force on June 1, 2021. Virginians 
receiving unemployment benefits must apply for two or more jobs a week and report the details to the Virginia 
Employment Commission.
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GRAPH 7
AVERAGE MONTHLY INITIAL UNEMPLOYMENT CLAIMS: 
HAMPTON ROADS, 2007-2020
Sources: Virginia Employment Commission and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are not seasonally adjusted and do not include PUA and PEUC claims.
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GRAPH 7 
Average Monthly Initial Unemployment Claims: 
ampton Roads, 2007-2020 
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GRAPH 8
MONTHLY INITIAL UNEMPLOYMENT CLAIMS: 
HAMPTON ROADS, JANUARY 2019-JUNE 2021




Monthly Initial Unemployment Claims: 
ampton Roads, January 2019-June 2021 
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GRAPH 9
CONTINUED UNEMPLOYMENT CLAIMS: 
HAMPTON ROADS, WEEK ENDING MARCH 14, 2020-JULY 31, 2021
Sources: Virginia Employment Commission and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are not seasonally adjusted and do not include PUA and PEUC claims.
 
GRAPH 9 
Continued Unemployment Claims: 
Hampton Roads, Week Ending March 14, 2020-July 31, 2021 
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Will The Lost Jobs 
Come Back?
In January 2020, there were a record 804,500 jobs in 
Hampton Roads (Graph 10). Prospects for the region were 
improving: defense spending was projected to increase, 
travel and tourism looked forward to another banner year 
and global trade volumes were expected to recover from the 
effects of ill-conceived trade conflicts with China and Europe. 
Three months later, however, employers had cut 1 in 10 jobs in 
the region as the COVID-19 pandemic continued to extract its 
economic toll.
Thankfully, the region did not remain at the nadir of job losses for long, but 
the climb back to the prepandemic peak has been arduous and is not yet 
complete. By October 2020, almost 65,000 of the lost jobs had returned, but 
progress has been slow in 2021. From January to June 2021, the region shed 
jobs while job growth accelerated at the national level. The erosion in payrolls 
finally halted in June 2020, but the region still remains 42,100 jobs below the 
peak observed in January 2020. 
To understand why, we can gain perspective by diving into the numbers. We 
ask: Which sectors have grown since 2019 and which have shrunk? We 
compare the number of jobs from each sector in Hampton Roads to the same 
month in 2019; otherwise, we might bias our conclusions given the significant 
declines in nonfarm payrolls in the first half of 2020.
While there were 33,000 fewer jobs in June 2021 than in June 
2019, 84.4% (28,100) of the job losses were concentrated in 
three sectors: leisure and hospitality, education and health 
services, and local government (Graph 11). 
Two of the three sectors, leisure and hospitality and education and health 
services, should ameliorate the losses in 2021. As domestic travel increases, 
demand for hotels, restaurants, bars and other leisure and hospitality services 
will rise. We should observe increased hiring in education and health services 
in the second half of 2021 as schools reopen fully and hospitals return to 
the normal pattern of elective surgeries. While the delta variant may require 
masking in public schools and hospitals, limiting outbreaks is key to a 
sustained economic recovery. Local government payrolls may lag other sectors 
due to the nature of the public budget cycle. Cities and counties typically hold 
budget meetings in winter and spring and start the new budget year on July 
1. There is a lag between improving economic conditions, tax revenues and 
government hiring.
The open question is whether Hampton Roads will better its record from the 
previous economic expansion. From February 2010, which represents the 
trough in nonfarm payrolls following the Great Recession, to the end of the 
expansion in February 2020, the United States increased nonfarm payrolls 
by 17.6% (Graph 12). Over the same period, nonfarm payrolls in Hampton 
Roads increased by 9.5%. At the lowest point of the COVID-19 recession, 
the U.S. had shed almost all the jobs created over the previous economic 
expansion. For Hampton Roads, the experience was more traumatic. The 
region not only shed all the jobs gained over the previous decade, but it 
bottomed out with 5% fewer jobs than at the worst point following the Great 
Recession.
It seems that Hampton Roads is playing the same, sad song. 
While job growth accelerated at the national level, the region 
(again) fell behind. The Hampton Roads economy may pick 
up speed in the coming months as travel and tourism and 
defense spending increase, but the question remains: Have 
we addressed the causes of our relatively tepid growth in the 
previous economic expansion, or have we grown increasingly 
reliant and complacent, ignoring the real possibility that the 
largess of the federal government could one day come to an 
end?
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GRAPH 10
NONFARM PAYROLLS (JOBS) IN HAMPTON ROADS: 
JANUARY 2020-JUNE 2021




Nonfarm Payrolls in Hampton Roads, 
January 202 May 021 
 
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are seasonally adjusted.  
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GRAPH 11
CHANGE IN NONFARM PAYROLLS (JOBS) IN HAMPTON ROADS: 
JUNE 2019-JUNE 2021




Change in Nonfarm Payrolls: Hampton Roads, 
June 019-June 021 
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GRAPH 12
CUMULATIVE GROWTH IN NONFARM PAYROLLS (JOBS): 
HAMPTON ROADS, FEBRUARY 2010-JUNE 2021
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are seasonally adjusted. The trough in nonfarm payrolls following the Great Recession was February 2010.
 
GRAPH 12 
Cumulative Growth in Nonfarm Payrolls (Jobs): 
Hampton Roads, February 2010-June 2021 
 
 
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are seasonally adjusted. The trough in nonfarm payrolls following the Great 
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Can Hampton Roads Rely 
On Defense Spending?
In an age when investors jump into “meme stocks” like GameStop and AMC or 
invest in cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Dogecoin, the idiom that one should 
not put all their eggs in one basket continues to apply. While we may read 
about the lucky investor who can now retire thanks to a fortuitous investment 
(gamble) in GameStop, we cannot forget that there are two sides to every 
trade. When fortunes turn, those who bet their life savings on an unlikely stock 
or cleverly named cryptocurrency can suddenly find themselves adrift.
The Department of Defense (DOD) has fueled the Hampton Roads economy for 
decades. As illustrated in Graph 13, from 2000 to 2008, DOD spending in the 
region increased by almost 73%. It should be no surprise that economic activity 
flourished during this period. When the Budget Control Act of 2011 and 
subsequent modifications moderated the growth in defense spending, however, 
our economy faltered. In the latter half of the last decade, Congress lifted and 
finally eliminated the discretionary spending caps that constrained the DOD 
base budget. Concurrently, direct DOD spending in the region increased, 
powering economic activity and job growth.
We estimate that direct DOD spending in Hampton Roads 
will reach almost $25 billion in 2021. If one includes the 
ripple effects of this spending, 4 of every 10 dollars spent in 
Hampton Roads can be traced back to the DOD. It should be no 
surprise that defense spending is one of the pillars (if not the 
central pillar) of the regional economy.
President Joe Biden proposed a base DOD budget of $715 billion for FY 
2022, a 1.6% increase from FY 2021 (Graph 14).4 In inflation-adjusted terms, 
this represents a real decline in the DOD base budget, and that assumes this 
modest nominal increase makes it past opposition from some in the president’s 
own party in Congress.
4   We note that the DOD now presents the base budget as the combination of what used to be the base budget 
and the overseas contingency operations (OCO) budgets.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) projects the DOD budget will 
grow at (or more likely below) the rate of inflation for the next five years. After 
several years of increasing budgets, the base budget is flat in real terms, and 
it is likely that future direct spending in Hampton Roads will remain near FY 
2022 levels as a result. 
Even the relatively modest increases in the DOD budget in the coming years 
could well be constrained by the unbridled spending habits of Congress 
and the president. The last time the federal government ran a surplus was 
FY 2000, and that was quickly undone by tax cuts in 2001 and 2003, as 
well as the fiscal impact of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Graph 15). After 
the fiscal response to the Great Recession, budget discipline (to some extent) 
and economic growth reduced the deficit to $442 billion in FY 2015. By FY 
2019, the deficit had reached $984 billion as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 
2017 reduced revenue growth, and the discretionary spending caps were 
abandoned. The fiscal response to the COVID-19 pandemic was relatively 
swift and large in magnitude and likely staved off an ever-greater economic 
shock. However, the deficit rocketed to $3.1 trillion in FY 2020. While the 
federal deficit may also approach $3 trillion in FY 2021, the passage of a 
large infrastructure bill and proposed increases in nondefense discretionary 
spending would certainly yield higher deficits in the future.  
While we cannot say for certain when markets will demand 
higher rates of return for U.S. treasuries, we do know that the 
federal debt exceeded 100% of U.S. gross domestic product in 
FY 2020. Even if we exclude holdings of the Federal Reserve, 
the federal government owes the public $17 trillion. By mid-
decade, this debt will certainly top $20 trillion. At some point, 
the butcher’s bill will come due, and when it does, the federal 
government will find itself having to raise taxes and cut 
expenditures. The DOD, as the largest discretionary program 
in the federal government, is an obvious target in such a 
scenario.  
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GRAPH 13
ESTIMATED DIRECT DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SPENDING IN HAMPTON ROADS, 
2000-2021
Sources: Department of Defense and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Includes federal civilian and military personnel and procurement. Data for 2020 and 2021 are estimates. Last updated on 




Estimated Direct Department of Defense Spending in Hampton Roads, 
00-2021 
 
Sources: Department of Defense and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Includes federal civilian and military personnel and procurement. Data for 2020 and 2021 are estimates. 
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GRAPH 14
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DISCRETIONARY BUDGET AUTHORITY, 
FISCAL YEAR 2010-FISCAL YEAR 2026*
Sources: Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University; Office of Management and Budget FY 2022 Presidential Budget (Table 20-1 Policy); and Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Department of 
Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request (May 2021). The FY 2022 budget presentation includes overseas contingency operations (OCO) in the DOD base budget. For backwards comparison, we present the DOD base as the sum of base 




Department of Defense Discretionary Budget Authority, 
Fiscal Year 2010-Fiscal Year 2026 
 
Sources: Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University; Office of Management and Budget FY 2022 Presidential Budget (Table 20-1 Policy); and Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) 
Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request (May 2021). The FY 2022 budget presentation includes overseas contingency operations (OCO) in the DOD base budget. For backwards comparison, we present 
the DOD base as the sum of base funding and OCO funding. Does not include emergency budget authority. 
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GRAPH 15
FEDERAL BUDGET SURPLUS OR DEFICIT IN MILLIONS OF NOMINAL DOLLARS, 
FISCAL YEAR 2000-FISCAL YEAR 2021
Sources: Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University, and Office of Management and Budget FY 2022 Presidential Budget (Table 1.1 – Summary of Receipts, Outlays, and Surpluses or Deficits: 1789 - 2026). 




Federal Budget Surplus or Deficit in Millions of Nominal Dollars, 
Fiscal Year 200-iscal ear 2021 
 
Sources: Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University, and Office of Management and Budget FY 2022 Presidential Budget (Table 1.1 – Summary of Receipts, Outlays, and Surpluses or 
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Cybersecurity And Budgets: 
Two Immediate Challenges
Even if the Department of Defense budget remains constant in real terms, there 
are strategic challenges that, if left unaddressed, will lead to unacceptable 
levels of risk. The ransomware infection of Colonial Pipeline on May 7, 2021, 
illustrated the vulnerability of critical infrastructure to cyberattack. The U.S. 
military is increasingly reliant on networked systems to achieve battlefield 
superiority – networks that may be vulnerable to intrusion and attack. Even if 
the military networks are secure, if hackers were to attack civilian firms that 
supply the DOD, could the U.S. military be rendered impotent and find itself 
unable to fight protracted battles? Without aggressive investments in offensive 
and defensive cyber capabilities, the nation and its armed forces will remain 
vulnerable to cyberattack.
A more immediate challenge that hits closer to home is the rising cost of 
weapons systems. The Congressional Research Service noted that the estimated 
procurement costs of the Ford-class carriers remain an area of concern. 
Relative to the procurement costs of the FY 2008 budget, the estimated 
procurement costs of nuclear aircraft carriers CVN 78, CVN 79 and CVN 
80 have grown 27%, 29.8% and 15.8%, respectively.5 Even if the carriers 
represent a significant leap in capabilities, can the U.S. Navy afford to put 
these multibillion-dollar assets at risk in the South China Sea or Persian Gulf? 
Or will it have to surround these carriers with an increasing number of other 
ships and submarines to lower vulnerability? 
The Navy is not the only military service with programs that have run over 
schedule and budget. For the Air Force, the F-35 program’s lifecycle program 
cost is likely to exceed $1.7 trillion.6 Also, the Air Force’s KC-46 tanker is 
restricted in the operations it can perform, has cost Boeing $5 billion in 
unanticipated fixes and was characterized as a $226 million “lemon” by Rep. 
Rob Wittman, R-Virginia, in a June 2021 Armed Services Committee hearing.7 
5   Congressional Research Service, “Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and 
Issues for Congress,” June 7, 2021.
6   https://www.stripes.com/news/us/pentagon-reportedly-estimates-that-the-f-35-budget-plan-is-running-10-
billion-short-through-2025-1.644700.
7   https://www.defensenews.com/air/2021/06/17/more-cost-overruns-are-coming-down-the-line-for-boeing-
as-the-kc-46-program-logs-another-two-technical-deficiencies/.
Cost and schedule overruns impact current and future capabilities. To pay 
for modernization efforts, the Marine Corps is planning to eliminate tanks, 
nine helicopter squadrons, three infantry battalions and three military police 
battalions, among others. The Army has come to a similar realization that it 
can either increase end strength or modernize the force, but not both. 
In its FY 2022 budget proposal, the Air Force proposed cutting 200 aircraft 
from the current fleet to redirect resources to research and development.8
The Battlefield Is Changing: 
Can The DOD Respond?
U.S. forces have long enjoyed air superiority on the battlefield. Air superiority 
not only allows soldiers to maneuver without fear of reprisal, but it also 
provides them the security to build large bases and operate sophisticated 
supply chains, as well as the luxury of planning when and where to strike the 
enemy. The Gulf War of 1991 illustrated how air superiority and the ability 
to maneuver ground forces in secret can create significant tactical advantage. 
While Iraqi forces hunkered down in Kuwait anticipating an amphibious 
invasion, the coalition forces used airpower to help ground forces “swing 
around” Iraqi defense in Kuwait (see photo on page 28).
The 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (2nd ACR) provided the punch to the 
campaign against Iraqi forces. During an 82-hour span, the 2nd ACR moved 
120 miles and engaged elements of five different Iraqi divisions. At the 
Battle of 73 Easting on Feb. 26, 1991, the 2nd ACR fought alongside the 1st 
Infantry Division’s (1st ID) two leading brigades against elements of the Iraqi 
12th Armored Division and the Tawakalna Division of the Iraqi Republican 
Guard. Even though the U.S. forces were outnumbered, the 2nd ACR and 1st 
ID destroyed 160 tanks, 180 personnel carriers, 12 artillery pieces and more 
than 80 wheeled vehicles, effectively wiping out several Iraqi brigades. 
8   https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/the-commandant-of-the-marine-corps-is-charging-into-the-future-but-
some-arent-ready-for-change/ar-AAMpBsS.
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M-1A1 ABRAMS FROM THE 3RD ARMORED DIVISION: OPERATION DESERT STORM, 1991. 
U.S. NATIONAL ARCHIVES
The Battle of 73 Easting may well have been the last time that U.S. forces fight 
a major tank-on-tank battle. The Gulf War demonstrated the foolishness of 
engaging the U.S. military in force-on-force combat. While the U.S. continued 
to wield advanced weaponry on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan into 
this century, the enemy had learned that direct engagement was an unwise, 
if not deadly, decision. During these conflicts, our forces found themselves 
engaged in a low-intensity conflict where the enemy often used cheap 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to counter the technological advantages of 
the U.S. military.
A seismic shift is now underway on the modern battlefield. In the fall of 2020, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan engaged in an armed conflict over the territory of 
Nagorno-Karabakh. What differentiated this conflict was Azerbaijan’s heavy 
use of drones against Armenian forces (see photo below). The Azerbaijanis 
procured drones from Israel and Turkey and also converted older manned 
aircraft to unmanned aircraft. This drone-centric strategy included the use 
of “kamikaze drones,” which dove into targets with an explosive load. 
These drone strikes inflicted serious losses among Armenian tanks, artillery, 
air defense systems and military personnel. The widespread use of drones 
allowed Azerbaijan to attack Armenia’s command and control and supply 
elements, which were positioned behind the front lines. Armenian forces found 
themselves unable to resupply, limited in maneuver and exposed to attacks on 
a constant basis. Azerbaijani forces secured a decisive victory, in part due to 
the widespread use of unmanned aircraft.
The list of countries and nonstate actors using drones continues to grow, 
increasing the threat to U.S. forces around the globe. The Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard aptly demonstrated this potential threat when it claimed it had 
overflown the USS Nimitz with an unmanned aircraft as it passed through the 
Strait of Hormuz in 2020 (see photo on page 29).9 It’s not much of a leap to 
envision a future where the battlefield is dominated by unmanned aircraft and 
vehicles, and large manned platforms represent targets of opportunity.
AZERBAIJAN DRONE STRIKE ON AN ARMENIAN TANK. AZERBAIJAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, SEPTEMBER 
2020. HTTPS://WWW.YOUTUBE.COM/WATCH?V=0Y7IUN8UQ-U
9   https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1426268/World-War-3-fears-iran-drone-footage-aircraft-carrier-
US-warship-video-vn.
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IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD DRONE PHOTO OF THE USS NIMITZ, JULY 2020. HTTPS://WWW.
THEGUARDIAN.COM/WORLD/2020/SEP/23/IRAN-DRONE-US-AIRCRAFT-CARRIER-REPORT
The U.S. military is facing asymmetries in warfare and cost structure. Tanks 
and armored personnel carriers require long supply chains and are vulnerable 
to IEDs and drone attacks. The F-35 costs $36,000 an hour to operate and 
requires sophisticated supply chains, as well as large air bases. The Navy’s 
carriers are increasingly expensive to procure, test and, eventually, operate 
at sea. The Air Force’s MQ-9 Reaper drone is more capable than the Turkish 
Bayraktar TB2 (used by an increasing number of countries) but is also 
estimated to be six times more expensive than the Turkish drone.
While history generally does not repeat, when it comes to weapons systems, 
the current U.S. warfare strategy echoes that of battleship-centric countries 
after World War I. Once considered crucial to naval power, battleships were 
soon outdated due to the rise of naval aviation. Innovation diminished the 
utility of these large warships; the last one commissioned by the United States 
was the USS Missouri in 1944. By 1960, the last battleship ever built, the HMS 
Vanguard, was sold for scrap.
Hampton Roads has long built and maintained large ships and 
submarines, platforms that are increasingly vulnerable to the 
cybersecurity and drone revolutions on the modern battlefield. 
As costs rise, the DOD is faced with the choice of maintaining 
current weapons systems or investing in modernization 
efforts. Currently, many of our “new” weapons programs are 
evolutions of existing platforms: a newer carrier, submarine, 
fighter aircraft, bomber or wheeled vehicle. 
We are at an inflection point in military affairs. Unmanned 
combat aircraft will be followed by unmanned ships and 
submarines. The Turkish Bayraktar TB2 can loiter above the 
battlefield for 27 hours without refueling and at a fraction 
of the cost of a manned aircraft. The DOD, at some point, 
will have to pivot toward newer weapons systems that are 
cheaper, quicker to build and more autonomous. When this 
happens, our military services will need fewer soldiers, 
sailors, airmen and Marines. Instead of an aircraft carrier with 
5,000 sailors, imagine a drone cargo carrier with hundreds 
of unmanned (and expendable) aircraft and only hundreds 
of sailors. Hampton Roads would not fare well in such a 
transition. 
Change is coming. It may not be today or tomorrow, but within 
years the force structure of the U.S. military will need to adapt 
to the advances in technology or have change forced upon it 
on a future battlefield. The question for us in Hampton Roads 
is whether we will realize early enough that diversification of 
the economic base is no longer a luxury but a necessity for the 
continued vitality of the region.
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Home Is Where The Heart Is 
(If You Can Afford It)
Five years ago, the tale of the Hampton Roads real estate market was spun 
around the lasting impact of the Great Recession. Foreclosures continued 
to retard growth in single-family home prices, and while sales of previously 
owned homes were increasing, there was nostalgia for the “good years” prior 
to the recession. The onset of the pandemic brought a measure of worry, but 
this was quickly set aside as sales and valuations continued to increase in 
2020. Now, with 2021 drawing to a close, the losses of the Great Recession 
have been cast aside as the housing market continues to surge to new heights.
Graph 16 illustrates the seasonal nature of the Hampton Roads housing market 
and the transitory impact of the COVID-19 economic shock. Sales of existing 
single-family homes increased from 2,810 in July 2019 to 3,175 in July 2020, 
a jump of 13%. In 2021, sales continued to bound upward, with the number of 
homes sold rising by 30.6% from April 2020 to April 2021, 38.2% from May 
2020 to May 2021 and 28.9% from June 2020 to June 2021. There were 
numerous reports of sellers receiving multiple offers above the asking price and 
entering into sales contracts within days of listing their homes.
There are, as economists are fond of saying, two sides of a market. Low 
interest rates, coupled with a K-shaped economic shock that left salaried 
workers largely unaffected, meant that demand for single-family homes 
continued to rise during a global pandemic. On the other hand, the supply 
side of the housing market contracted as the inventory of homes for sale fell 
precipitously in 2020 and into 2021 (Graph 17). The inventory of existing 
homes declined by more than half (53.5%) between June 2019 and June 
2021. Falling inventories were largely due to brisk sales relative to new listings 
coming on the market. With demand increasing and supply falling, there was 
only one direction for median housing prices to go, and that was up. 
As shown in Graph 18, the median sales price climbed from $237,300 (June 
2018) to $245,000 (June 2019) to $254,900 (June 2020) to $289,900 (June 
2021). We remind the reader that Hampton Roads was just emerging from the 
trough of the pandemic shock in May 2020, yet the real estate market barely 
seemed to notice the economic turmoil. The first half of 2021 was a seller’s 
market, with prices climbing through the spring and into summer.
While the real estate market has been, to borrow a term from ESPN, “en 
fuego” for the last three years, we must also avoid recency bias. We need only 
return to 2007, when real estate and equities were a “sure thing” and one 
could “never lose.” Rising inflation and deficits will likely lead to increasing 
interest rates sooner rather than later. As capital becomes more expensive, the 
market for homes will cool and the rapid gains of recent times will retreat into 
memory. It may be time to be more, rather than less, cautious about how the 
real estate market will perform over the coming 24 months.
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GRAPH 16
NUMBER OF EXISTING SINGLE-FAMILY HOMES SOLD: 
HAMPTON ROADS, JANUARY 2019-JUNE 2021




Number of Existing Single-Family Homes Sold: 
ampton Roads, January 2019-June 021 
 
Sources: Real Estate Information Network and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are not seasonally adjusted. 
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GRAPH 17
INVENTORY OF EXISTING SINGLE-FAMILY RESIDENTIAL HOMES: 
HAMPTON ROADS, JANUARY 2018-JUNE 2021
Sources: Real Estate Information Network and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are not seasonally adjusted.
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 GRAPH 17 
Inventory of Existing Single-Family Residential Homes: 
ampton Roads, January 2019-June 2021 
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GRAPH 18
MEDIAN PRICE OF EXISTING SINGLE-FAMILY HOMES SOLD: 
HAMPTON ROADS, JANUARY 2018-JUNE 2021




Median Price of Existing Single-Family Homes Sold: 
Hampton Roads, January 2019-June 2021 
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The Port: Fair Winds 
But Troubled Seas
The Port of Virginia’s performance over the last decade illustrates the 
importance of effective management even as the Port struggled to retain market 
share. A return to profitability and increasing levels of cargo traffic boded 
well for the Port prior to the pandemic. The Port was not without challenges, 
however, as the Trump administration’s ill-advised trade conflicts undermined 
trade with China and Europe. At the start of 2020, even with these challenges, 
the Port could look forward to another year of growth. 
By May 2020, however, traffic at the Port of Virginia had plummeted, with 
loaded 20-foot equivalent container units (TEUs) falling 23% from May 2019 
(Graph 19). Yet, the Port proved markedly resilient. By September 2020, 
loaded TEU traffic had eclipsed 2019 levels, and approximately 24,000 
more TEUs crossed through the Port in December 2020 than December 2019. 
Loaded TEU flows through the Port continued to increase in 2021, and it set 
a record for total loaded TEUs in May 2021. Empty TEUs (which are, as the 
name suggests, empty) also set a record in May 2021, as these containers 
were shipped from the Port to other locations.
Import and export loaded TEU flows have increased in 2021 (Graph 20). 
Compared to May 2019, loaded TEU export traffic in May 2021 increased 
by 13.2%. Loaded TEU import flows, on the other hand, increased by 21.2% 
from May 2019 to May 2021. The sustained increases in imports are another 
signal of the ongoing economic recovery in the United States, as American 
consumers’ demand for imported goods continues to increase.
Graph 21 displays the share of total loaded TEUs for four major East Coast 
ports from 2006 to 2021. Two phenomena are readily observable: the rise of 
the Port of Savannah and the relative decline of the Port of New York/New 
Jersey. As for the Port of Virginia, its market share in 2020 was the same as it 
was in 2011; the Port’s market share has varied somewhat year to year, but it 
has not managed to grab a larger share of the market over time.
This is the challenge the Port must address in the coming years, since its 
competitors are not standing still. 
To its credit, the Port of Virginia has invested in facilities and technology 
to handle more cargo. The Commonwealth and the federal government 
are putting money into dredging the port channel to accommodate more 
traffic. These efforts are indeed laudable. Improving the infrastructure in and 
surrounding the Port is crucial to attracting cargo traffic.
Undoubtedly, the Port of Virginia provides fuel for the region’s economic 
engine. The challenge now facing the Port is to ward off the rise of competitors 
and to gain and sustain market share. What is beyond the Port’s control is 
whether economic activity in Virginia and surrounding states will be sufficiently 
robust to enable it to achieve this goal.
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GRAPH 19
TOTAL AND LOADED 20-FOOT EQUIVALENT CONTAINER UNITS (TEUS): 
PORT OF VIRGINIA, JANUARY 2019-MAY 2021
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Port of Virginia, January -May 2021 
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GRAPH 20
EXPORT AND IMPORT LOADED 20-FOOT EQUIVALENT CONTAINER UNITS (TEUS): 
PORT OF VIRGINIA, JANUARY 2019-MAY 2021
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GRAPH 21
SHARE OF TOTAL LOADED TEUS FOR SELECTED EAST COAST PORTS,* 
2006-2021
Sources: American Association of Port Authorities, port websites and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Market shares are based on TEUs for Baltimore, Boston, Charleston, Virginia, New York/




Share of Total Loaded TEUs for Selected East Coast Ports,* 
2 06-2021 
Sources: American Association of Port Authorities, port websites and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Market shares are based on TEUs for Baltimore, Boston, Charleston, Virginia, New 




























































































Savannah Virginia Charleston New York/NJ
'-.~-...._ ............... ,--------------17 
- - - -
THE STATE OF THE REGION  |  HAMPTON ROADS 202138
A Recession For Some, A 
Recovery For Others
Much of the economic news in 2021 has been good. Retail sales are up, 
employers are hiring, unemployment rolls are declining and trade volumes 
are up. Inflation remains a concern, given the trillions of dollars of fiscal and 
monetary stimulus pumped into the national economy over the past 18 months. 
America may be on the road to recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, but 
for some, the economic shock continues to linger. 
Graph 22 illustrates that the shock in 2020 was concentrated among hourly 
workers. While average employment for salaried workers dipped nationally 
by approximately 500,000 from 2019 to 2020, hourly employment declined 
by 9 million Americans. Among salaried workers, male employment declined 
by about 500,000 (1.5%) while female employment slipped by approximately 
100,000 (0.4%). For salaried workers, the pandemic, in general, created a bit 
of mild economic turbulence.
National data reveal the economic damage wrought on 
hourly workers. One in 10 hourly workers lost employment 
in 2020; male employment fell by 4.1 million (10%) and 
female employment dropped by 4.9 million (11.8%). While 
salaried workers encountered only mild economic turbulence 
in 2020, hourly workers found themselves on a plane with 
pilots suffering from food poisoning, an engine on fire and all 
nearby airports unavailable due to heavy fog. This economic 
trauma may help explain why workers quit their jobs at 
record rates in early summer 2021.
Who was affected by the economic shock is more than an academic question. 
It has implications for both those who will experience income and wealth gains 
during the recovery and those who will face continued economic hardship. 
Diving into the data, we unearth two observations, one surprising and one 
familiar. Our first observation is that while the number of Asian Americans in 
the labor force declined by 1.4% from February 2020 to June 2021, Asian 
American employment fell by 4.7% (Graph 23). The decline in employment 
among Asian American workers was similar to that for Blacks, whites and 
Hispanics, but it was relatively larger when compared to the decline in the 
labor force. Two factors appeared to contribute to this ahistorical rise in 
unemployment. First, many Asian American workers were more likely to be 
employed by businesses engaged in person-to-person services (restaurants, 
bars, small stores) that experienced the greatest shock from the pandemic.10 
Second, unemployed Asian American workers were more likely to be among 
the ranks of the long-term unemployed (27 weeks of unemployment or longer). 
A third (and perhaps not entirely surprising) observation is that even though 
Black and white workers left the labor force at roughly the same rate, Black 
employment fell more than white employment.
Graph 24 provides data on the change in the labor force and employment by 
race and gender. The number of white men in the labor force declined by 2.3% 
from February 2020 to June 2021. Over the same period, the number of Black 
men in the labor force increased by 1.4%. However, employment dropped by 
4.8% and 2.9% for white and Black men, respectively. For women, the declines 
were more pronounced. The number of Black and white women in the labor 
force declined by 3.5% and 2.6%, respectively, over the same period. While 
employment of white women declined by 4.8% from February 2020 to June 
2021, Black women’s employment dropped by 7.2%.
Even when the pandemic recedes in the rearview mirror, there will be lasting 
economic damage. For hourly workers, especially those in the leisure and 
hospitality, education and public health, and local government sectors, the last 
18 months have not been kind. For some of these employees, scant savings 
have been depleted, housing has been lost and remote schooling has left many 
minority children further behind their peers. The challenge will be to remember 
those who suffered the most even as the good times roll on for many of us.
10   https://www.marketwatch.com/story/asian-american-businesses-are-dealing-with-two-viruses-reeling-from-
racist-incidents-many-are-hurting-financially-during-covid-19-11613610159.
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GRAPH 22
WAGE AND SALARIED WORKERS:  
UNITED STATES, 2019 AND 2020
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University 
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GRAPH 23
CHANGE IN CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE AND EMPLOYMENT BY RACE: 
UNITED STATES, FEBRUARY 2020-JUNE 2021




Change in Civilian Labor Force and Employment by Race: 
United States, February 20-June 021 
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GRAPH 24
CHANGE IN CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE AND EMPLOYMENT BY SELECTED RACE AND GENDER: 
UNITED STATES, FEBRUARY 2020-JUNE 2021
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. Data are seasonally adjusted.
 
GRAPH 24 
Change in Civilian Labor Force and Employment by Selected Race and Gender: 
United States, February 0-June 2021 
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Final Thoughts
Over the past 18 months, Hampton Roads residents have experienced school 
closures, widespread job loss, restrictions on social activities and, more 
recently, some semblance of a return to normality. The COVID-19 pandemic 
and economic shock exposed the impact of disinformation on our social 
discourse, politics and public health. Now, as economic activity picks up, we 
can look forward to a brighter future if we decide to work together to diversify 
the regional economy, combat those who would undermine our efforts to 
improve public health and leverage our existing strengths to remind the nation 
of our engineering mettle, scientific prowess and efforts to lead in renewable 
energy.
A return to the prepandemic status quo is both attractive and 
dangerous. Hampton Roads will undoubtedly continue to 
play a vital role in the nation’s defense. However, we have 
seen over the last decade how dependence on decisions in 
Washington, D.C., can sink even the best efforts to promote 
regional economic development.
It is time to move beyond quiet discussions of the “D” word: 
that is, diversification of the region’s economic base. We can be 
an asset to the national defense and work to seek additional 
sources of economic vitality. However, we must escape the pull 
of inertia and history. Too often, talk of reform has ebbed as 
budgetary conditions have improved in Congress. Now, as we 
emerge from a historic economic shock, is the time to be bold. 
One effort to encourage conversations on diversification has appeared in the 
form of the 757 Recovery and Resilience Action Framework, self-described 
as “a game plan created by and for the 757’s business community to help 
accelerate the region’s economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic.” 
We applaud the private and public discussions on how to not only recover 
from the pandemic’s economic shock, but also how to foster coordination and 
cooperation among the cities and counties in Hampton Roads. If there is one 
lesson of the pandemic, it is that we are all in this together.
A focus on key industries (renewable energy, advanced manufacturing, 
cybersecurity, health services) is important. The question is whether this effort 
will survive as economic growth accelerates and the immediate need for crisis 
response fades. Cynics will note that the dustbin of history in Hampton Roads is 
littered with attempts to improve collaboration among its cities and counties. 
To paraphrase Ronald Reagan, we will trust the region’s leaders to keep 
pushing forward, but will also objectively verify whether their efforts bear fruit 
over time.
One recommendation for enhancing our economic outlook is to encourage 
the region’s high-quality medical institutions to foster the development of an 
“education-medical” center. Hampton Roads is fortunate to be home to Eastern 
Virginia Medical School (EVMS) and several institutions of higher education. 
EVMS and Old Dominion University bring in approximately $100 million in 
federally funded research annually; to put this in context, that’s about 10% of 
the federal research funding awarded to Johns Hopkins University each year. 
Merely wishing that we could double or triple our federal research funds will 
bear no fruit. We must realize that an education-medical complex is only 
possible if all the major players agree to set aside their parochial interests and 
come together. This effort will be a heavy lift, but in its favor is the fact that 
Sentara Healthcare brings financial resources and know-how to the table to 
complement the capabilities of EVMS and ODU. We believe that an education-
medical center built around Sentara-EVMS-ODU and other higher education 
institutions is not only necessary, but also central to the region’s growth.
We need only look north to Richmond to see how the battle 
over the merger of Medical College of Virginia and Richmond 
Professional Institute to form Virginia Commonwealth 
University (VCU) played out. There was such opposition to 
this merger that the General Assembly stipulated the Medical 
College of Virginia would retain its name in perpetuity. 
Today, VCU is the Richmond area’s only Level 1 trauma center. 
Newsweek recently ranked VCU third best among all Virginia 
hospitals and in the Top 100 of all U.S. hospitals.
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VCU’s efforts in creating an education-medical center are 
illustrated in its ability to attract research funding. VCU 
reached $310 million in sponsored research funding in FY 
2019, of which $90 million came from the National Institutes 
of Health. Building an education-medical center in Hampton 
Roads will not take place overnight, but, unlike other gambles 
to spur growth, it is more likely to lead to higher-paying jobs 
and economic expansion in the long term.
Another recommendation (which has been made before but is worth repeating) 
is to consolidate public services across the cities and counties of Hampton 
Roads. How many library systems, fire departments, and police and sheriff 
departments are necessary for a region of 1.7 million people? Each local 
system requires an administrative support structure. As Parkinson’s law notes, 
“work expands so as to fill the time available for its completion,” and the 
numerous, duplicative administrative structures in our region are no exception. 
If a trip to the General Assembly is needed to obtain the appropriate legal 
authorities, taxpayers would surely be supportive of such an effort to lower 
costs and increase efficiency.
None of these proposals is easy. If they were, they would already be 
undertaken. They will require time, consensus and concerted effort. In 2020, 
the COVID-19 pandemic spurred many discussions and calls for action. Now, 
as we approach 2022, we must avoid the sense that we have done enough, 
that we have endured, and that is sufficient. Benjamin E. Mays, who is credited 
with laying the intellectual foundations of the civil rights movement in this 
country, aptly observed: “The tragedy of life is often not in our failure, but 
rather in our complacency; not in our doing too much, but rather in our doing 
too little; not in our living above our ability, but rather in our living below our 
capacities.”
Now is the time for Hampton Roads to strive to do too much, rather than too 
little. Yes, there is a chance we may fail, but if we do not resolve to be bold, 
our only success will be measured by the degree of our timidity.

Bounce Back?
The Pandemic and 
Tourism in Hampton Roads
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BOUNCE BACK? THE PANDEMIC AND 
TOURISM IN HAMPTON ROADS
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the 
epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of light, it was the season of darkness, it was the 
spring of hope, it was the winter of despair.
– Charles Dickens, “A Tale of Two Cities”
O
ver the last 24 months, the Hampton Roads tourism industry has set several records. In 2019, traditional hoteliers reported a record $892 million in 
revenue. Monthly Airbnb revenue in the region reached $17 million in August 2019. Tens of thousands of visitors flocked to events such as Something 
in the Water, the Virginia International Tattoo and the North American Sand Soccer Championships, among others. Occupancy, revenue and revenue 
per available room (RevPAR) were all on the rise in early 2020, and a sense of optimism infused the industry.
Within months, more records were set, although these records were not ones to 
be announced with fanfare. Monthly hotel revenue in Hampton Roads declined 
by an astonishing 76.6%, from $78.1 million in April 2019 to $18.3 million 
in April 2020. In Williamsburg, monthly hotel revenue disappeared almost 
completely. Williamsburg hotels generated $18.1 million in revenue in April 
2019, but a year later, revenue fell precipitously to $846,743, a collapse 
of 95.3%. Reported occupancy rates fell below 40% in many of the region’s 
cities, domestic and international travel plummeted to record lows and layoffs 
rocketed upward. Optimism, unlike hotel rooms, was in short supply.
Now, in the second half of 2021, we find ourselves in a markedly different 
environment. Heightened consumer and business expectations have increased 
interest in domestic travel and tourism. Hotels in Hampton Roads have fared 
well in this recovery compared to the nation. While hotel revenue in the 
region for June 2021 was 10% higher compared to the same month in 2019, 
nationally, hotel revenue was down by 12%. The region’s tourism recovery has 
been relatively strong and thus far sustained. 
As with other sectors of the regional economy, the COVID-19 pandemic 
continues to linger over prospects for an even more robust recovery. The rise 
in infections, hospitalizations and deaths among the unvaccinated compared 
to the fully vaccinated underscores the question of whether employers should 
require vaccinations for employees working in the tourism sector. Difficulties 
in attracting and retaining talent will also likely persist in the coming months, 
and it is unknown whether international workers will return in large numbers 
in 2022. Yet, even with these headwinds, prospects for the coming year 
are continuing to improve barring another virulent COVID-19 variant or 
unexpected economic shock.
In this chapter, we explore the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the 
Hampton Roads tourism industry. We delve into how traditional hoteliers 
were affected and compare their performance with that of short-term renters 
(Airbnb, VRBO and others). While the pace of recovery has not been uniform, 
hotels and short-term rentals outperformed the overall economy in Hampton 
Roads in the first half of 2021.
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Years To Remember: 
2019 And 2020
2019 and 2020 were years for the history books when it comes to the 
Hampton Roads tourism industry, albeit for dramatically different reasons. 
In 2019, hotel revenue set a new record. It was the year that saw the debut 
of Something in the Water, a music festival that garnered national attention, 
and a period when a number of traditional hotels continued to move upscale. 
Conversely, 2020 was a year many in the hotel industry would like to forget, 
marked by record declines in revenue, occupancy and staffing.
Graph 1 presents the shares of each of the Hampton Roads hotel markets in 
2019. Virginia Beach claimed the greatest share of hotel revenue (38.3%), 
followed by Williamsburg (19.2%). The other markets each comprised roughly 
14% of the regional market.
Graph 2 displays nominal and real (inflation-adjusted) hotel revenue for 
Hampton Roads from 2000 to 2020. Nominal hotel revenue had climbed from 
the post-Great Recession low of $658 million in 2013 to $892 million in 2019. 
In 2020, nominal and real revenues both fell by more than 33%. The level of 
nominal revenue reverted to a level not seen since 2002, while real revenue 
declined to a point not observed this century. 
While the declines in hotel revenue, rooms rented and revenue per available 
room (RevPAR) were broad-based in Hampton Roads, Virginia and the United 
States, most of the markets in our region fared better than the state or nation 
in 2020. Hotel revenue declined by almost half in the Commonwealth and the 
U.S., but most markets in Hampton Roads observed declines of 30% or less 
(Graph 3). Exceptions were the Norfolk-Portsmouth market, where revenue 
declined by 32.7%, and the Williamsburg market, where it dropped an 
astounding 64%.
The annual data mask the collapse of hotel revenue in Williamsburg during 
the depths of the pandemic’s economic shock. In August 2019, monthly hotel 
revenue peaked at $21.5 million (Graph 4). With the onset of the pandemic, 
monthly revenue declined to $7.5 million (February 2020), $4.7 million 
(March 2020) and $846,423 (April 2020). In the span of only three months, 
hotel revenue in the Williamsburg market declined 88.8%. While revenue has 
increased from the low of April 2020, it remains well below 2019 levels. In 
June 2021, monthly hotel revenue reached $17.7 million. While this was a 
514% increase from June 2020, it hides the fact that June 2021 revenue was 
6% lower than in June 2019.
Why did many of the markets in Hampton Roads fare relatively better in 2020 
than Virginia and the United States, and why did Williamsburg fare significantly 
worse? In the case of Williamsburg, the number of hotel rooms rented fell by 
more than 50% and, in some months, occupancy rates dropped below 20% 
(Graph 5). The declines in revenue occurred primarily because hoteliers had 
to lower prices in the face of slumping demand; higher-end hotels were more 
severely impacted. Compared to other markets, the Hampton Roads hotel 
industry relies more on leisure and transient guests and is not as dependent on 
large events, such as conventions, conferences, concerts and the like. 
RevPAR is a key measure of performance in the hotel industry, 
as it represents both the demand (revenue) and supply 
(available rooms) sides of the market. As shown in Graph 6, 
RevPAR declined by almost 35% from 2019 to 2020 in Hampton 
Roads. It must be pointed out that the actual decline in RevPAR 
was likely higher, since some hotels either significantly reduced 
the supply of rooms or closed temporarily during the depths 
of the pandemic. In any case, in 2020, Hampton Roads hotels 
earned about a third less than they did in 2019. 
We would be remiss if we did not point out the large and 
negative influence of the Williamsburg market on this 
measure. RevPAR in Williamsburg declined an astonishing 
60.6% from 2019 to 2020. Simply put, the COVID-19 pandemic 
had a devastating impact on the city’s hotel industry. Major 
attractions, like Busch Gardens and Water Country USA, 
were closed due to the pandemic. With Colonial Williamsburg 
already experiencing a downturn in visits prior to the 
pandemic, this latest economic shock is likely to reverberate 
throughout Hampton Roads for years to come.
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GRAPH 1
ESTIMATED SHARES OF HOTEL ROOM REVENUE: 
HAMPTON ROADS, 2019




Estimated Shares of Hotel Room Revenue: 
Hampton Roads, 201  
 
Sources: STR Trend Report, January 2021, and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University  
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GRAPH 2
NOMINAL AND REAL HOTEL REVENUE: 
HAMPTON ROADS, 2000-2020




Nominal and Real Hotel Revenue: 
Hampton oads, 0 0-2020 
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GRAPH 3
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN HOTEL REVENUE IN SELECTED MARKETS: 
HAMPTON ROADS, VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES, 2019-2020
Sources: STR Trend Report, January 2021, and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. The Williamsburg market includes Williamsburg and James City County.
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GRAPH 3 
Percentage Change in Hotel Revenue in Selected Markets: 
Hampton Roads, Virginia and the United States, 2019-2020 
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GRAPH 4
NOMINAL MONTHLY HOTEL REVENUE: 
WILLIAMSBURG MARKET, JANUARY 2019-JUNE 2021
Sources: STR Trend Report, January 2021; STR monthly reports; and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. The Williamsburg market includes Williamsburg and James City County.
 
GRAPH 4  
Nominal Monthly Hotel Revenue: 
Williamsburg arket, January 2019-June 2021 
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GRAPH 5
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN HOTEL ROOMS RENTED IN SELECTED MARKETS: 
HAMPTON ROADS, VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES, 2019-2020
Sources: STR Trend Report, January 2021, and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. The Williamsburg market includes Williamsburg and James City County.
 
GRAPH 5 
Percentage Change in Hotel Rooms Rented in Selected Markets: 
Hampton Roads, Virginia and the United States, 2019-2020 
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GRAPH 6
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN REVENUE PER AVAILABLE ROOM IN SELECTED MARKETS: 
HAMPTON ROADS, VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES, 2019-2020
Sources: STR Trend Report, January 2021, and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. The Williamsburg market includes Williamsburg and James City County.
GRAPH 6  
Percentage Change in Revenue Per Available Room in Selected Markets: 
Hampton Roads, Virginia and the United States, 2019-2020   
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2021: A Recovery Coming 
Into Sight
Hoteliers in Hampton Roads fared better (mostly) than their counterparts 
elsewhere in the United States and experienced a more robust recovery 
through early summer 2021. Graph 7 highlights the percentage change in 
monthly hotel revenue for selected months from 2019 to 2021. We chose 2019 
as the basis of comparison, as the shock in 2020 would bias our conclusions 
about the recovery progress. While hotel revenue was still 33% below 2019 
levels in June 2021 among the nation’s top 25 hotel markets, monthly revenue 
was up 10% in Hampton Roads compared to the same month in 2019.
By the summer of 2021, conditions had improved markedly at the local level 
in Hampton Roads. Graph 8 displays the percentage change in RevPAR for the 
region’s markets. While RevPAR through June 2021 was down by more than 
30% for the United States and Virginia, it was down by only 2.1% for Hampton 
Roads. The Williamsburg market was starting to rebound but still down 15.3% 
when compared to 2019, Newport News-Hampton was down by 12.2% and 
Norfolk-Portsmouth was down by nearly 10%. On the other hand, RevPAR in 
the Virginia Beach market was 7.3% higher than for the same time period in 
2019. In the Chesapeake-Suffolk market, RevPAR increased by 5% through 
June 2021. 
The Hampton Roads hotel industry recovered faster from the 
COVID-19 pandemic than almost any other market in the 
United States. While regional economic performance lagged 
that of Virginia and the nation in the first half of 2021, the 
regional hotel industry proved markedly resilient in most 
Hampton Roads cities. This recovery is even more striking 
considering the numerous reports of staffing challenges in the 
industry.
The rapid recovery in the Virginia Beach and Chesapeake-
Suffolk markets bodes well for Hampton Roads. Most of 
the other markets in the region should fully recover by the 
summer of 2022 (if not earlier). The obvious concern is the 
Williamsburg market. The overall performance of this market 
may have more to do with structural issues within Colonial 
Williamsburg than recovery from the COVID-19 economic 
shock. If so, Williamsburg may face a longer recovery period 
than the rest of Hampton Roads.
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GRAPH 7
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN MONTHLY HOTEL REVENUE: 
HAMPTON ROADS, TOP 25 MARKETS AND ALL OTHER MARKETS, 2019-2021
Sources: STR monthly trend reports and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University
GRAPH 7  
Percentage Change in Monthly Hotel Revenue:  
Hampton Roads, op 25 Markets and All Other Markets, 2019-2021 
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GRAPH 8
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN REVENUE PER AVAILABLE ROOM IN SELECTED MARKETS: 
HAMPTON ROADS, VIRGINIA AND THE UNITED STATES, YTD JUNE 2019-YTD JUNE 2021
Sources: STR monthly trend reports and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. The Williamsburg market includes Williamsburg and James City County.
 
GRAPH 8  
Percentage Change in Revenue Per Available Room in Selected Markets: 
Hampton Roads, Virginia and the United States, YTD June 2019-YTD June 2021 
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Airbnb Navigates Its Way 
Through The Pandemic
The rise of Airbnb from its humble beginnings is a remarkable story. Starting in 
2008 with the rental of an air mattress in San Francisco, Airbnb has become 
one of the largest (if not the largest) short-term rental companies in terms of 
listings, funding and name recognition. It continues to expand its business 
model, offering “experiences” (hosted tours) and an increasing number of 
connections to travel websites. To track Airbnb business in Hampton Roads, 
we use data from AirDNA (a private company not associated with Airbnb) to 
examine listings, revenue and occupancy of Airbnb-hosted properties.1
Graph 9 illustrates the meteoric rise of Airbnb in Hampton Roads. In October 
2014, the first month for which data are available, monthly Airbnb revenue in 
the region was approximately $61,000. By July 2016, peak monthly revenue 
reached $2.16 million. In October 2018, peak monthly revenue had jumped 
to $13 million, and another monthly record was set in July 2019, with monthly 
revenue of $16.7 million. Airbnb revenue in July 2020 set yet another record, 
coinciding with the “reopening” of the regional economy.
Graph 10 presents the shares of each of the markets in Hampton Roads for 
2019. Virginia Beach dominated Airbnb listings and revenue in the region, 
accounting for 66.1% of revenue in 2019. Williamsburg (14.6%) and Norfolk-
Portsmouth (12.3%) were the next largest markets in the region. Newport 
News-Hampton (5%) and Chesapeake-Suffolk (2%) had relatively few Airbnb 
listings and low revenue in 2019.
Virginia Beach, accounting for approximately 6 of every 10 dollars in 2019 
Airbnb revenue, has been the focal point of short-term rentals in Hampton 
Roads. Graph 11 provides insight into monthly Airbnb revenue from 
Virginia Beach listings, January 2019 to May 2021. Revenues in 2020 were 
approximately $8.1 million less than in 2019. However, these losses were not 
spread evenly throughout the year. Revenue for the peak vacation months (May 
through September) was essentially the same – $36.9 million in 2019 and 
1   Airbnb does not provide open access to its data. We rely on data from AirDNA, which tracks the performance 
of listings and predicts whether or not properties are booked. For more information, see www.airdna.co/
methodology.
$35.8 million in 2020. Off-peak revenue, however, was lower, and this trend 
continued into 2021. Comparing the first five months of the year for Airbnb in 
Virginia Beach, revenue was $23.7 million, $17.4 million and $10.5 million in 
2019, 2020 and 2021, respectively. If there is a modicum of good news, it is 
that the percentage decline in revenue relative to 2019 steadily decreased by 
the spring of 2021.
While the COVID-19 economic shock to the traditional hotel 
industry in Hampton Roads led to double-digit declines in 
occupancy, revenue and RevPAR, the impact on the short-term 
rental industry was decidedly less pronounced. Annual Airbnb 
revenue in the region fell from $100.3 million in 2019 to $92.9 
million in 2020. This 7.4% decline paled in comparison to the 
35.2% decline in hotel revenue across the region. 
Airbnb experienced a rough start in 2021, however. Monthly 
revenue for January was down approximately 50% when 
compared to 2019. The short-term rental market has 
recovered, but not as quickly as that for traditional hotels in 
the region. By May 2021, monthly Airbnb revenue was only 
20% lower than for the same month in 2019. If all goes well, 
the short-term rental industry should be back on track by the 
spring of 2022.
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GRAPH 9
AIRBNB REVENUE IN HAMPTON ROADS, 
OCTOBER 2014-MAY 2021
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GRAPH 10
ESTIMATED SHARES OF AIRBNB REVENUE: 
HAMPTON ROADS, 2019
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GRAPH 11
AIRBNB REVENUE: 
VIRGINIA BEACH, JANUARY 2019-MAY 2021
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Risk, Comfort And Airbnb
Recent research suggests that tourists’ risk perceptions increased significantly 
during the pandemic. Tourists, hotel staff and short-term hosts all expressed 
concern about the possibility of contracting the coronavirus. It should have 
been no surprise when hotels and short-term rental companies announced new 
cleaning protocols and other measures to mitigate the risk of transmission.2 
These measures, however, imposed additional costs at the same time 
reservations and revenue were under significant pressure. Short-term rental 
hosts noted that, unlike traditional hoteliers, they were unlikely to qualify for 
government aid, and some short-term hosts left the industry.3 As listings and 
revenues declined worldwide, Airbnb laid off 1,900 of its 7,500 employees.4 
Yet, in Hampton Roads, the percentage decline in Airbnb revenue for 2020 
was markedly less than that experienced by the traditional hotel sector. 
What factors might explain why Airbnb outperformed its more established 
competitors in our region as well as other areas of the country?
One possible explanation is that, unlike traditional hotels, Airbnb listings 
offered more opportunities for social distancing. Also, over time, the trend in 
Airbnb listings has shifted toward multiroom, entire-place properties. Airbnb 
no longer should be thought of primarily in terms of empty nesters renting 
spare rooms in the back of the house. Despite the decline in revenue last year, 
the Hampton Roads share of Airbnb revenue originating from entire-place 
properties increased from 90.5% in 2019 to 92.8% in 2020. During the 
pandemic, if someone was going to travel, they were likely more comfortable 
in having an entire property to themselves than staying in a traditional hotel.
Another explanation for Airbnb’s relative success is that Hampton Roads likely 
benefited from the near shutdown of international travel and the significant 
reduction in domestic tourism. Instead of traveling to other parts of the country 
or internationally, those who did take vacations found themselves traveling to 
their “backyard.” Strong defense spending in the region also may have helped 
offset some of the losses from domestic and international tourism.
2   https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/JTF-02-2020-0014/full/html.
3   https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0278431920302152#bib0250.
4   https://news.airbnb.com/a-message-from-co-founder-and-ceo-brian-chesky/.
Yet another factor to be considered is that Airbnb supply is sensitive to market 
conditions. Unlike traditional hoteliers, Airbnb property owners can bring 
their properties on market (or take them off market) with little notice. During 
the pandemic, highly desirable properties that commanded a premium were 
more likely to remain listed, while less-desirable properties that may have been 
listed previously for large events fell by the wayside. Knowing this, higher-end 
property owners may have been able to command a premium for their rentals 
during the pandemic, unlike hoteliers, who had to reduce room rates in the 
face of slumping demand.
Final Thoughts
The tourism industry is one of the three pillars of the Hampton Roads economy. 
As evidenced by the shock to the hotel industry, COVID-19 clearly was 
responsible for fewer people visiting and spending money in our region. The 
leisure and hospitality sector accounted for the largest number of layoffs in 
Hampton Roads in 2020, and while demand has increased in 2021, some 
of the region’s markets still face an uphill climb. Inoculations have contributed 
to a measure of economic resurgence, but overcoming vaccine hesitancy and 
resistance among the unvaccinated adult population is key to a sustained 
recovery. 
Surprisingly, amid the pandemic, Airbnb properties fared relatively well in 
Hampton Roads. Explanations abound as to why Airbnb revenues did not 
decline as much as those in the traditional hotel sector, or at the same pace 
seen in other U.S. metropolitan areas. Perhaps the simplest explanation is best: 
Airbnb listings in Hampton Roads offered a respite to those traveling during 
the pandemic. Whether these properties were safer than traditional hotels 
is a matter of debate. What cannot be debated is the performance of these 
short-term rental properties in 2020. Now, with the traditional hotel sector on 
the rebound, the question is whether the short-term rental sector will lag as 
vaccinations increase and consumer confidence grows. Time will tell.

Earn While You Learn: 
The Apprentice School at 
Newport News Shipbuilding
THE STATE OF THE REGION  |  HAMPTON ROADS 202164
EARN WHILE YOU LEARN: THE APPRENTICE SCHOOL 
AT NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING
Young people learn through observation, imitation, trial and error, and reiteration; in other words, through force of 
experience. Though professionalism and care are expected, perfection is not. Adult mentors hold the discipline for the 
apprentice, sequencing and controlling task demands to keep them on the constructive side of difficulty. They direct 
apprentices’ attention, demonstrate and sometimes collaborate. 
– Robert Halpern, “The Means to Grow Up: Reinventing Apprenticeship as a 
Developmental Support in Adolescence”
P
ublications like Forbes and The Wall Street Journal increasingly highlight a conundrum facing companies and the education system in the United States. 
Firms are complaining that they have plenty of job openings, but the education system is failing to train students in the skills needed to fill them. Hampton 
Roads, like other regions, suffers from this “skill mismatch” – the divergence between the skills students are taught and employers’ needs in the job 
market. According to a recent report,1 firms in Hampton Roads are struggling to find entry-level and middle-skill employees in key growth sectors, such 
as advanced manufacturing. Other positions that are difficult to fill locally include trades, such as technician, mechatronics/repair technician, welder, shipbuilder, 
pipefitter and machinist, along with warehouse and packing personnel. These jobs are not only high paying, but also critical to the economic vitality of the region.
Several recent presidential administrations have pushed to solve this 
problem by increasing the number of apprenticeships. An age-old practice, 
apprenticeships allow individuals to earn a paycheck while receiving 
supervised training and work-based learning in conjunction with academic 
instruction. Indeed, apprentices are both student-employees and employee-
students. The apprenticeship model has been a mainstream route to career 
success in many European countries; however, it has struggled to gain a 
foothold in the United States.1 
There is a lot to like about apprenticeships. They provide 
benefits to both employers and workers. Workers experience 
a smoother transition from school to career, compared to most 
school-based preparation. Furthermore, apprenticeships can 
1   “Hampton Roads Talent Alignment Strategy Initiative: Supply and Demand Gap Analysis,” (2019), commis-
sioned by the Hampton Roads Community Foundation in partnership with the Hampton Roads Workforce 
Council.
provide a lucrative path to meaningful work for those who 
complete them. The average starting salary for an apprentice 
who completes a program in this country is $72,000, which is 
35% higher than the median wage in Hampton Roads. Also, 
apprentices tend not to struggle with student loan debt, unlike 
many traditional college graduates. For the apprentice, earning 
an income while learning an occupational skill confers a sense of pride and 
identity, along with the confidence in knowing their investment and effort will 
pay off. Employers benefit by gaining loyal, skilled employees. According to 
the U.S. Department of Labor, employers retain 92% of employees who have 
completed an apprenticeship.  
As it turns out, Hampton Roads is home to the gold standard for the 
apprenticeship model in this country: Newport News Shipbuilding’s (NNS) 
Apprentice School. Founded in 1919, The Apprentice School has trained more 
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than 10,000 apprentices and evolved into a full-service academic institution. In 
2020, the State Council of Higher Education for Virginia granted approval for 
The Apprentice School to award academic degrees, and the school now offers 
associate degrees in several applied sciences disciplines. Today, over 700 
apprentices are enrolled. They spend two days a week in academic classes, 
with their remaining time in on-the-job training, learning leadership skills and 
a trade such as electrician or machinist. Apprentices earn while they learn, 
making almost $18 per hour when they start and up to $30 per hour by the 
completion of their program. The $18 hourly wage is $6 per hour higher than 
the median hourly wage in Hampton Roads. Further, they receive a myriad of 
other benefits, including health and life insurance, a 401(k) savings plan and 
paid leave. In this chapter, we look at the apprenticeship model and delve 
into the unique aspects of the NNS Apprentice School that have made it so 
successful.
The Apprenticeship Model 
A BRIEF LOOK AT APPRENTICESHIPS THROUGH HISTORY
The master-apprentice relationship dates back to the 18th century B.C. in Egypt 
and Babylon. Nearly 4,000 years ago, these ancient civilizations understood 
the need for skilled craftsmen and codified rules that required artisans 
to teach their skills to the next generation. Over the course of the Roman 
Empire, craftsmen went from primarily being slaves to forming independent 
professional organizations, or “collegia,” such as the trade guilds “collegia 
opificum.” 
Craft guilds would become a hallmark of medieval Europe. The guild system, 
made up of masters, journeymen and apprentices, oversaw production quality 
and working conditions for each trade group in a town. Similar to modern-day 
apprenticeships, they involved a collaborative relationship between a skilled 
adult and a younger pupil. Apprentices developed skills through imitation and 
guided experimentation under the watchful eyes of a mentor. As Bert De Munck 
and Hugo Soly put it in a 2007 book they co-edited with Steven L. Kaplan, 
apprentices “learned on the shop room floor.”2 Apprentices would often train 
for up to seven years before graduating to journeymen and travel between 
towns to learn and teach new techniques. 
Scholars point to the apprenticeship system as an important impetus to 
Europe’s rise in the Industrial Revolution. When this system worked well, it led 
to the transfer of information and knowledge. It resulted in innovation through 
thoughtful and well-trained artisans who advanced the frontiers of knowledge. 
Historians have attributed major advances in European craft production – in 
areas as diverse as shipbuilding, textiles, lens grinding, metalworking, printing, 
mining, clockmaking, millwrighting, carpentry, ceramics and painting, among 
others – to the apprenticeship system.3 European settlers also leveraged the 
apprenticeship system in Colonial America. In fact, several of our Founding 
Fathers, including George Washington (surveyor), Benjamin Franklin (printer) 
and Paul Revere (silversmith), trained as apprentices.
Despite having similar roots, the apprenticeship system that flourished in 
several European countries, including Austria, Switzerland and Germany, 
floundered in the United States. There are many reasons why. After World 
War II, the U.S. became obsessed with the idea that college was the primary 
pathway to the middle class and upward mobility. Furthermore, there was 
a strong desire to avoid creating curricula that grouped students based on 
perceived ability, IQ or achievement levels – known as “tracking” in education. 
There were also political complications that involved class, culture and unions. 
In contrast, after the fascist uprising following World War I, some European 
countries saw the need to connect their education system to the economy in 
order to ensure employment, especially for young men. To accomplish this, 
these countries introduced apprenticeships, job training and other programs.
THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS
Apprenticeship programs around the world today are as diverse as the 
countries that have them. In fact, in some European nations, they offer a 
mainstream route to career success. In Germany, Austria and Switzerland, 
2   Bert De Munck and Hugo Soly, “Learning on the Shop Floor in Historical Perspective,” in Learning on the Shop 
Floor: Historical Perspectives on Apprenticeship, Steven L. Kaplan, Bert De Munck and Hugo Soly, eds. (New 
York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 3-32. 
3   David de la Croix, Matthias Doepke and Joel Mokyr, “Clans, Guilds, and Markets: Apprenticeship Institutions 
and Growth in the Preindustrial Economy,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics (2018), 133(1), 1-70.
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50% to 70% of young people filter through the apprenticeship system. The 
apprenticeship models in these countries are often viewed as the gold standard 
for vocational learning. 
For instance, many have praised the German system for the country’s 
low youth unemployment rate; ability to maintain a vibrant, high-quality 
manufacturing sector; and role in helping it weather economic downturns. In 
Germany, the system that regulates vocational training emerged formally in 
1969. However, its historical roots run deep. Over the years, arrangements 
between unions and management have reinforced the system through strict 
certification standards. The certifications cover more than 300 occupations 
that range from blue-collar trades to an increasing collection of white-collar 
professions, such as information technology and engineering. Young people 
start taking either the apprenticeship or academic track as early as fourth 
grade. The track ultimately chosen is based on discussions among the school, 
child and parents, and takes into consideration grades, abilities and aptitude. 
Upon completion of compulsory schooling, apprentices spend three to four 
days a week devoted to workplace learning and the remainder of the week 
in government-funded schools for academic learning. This model creates a 
smooth transition from school to work, one of the German system’s major 
benefits. In 2017, apprentices accounted for 52.9% of students in Germany’s 
dual-track education system. A total of 427,227 companies participated, 
amounting to 20% of all German employers. 
Apprenticeships in the United States look more like a patchwork quilt of 
state and federal policies compared to the highly regulated model that is 
integrated into the fabric of the German education system. Both the Obama 
and Trump administrations tried to bolster apprenticeships, albeit in different 
ways. For instance, in 2014, President Obama hosted the first-ever White 
House Summit on American Apprenticeships and set a goal of doubling the 
number of apprentices over five years. To accomplish this, the administration 
made $175 million in federal public-private partnership grants available to 
“increase apprenticeships in high-growth fields; align apprenticeships with 
further learning and career advancement opportunities; and take successful 
apprenticeship models to scale.”4 In contrast, President Trump signed a 2019 
4   https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2014/07/14/first-ever-white-house-summit-american-
apprenticeship-helping-american-workers-punch.
executive order creating a new “industry-recognized” apprenticeship program 
outside of the Department of Labor. Groups such as trade associations, 
educational institutions, nonprofits or labor unions could become the entities 
that set the training and curriculum standards relevant to their industry. Despite 
this renewed interest, neither policy appears to have moved the needle on 
apprenticeships. 
With the oscillating policies of the last two administrations, how have 
apprenticeships fared? Graph 1 includes data from the Department of 
Labor on the number of new apprentices starting each year, while Graph 
2 displays the percentage of new apprentices for a cohort’s entrance 
into the workforce. The trajectory was clearly positive over 
the last decade. The total number of new student workers 
entering apprenticeships grew by 129% from 2010 to 2019. 
Furthermore, apprenticeships made up 5.7% of the average 
20-24-age cohort, up from 2.6% a decade earlier. Despite 
the growth in the number of new apprentices, the number of 
active programs has fluctuated and was lower in 2019 than a 
decade earlier (Graph 3). 
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GRAPH 1
NEW APPRENTICES: UNITED STATES, 2008-2019
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GRAPH 2
PERCENT OF A COHORT IN APPRENTICESHIPS: UNITED STATES, 2008-2019
Sources: Department of Labor and U.S. Census Bureau 
Note: Apprenticeship data are from the Labor Department and age breakdowns are from the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey. In particular, according to the American Community Survey 5-year estimates, the number of 
20-24-year-olds stood at 22,015,108 in 2019, or an average for each age of 4,403,021 people. Dividing the number of people entering apprenticeship programs in 2019 (252,271) by 4,403,021 equals about 5.7%. This approximates 
the size of a typical cohort entering the apprenticeship system. 
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GRAPH 3
ACTIVE APPRENTICESHIP PROGRAMS: UNITED STATES, 2008-2019
Source: Department of Labor
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A Closer Look At The 
Newport News Shipbuilding 
Apprentice School
In 2019, The Apprentice School at Newport News Shipbuilding (NNS) 
celebrated its 100th birthday. Since its inception, it has employed, educated 
and trained more than 10,000 tradespeople and evolved from a small trade 
school with three faculty members into a full-service academic institution 
housed in an 85,000-square-foot cutting-edge facility. It also serves as part of 
NNS’s “leadership factory,” with 14 alumni rising to the vice president level. 
William R. “Pat” Phillips Jr., a 1954 pipe designer graduate, became the 14th 
president of NNS in 1992, the first Apprentice School graduate who became 
CEO and president of Newport News Shipbuilding. He retired in 1995, after 
46 years with NNS.
As we delve deeper into The Apprentice School, we will look at several features 
that make it unique. But first, we start with a general overview, highlighting 
some distinctive features before moving on to the school’s culture and its vision 
for the future.
OVERVIEW OF THE APPRENTICE SCHOOL
Similar to many higher education institutions, The Apprentice School offers 
athletics (six varsity teams in baseball, men’s and women’s basketball, football, 
golf and wrestling) and various student organizations as a complement to 
its academic instruction in the classroom. Recruiting takes place over a wide 
geographic area at both high schools and career fairs. 
Peeling back the layers reveals several unique features in how the school 
operates. First, starting cohorts are small, typically around 25 to 
30 students each quarter. The number of apprentices ebbs and 
flows over time since enrollment depends on the employment 
needs at NNS. Graph 4 gives a broad picture of enrollment and retention 
over the last decade. The total number enrolled has hovered around 800 
annually. The number of terminations, an average of 80 per year, indicates 
that advancing through the program isn’t a cakewalk. Math is the most 
significant barrier to success on the academic side. Terminations due to math 
course failures, however, have been falling in recent years, owing to math 
remediation efforts and the introduction of night school. 
Second, the small cohort sizes also highlight another unique 
feature – small classes and close relationships with faculty. 
Graph 5 shows the breakdown of faculty and staff in 2019. The Apprentice 
School has 71 craft and 15 academic instructors, creating a close-knit learning 
environment. The academic instructors all have graduate degrees in their field, 
while the craft instructors are all Apprentice School graduates themselves. 
Third, admission to The Apprentice School is competitive – as 
competitive as the most elite Ivy League schools. The school 
receives upwards of 4,000 applications each year. Over the 
last decade, the largest number of new students to enroll each 
year was 330, while the low was 86, yielding acceptance rates 
between 2% and 8%. The varsity athletic teams account for around 55 of 
the open spots each year. To be considered for admission to The Apprentice 
School, applicants must be 18 or older and have a high school education. The 
admission process focuses on students with a hybrid of success in math and 
science courses as well as hands-on technical training experience. This tends 
to winnow down the applicant pool. Nonetheless, applicants with promise who 
are not admitted to The Apprentice School are encouraged to apply with NNS 
for general employment. 
Similar to many community college student bodies, the average age of 
apprentices, 25, is older than that of typical undergraduates. This is due to 
many students entering the school after becoming unsatisfied with their early 
career trajectory. Graph 6 shows the student body makeup by race and 
gender. The Apprentice School student body reflects the demographics of many 
apprenticeship programs – primarily male (81%) and white (64%). However, 
those within the school note their continued efforts to diversify the student body. 
In 2020, 51 of the 767 (6.6%) students enrolled in The Apprentice School were 
veterans. Some even started out in the Navy on the waters near NNS and 
transitioned to school after separating from the military. 
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GRAPH 4
APPRENTICE SCHOOL ENROLLMENT AND RETENTION, 2010-2020
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GRAPH 5
FACULTY AND STAFF AT THE APPRENTICE SCHOOL, 2019
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GRAPH 6
RACE AND GENDER OF STUDENTS ENROLLED AT THE APPRENTICE SCHOOL, 2017-2020
Source: The Apprentice School
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Fourth, The Apprentice School seamlessly ties theory to practice 
and practice to theory. As a part of the school’s World Class Shipbuilder 
Curriculum (WCSC), students spend two days per week in the classroom, 
ultimately receiving approximately 1,000 hours of academic instruction 
(comparable to the requirements of many associate degree programs). This is 
coupled with 7,000 hours of hands-on training in various trades. As of April 
2019, apprentices earn a Maritime Studies Certificate for completing the 
WCSC. Table 1 displays the academic portion of the training. Cynthia Lear, 
WCSC manager, highlights the practical applications of the classroom material 
and how it differs from that offered in traditional higher education: 
“If you took a college geometry or trigonometry course you would 
be doing proofs, where ours is applied to what they are going to be 
seeing in the shipyard environment. So we make that relevant. A lot of 
our students are hands-on, so they need to know the relevancy of what 
they are learning in the classroom . . . when we start to look at and 
introduce mechanics and do statics and we look at forces on cranes, 
things they are going to see in the shipyard. This helps solidify the 
content in the apprentice’s mind.
“In the Technical Mathematics II course, they are actually finding, for 
instance, volumes and surface areas of spherical tanks, which are 
shapes they would see in the shipyard. They may look at flow rates to 
see how long it takes to drain the tank or fill the tank using a certain-
size pipe.”
Table 2 shows the range of trade disciplines offered at The Apprentice 
School. There are 19 shipbuilding disciplines with on-the-job training and 
mentoring. Apprentices who excel in the WCSC have the opportunity to pursue 
one of nine advanced fields. The advanced disciplines range from supply 
chain management apprentice to nuclear test technician. These disciplines 
couple on-the-job training with academic coursework in partnership with 
local higher education institutions. Apprentices can take classes at Thomas 
Nelson Community College toward an associate degree and at Old Dominion 
University for a bachelor’s degree in either engineering or modeling and 
simulation.
TABLE 1
WORLD-CLASS SHIPBUILDER CURRICULUM 
AT THE APPRENTICE SCHOOL
Academic Terms
Subject 1 2 3 4
Technical Mathematics Technical Mathematics I (3) Technical Mathematics II (3)
Drafting, Engineering and Design Drafting (3) Mechanics (3)
Marine Engineering and 
Naval Architecture
Ship Construction I (2) Ship Construction II (3)
Physical Science Physical Science I (3) Physical Science II (4)
Technical Communications Technical Communications I (3) Safestart (2)
Business Processes Introduction to Computers (3)
Business Operations and 
Leadership (3)
Problem Solving (4)
Source: The Apprentice School 
Note: Credit hours are in parentheses.
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TABLE 2
TRADE DISCIPLINES AT THE APPRENTICE SCHOOL
Shipbuilding Disciplines
Coatings Specialist Electrician Heating and Air Conditioning Worker Heavy Metal Fabricator
Insulator Machinist Maintenance Electrician Maintenance Pipefitter
Millwright Molder Non-Destructive Tester Outside Machinist
Patternmaker Pipefitter Rigger Sheet Metal Worker
Shipfitter Welder Welding Equipment Repair
Advanced Disciplines
Advanced Shipyard Operations Cost Estimator Metrology Technician Marine Designer
Modeling and Simulation Nuclear Test Technician Production Planner Marine Engineer
Supply Chain Management
Source: The Apprentice School
APPRENTICE CULTURE 
“What’s different here?” trade instructor and 1988 Apprentice 
School graduate Stan Best asked rhetorically during a 
discussion about The Apprentice School. “We have 100 years 
of history. We get to stand on [many] shoulders, and it is really 
our job not to ruin it.” Latitia McCane, who came to The Apprentice 
School in 2018 as director of education after holding several community 
college leadership positions, also pointed to the importance of the school’s 
values in its overall success. Best and McCane are both referring to the culture 
and mindset that permeate the school. It’s a mindset of asking, “How I can 
help you?” – and one that values collaboration over competition, while also 
improving the bottom line.
School traditions transcend the age of the institution. One of them, says 
McCane, has to do with legacy. There are generations of families that send 
their children to train and learn there. It is not unheard of to have three 
generations of Apprentice School alumni working at NNS all at the same time. 
With that kind of legacy, one can easily see how loyalty runs deep. 
This culture seems to be the driving force in the instructor-apprentice 
relationship. David Blunt, shipfitter craft instructor and 2008 graduate, 
commented, “My apprenticeship experience caused me to mature faster, put 
me in positions outside of my comfort zone and challenged me to make the 
best decisions possible. I have created lifelong bonds with other employees at 
The Apprentice School and throughout NNS who took me under their wing 
and showed me a multitude of ways to be successful while meeting customer 
demands.”5
Trade instructor Jacob Johnston, welder/non-destructive test inspector/craft 
instructor, class of 2006, notes: “Being a craft instructor allows me to train and 
pass on my knowledge to apprentices in Welding School and trade theory 
courses. The role also allows me to watch them grow as individuals and 
become successful in their trade and with the company. By developing trade 
and leadership skills in apprentices, we demonstrate our commitment to the 
company while continuing to help the school grow.”6 
According to James Adkins, a Frontline FAST electrician apprentice, 
apprentices experience the benefits of collaboration firsthand – a departure 
5  From the 2016 Apprentice School Annual Report.
6  From the 2016 Apprentice School Annual Report.
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from the survival-of-the fittest-style competition endemic in higher education. 
“Apprentices often collaborate through the sharing of ideas and previous 
experiences while working together on jobs,” he said. “This promotes growth 
among apprentices and helps the company save money by reducing man-
hours spent on rework and downtime. This same collaboration helps to 
increase the quality of our product delivered to the U.S. Navy.”7
Retaining graduates is one of the key ways the culture 
cultivated at The Apprentice School helps the bottom line. 
Apprentices are compensated for their work in the trades as 
well as their time in the classroom. However, they do not have 
an obligation to stay with NNS after graduation. Nevertheless, 
80% of Apprentice School graduates remain with the company 
for at least 10 years. 
INNOVATION AND THE FUTURE OF THE APPRENTICE SCHOOL
Despite The Apprentice School’s long history and prominence at NNS, it is 
not resting on its laurels. Instead, it is pushing forward on several initiatives to 
help keep its future bright. For instance, the school has recently made strides 
in virtual delivery. The COVID-19 pandemic served to accelerate a process 
underway to bring academic training online. Furthermore, through two 
different grants, the school created a virtual technical training lab, dubbed the 
Innovation Room, for welding, machine tool technology and other disciplines. 
The aim is to take the Innovation Room to career fairs and give prospective 
students a hands-on feel for the apprentice training experience.
Since receiving approval last year to grant academic degrees, 
the school will soon be awarding Associate of Applied 
Science degrees in maritime technology in 26 disciplines, 
including maintenance electrician, marine designer, nuclear 
test technician, and modeling and simulation program 
analyst. Granting academic degrees is a significant move 
for the school as an educational institution and enhances its 
national reputation as a model apprenticeship program.
7  From the 2016 Apprentice School Annual Report.
Historically, The Apprentice School offered a hybrid program. Approximately 
20% of apprentices qualified to earn an associate degree from Thomas 
Nelson Community College. Some of these students then transitioned to ODU 
to complete studies for a bachelor’s degree in engineering or modeling and 
simulation. However, the remaining 80% of the apprentices struggled to 
move into leadership positions that require at least an associate degree. The 
Apprentice School’s recent authorization to award associate degrees as a part 
of its curriculum provides an avenue for upward mobility, as graduates embark 
on their careers.
Xavier Beale, Newport News Shipbuilding’s vice president of 
trades, puts it best: “Our ability to offer academic degrees 
deepens our commitment to workforce development and will 
open new opportunities for our company to help to meet the 
ever-growing demand for skilled workers in our region.”8
While the move to confer academic degrees pushes The Apprentice School 
further down the educational pipeline, it is also reaching back with its pre-
apprenticeship program. The idea underpinning this program is to provide 
mentoring, math enrichment and an introduction to soft job skills, like 
leadership, while also exposing students to the craft trades. The program 
started in fall 2019 with 11 students at the New Horizons Career and Technical 
Education Center. Of the 11 students in the program, seven went on to The 
Apprentice School, three took jobs at NNS (a division of Huntington Ingalls 
Industries) due to insufficient math skills, and one student opted to enroll at a 
traditional four-year college.
After the pilot program’s success at New Horizons, The Apprentice School 
is expanding its pre-apprenticeship program to more schools. It’s part of 
a broader effort to build a pipeline of talent for skilled-trade jobs, and the 
program is open to high school students whether or not they plan to go on 
to The Apprentice School. The long-term goal is admirable: take 
students starting ninth grade and let them finish the academic 
portion of the WCSC while in high school, then follow up with 
on-the-job craft training, and ultimately award an associate 
degree. 
8   https://newsroom.huntingtoningalls.com/releases/photo-release-the-apprentice-school-at-newport-news-
shipbuilding-approved-as-an-institution-of-higher-education.
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The Apprentice School at NNS holds a unique place at the intersection 
of higher education and the workplace. The school often touts how it is 
“accelerating the time to talent” for its students. For example, Apprentice 
School alumni are helping spearhead the shipyard’s transition to high-tech 
initiatives, like integrated digital shipbuilding. Furthermore, many graduates 
are quickly moving up the ranks to become foremen. This is particularly 
important because the shipyard, flush with both young employees and 
longtime workers, has developed a gap in the middle of the workforce 
pipeline. Despite its many successes, however, The Apprentice School still faces 
challenges in some areas. For example, it has struggled to recruit and train 
women. However, the school is taking steps to change this. With the help of 
a U.S. Department of Labor grant, The Apprentice School is partnering with 
education, research, business and advocacy groups to come up with practical 
tools to increase enrollment among minorities and women. The school also 
plans to use its pre-apprenticeship program to engage females early in the 
trades. 
Summing Up 
The Apprentice School clearly operates at a high level, which prompts us to 
ask: What lessons can we learn from its success? Can its model be replicated 
and scaled? In light of these questions, we provide some final thoughts on 
expanding apprenticeship opportunities in Hampton Roads.
The Apprentice School provides a local “proof of concept” that 
apprenticeship programs can work well, especially if there is 
a strong relationship with an employer. When a program is done 
right, it yields a host of benefits to both employers and employees. However, 
sometimes the net benefits are difficult to quantify. Newport News Shipbuilding 
strongly believes in the efficacy of The Apprentice School, despite not having 
a rigorous, formal cost-benefit evaluation process in place. A recent report 
by researchers at Case Western Reserve University and the U.S. Department 
of Commerce provides some insight as to why they are so confident. The 
researchers looked carefully at several employer-led apprenticeship programs, 
including health care system Dartmouth-Hitchcock and manufacturing firm 
Siemens USA, and found an internal rate of return of an astoundingly high 
40% to 50%.9 
The Apprentice School’s track record spans a century. It has 
survived the test of time because of its ability to adapt and 
evolve. This is both a promising and cautionary tale for others. Both policy 
makers and firms should develop apprenticeship programs that are nimble and 
can adjust to a changing economic environment. 
Apprenticeships, especially those in the trades, can help 
address workforce gaps by supplying young employees. The 
Apprentice Institute at Tidewater Community College is a useful step forward 
for Hampton Roads. Linking apprenticeship programs with high schools also 
holds significant promise, but would require regional collaboration regarding 
workforce needs. Further, there are promising opportunities as well outside the 
trades, as the service sector continues to grow. For example, Hampton Roads’ 
medical institutions could establish an apprenticeship program for health care 
workers. 
Unfortunately, expanding apprenticeship opportunities likely won’t come easy. 
As the saying goes, “Culture eats strategy (and policy) for breakfast.” At the 
firm level, The Apprentice School has a 100-year legacy and a culture that 
has evolved and strengthened over time. Huntington Ingalls’ sister shipyard in 
Pascagoula, Mississippi, which also has an apprenticeship program, would 
love to have the same level of success. 
The broader culture around apprenticeships can also act as a stumbling block 
to both future applicants and firms. There is a perception that apprenticeships 
are only for the trades. Parents often view apprenticeship programs as a less-
desired option for their children, when compared to a college education, and 
are unaware that many such programs provide a pathway to a baccalaureate 
degree. Meanwhile, inexperienced firms are wary of taking on the regulatory 
burden of registering an apprenticeship program. Finding ways to change 
some of these cultural attitudes is crucial to expanding apprenticeships in the 
region. We believe making such an effort is worthwhile.
9   Susan Helper, Ryan Noonan, Jessica R. Nicholson and David Langdon, “The Benefits and Costs of 
Apprenticeships: A Business Perspective,” U.S. Department of Commerce (2016), https://files.eric.ed.gov/
fulltext/ED572260.pdf.
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ALL IN: CASINOS, ONLINE BETTING AND THE FUTURE OF 
GAMBLING IN HAMPTON ROADS
You’ve got to know when to hold ’em 
Know when to fold ’em 
Know when to walk away 
And know when to run
– From “The Gambler,” as sung by Kenny Rogers
G
ambling is not new to the Commonwealth of Virginia. In 1612, the Virginia Company of London held a lottery to fund ships bound for the Jamestown 
Colony. After King William III and Queen Mary II of England signed the royal charter in 1693 to establish what is now known as the College of 
William & Mary, lottery funds helped fuel construction of the campus. Not only were lotteries a means of funding public infrastructure projects in the 
Colonies, they also were used to purchase supplies for Continental Army soldiers in the field during the Revolutionary War.1 Over the next 200 years, 
the popularity and legality of lotteries and other forms of gambling in Virginia waxed and waned until the passage of a public referendum to create the Virginia 
Lottery in 1987. For a state that once cast a suspicious eye on gambling, Virginia is now all in on gambling.
With the sale of the first scratch ticket in September 1998, the Virginia Lottery 
marked an inflection point in public attitudes and policies about gambling 
in the Commonwealth. Now, Hampton Roads residents can play the lottery 
in person or online, place bets with online sportsbooks such as FanDuel, 
DraftKings and BetMGM, and play historical horse racing machines in 
Hampton. Soon to enter this increasingly competitive arena of gambling will be 
the Rivers Casino Portsmouth (late 2022) and HeadWaters Resort & Casino in 
Norfolk (2023).1 
When it comes to gambling, it’s all about winners and losers. Success, whether 
in the lottery or at a gaming establishment, is often celebrated in the media, 
while gambling losses and costs to society are rarely mentioned. In January 
2021, a Newport News resident won a record-breaking $914,000 jackpot 
at Rosie’s Gaming Emporium in Hampton.2 In March 2021, a Virginia Beach 
1   Charles T. Clotfelter and Philip J. Cook, Selling Hope: State Lotteries in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1989), p. 20.
2   https://www.wavy.com/news/local-news/hampton/newport-news-man-hits-914k-record-breaking-jackpot-
at-rosies-in-hampton/.
woman won $1 million playing the Virginia Lottery.3 In April 2021, a local 
shipyard worker walked away with $2 million following a Powerball lottery 
drawing.4 We learned about these lucky individuals from TV and newspaper 
stories.
One is much harder pressed, however, to hear and read stories 
about local residents who lose money gambling, who suffer 
from gambling addiction or who were victims of crime due to 
increased gambling activities. The same holds true for stories 
about the associated costs of gambling to city and county 
budgets. As President John F. Kennedy once told a reporter, 
“Victory has a hundred fathers and defeat is an orphan.”
3   https://www.13newsnow.com/article/news/lottery/i-cant-stop-smiling-virginia-beach-woman-wins-1-million-
in-virginia-lottery/291-3e3078e4-3a6e-40d1-b78d-bd0318f88c89.
4   https://www.wavy.com/news/local-shipyard-electrician-wins-2-million-in-powerball-
drawing/#:~:text=Local%20shipyard%20electrician%20wins%20%242%20million%20in%20Powerball%2-
0drawing,-News&text=SUFFOLK%2C%20Va. 
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While Norfolk and Portsmouth are likely to benefit from the construction and 
operation of the new casinos, the overall impact of this bet on the Virginia 
Beach-Norfolk-Newport News metropolitan statistical area (Hampton Roads) is 
likely to be small. Why? As residents begin to frequent these casinos, they will, 
in effect, be moving their money from one form of entertainment to another in 
the region. In other words, instead of spending their hard-earned dollars at 
bars, restaurants and movie theaters, consumers will be “voting with their feet” 
and spending some of their money at these new venues.
We estimate that the Norfolk and Portsmouth casinos will 
lift regional gross domestic product (GDP) between $100 
million and $400 million annually. This expected impact 
equates roughly to 0.1% to 0.3% of regional GDP. However, 
the casinos will also shift spending within the two cities and 
across the region, as consumers decide to spend some of their 
entertainment dollars at these gaming establishments instead 
of other entertainment, hospitality and leisure businesses in 
the region. We applaud the fact that these developments are 
not receiving direct public subsidies, a departure from some 
previous projects in the region and the Commonwealth. Finally, 
we note that if competition proves fiercer than expected or 
patrons tire of casino gaming at some point, our estimates 
likely represent an optimistic economic outcome. Given the 
unfulfilled promise of casinos in many communities, it is 
perhaps best to enter this discussion with clear eyes, even if 
we hope with full hearts for a resounding success.
In this chapter, we examine the evolution of gambling in the United States 
and Virginia, and the future of gambling in Hampton Roads. We estimate the 
impact of the Norfolk and Portsmouth casinos and discuss how displacement 
may alter the projected economic effects of these new venues. We also look 
at the social costs of gambling and pay particular attention to gambling 
addiction. We conclude with some thoughts on whether betting on gambling 
will spur innovation and growth in the region.
Gambling In The United 
States: From The Rat Pack 
To Your Phone
If the only constant is change, then the state of gambling in the United States 
embodies this saying. In the 1960s, Frank Sinatra, Dean Martin, Sammy 
Davis Jr., Peter Lawford and Joey Bishop, collectively known as the “Rat Pack,” 
helped transform the image of Las Vegas, Nevada, from a place to gamble to 
a highly popular entertainment destination where one could not only legally 
gamble in a casino, but also enjoy shows and concerts. In the United States, 
casino gambling was legal only in Nevada until New Jersey voters approved 
casino gambling for Atlantic City in 1974. While sports track betting was also 
legal in a number of states, most communities were relatively distant from an 
establishment where one could place a legal bet.
To say that times have changed would be an understatement. Since the 1970s, 
attitudes and policies toward gambling have shifted dramatically. Forty-five 
states and the District of Columbia now operate state lotteries. In 2018, the 
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection 
Act of 1992, which effectively granted Nevada a monopoly on legal sports 
betting, was unconstitutional. A number of states, including Virginia, rapidly 
moved to create the legal and regulatory frameworks necessary for residents 
to place sports bets via computer or their phone. By 2019, 18 states had land-
based commercial casinos and another six states were operating riverboat 
casinos (which, curiously, rarely venture beyond their designated pier).
Americans’ views on gambling as a morally acceptable activity have continued 
to shift over the last two decades. In the most recent Gallup survey of American 
moral values, 68% of respondents replied that gambling was “morally 
acceptable.”5 This represents an 8% increase from when the question was first 
asked in 2003. Drinking alcohol, smoking marijuana and gambling were all 
viewed as morally acceptable by at least 7 in 10 respondents to the 2020 
survey. The push for more legalized forms of gambling is not only driven by 
states and localities in search of revenue, but also by citizens’ preferences.
5   Gallup (2021), “Moral Issues,” available at: https://news.gallup.com/poll/1681/moral-issues.aspx.
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When one hears the word “gambling,” thoughts of casinos and horse tracks 
may come to mind. The commercial casino, with its blackjack tables, roulette 
wheels and slot-style machines, has occupied a place in the American 
consciousness for decades. However, the number of commercial casinos in 
operation has waxed and waned over the last decade. As illustrated in Graph 
1, the number peaked at 524 in 2016, before falling sharply the following 
year. The number of casinos in operation in 2020 was roughly equivalent to 
the level seen in 2007.
The COVID-19 pandemic and associated restrictions on economic and social 
activity negatively affected the financial performance of commercial casinos. 
Casino revenues declined in 2020 to approximately $30 billion, a level 
not seen since 2003. For the first quarter of 2021, the American Gaming 
Association (AGA) reported that casino revenues were $11.1 billion, a 17.7% 
increase compared to the same quarter in 2020.6 With an increasing number 
of Americans vaccinated and demand for leisure and hospitality services on 
the rise, we are likely to observe a sharp rebound in casino revenues in 2021. 
Whether these revenues can be sustained in the face of increasing competition 
for gambling dollars remains to be seen.
State and local lotteries have grown considerably over the last three decades. 
In the late 1970s, state and local lottery revenues amounted to less than $1 
billion. By 2019, revenues approached $29 billion.7 Growth in some states, 
however, slowed (if not declined outright) as consumer fatigue set in and 
competition in other sources of gambling intensified over the last decade. 
In Virginia, the launch of the mobile lottery and larger jackpots lifted lottery 
revenues to $1.43 billion and profits to $350 million (a record) in just the 
second half of 2020.8
Competition is likely to only increase for casinos and lotteries in the coming 
years. Since the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Nevada’s legal monopoly 
on sports betting in 2018, this particular form of gambling is now offered in 
21 states and the District of Columbia and is legal, but not yet operational, 
6   AGA Commercial Gaming Revenue Tracker, https://www.americangaming.org/resources/aga-commercial-
gaming-revenue-tracker/.
7   Statista, state and local lottery revenue in the United States from 1977 to 2019, https://www.statista.com/
statistics/249128/us-state-and-local-lottery-revenue/
8   https://richmond.com/news/state-and-regional/govt-and-politics/big-jackpots-online-gambling-lift-virginia-
lottery-revenue-37-in-late-2020/article_98743ed5-de36-567a-90e6-22b7fd4033d8.html.
in another 10 states.9 Intrastate mobile sports betting had been implemented 
or authorized, at the time of this writing, in 14 states and the District of 
Columbia. While some states require in-person registration for mobile betting, 
this requirement appears to limit revenue growth and is likely to fall by the 
wayside. In 2018, total sports betting revenue in the United 
States amounted to $430.7 million. In 2019, it more than 
doubled, jumping to $908.9 million. Sports betting revenue is 
forecast to reach $2.5 billion in 2021 and could hit $8 billion 
by 2025.10 Every dollar wagered by phone or computer is one 
less dollar that could have been spent on a lottery ticket or 
gambled in a casino.
9   https://www.actionnetwork.com/news/legal-sports-betting-united-states-projections. The state data are 
current as of August 2021.
10   S. Lock (2021), “Forecast revenue from sports betting in the U.S. 2021-2025,” at: https://www.statista.com/
statistics/1117369/sports-betting-revenue-forecast-us.
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GRAPH 1
NUMBER OF COMMERCIAL CASINOS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2005-2020
Source: Statista (2021)  
GRAPH 1 
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Virginia Rolls The Dice
For decades, the attractiveness of casinos for some Virginia stakeholders 
has been the lure of additional tax revenue without having to levy new taxes 
or increase existing tax rates, the creation of new jobs and the addition of 
new venues to attract more visitors (and their dollars) to the Commonwealth. 
Legalizing casinos in Virginia could also stem the flow of Virginians to other 
states in search of gambling opportunities. It is, as the rapper Puff Daddy sang 
in 1997, “all about the Benjamins.”
Over the last five years, there has been a rapid shift in public policy toward 
gambling in Virginia. In 2015, legal gambling consisted primarily of the 
Virginia Lottery, historical horse racing and games associated with charitable 
giving. By 2021, Virginians could gamble via online lotteries, wager bets 
with mobile sportsbooks, visit expanded historical horse racing sites and 
look forward to frequenting commercial casinos in the near future.11 Table 
1 provides descriptions of the types of gambling that are currently legal in 
Virginia.
One might argue that the demarcation line for this change in public policy 
was drawn in March 2019 when Gov. Ralph Northam signed Senate Bill 
1126, establishing a broad framework for expanding commercial casinos and 
authorizing casino gaming to be regulated by the Virginia Lottery Board. The 
bill included a reenactment clause, which meant it would need to be passed 
again for it to take effect. The clause directed the Joint Legislative Audit and 
Review Commission (JLARC) to conduct a review of gaming laws in other 
states and approximate what would occur in Virginia if casino gambling were 
authorized in the Commonwealth. The findings from JLARC’s report prompted 
the re-signing of the bill in 2020.
11   Games of skill were legal for a short period but were effectively banned on July 1, 2021.
The bill authorized casinos in five cities – Bristol, Danville, 
Norfolk, Portsmouth and Richmond – but only if citizens 
approved the casinos. Residents in Bristol (71.1%), 
Danville (68.7%), Norfolk (65.1%) and Portsmouth (66.8%) 
resoundingly voted in favor of having a commercial casino in 
their cities. Richmond has scheduled a vote on its proposed 
casino for November 2021.12
In 2019, Richmond was among five cities in the 
Commonwealth authorized to build and operate a casino. 
Unlike the other four cities that debuted their casino 
proposals during the November 2020 general election, 
Richmond decided to postpone its referendum until 
November 2021. Council members whittled six proposals 
to two and then selected the One Casino + Resort in 
May 2021. The developers have said that the proposed 
casino will create more than 1,000 jobs, with salaries of 
over $50,000 annually. With five casinos being built in 
the Commonwealth, assuming the Richmond referendum 
passes, one must question whether all of them can survive 
in the long run. Opponents argue that the casinos will 
likely increase problem gambling and primarily attract 
lower-income customers, serving in essence as a regressive 
form of taxation. While voters will determine the fate 
of the proposed Richmond casino in the fall, given the 
success of the other four casino referenda, it is likely the 
Richmond referendum will also be approved. For Norfolk 
and Portsmouth, this would mean another competitor, just 
90 minutes up the road.
12   “Richmond city postpones casino application and calls for citizen input in 2021” (December 2020), https://
www.rva.gov/sites/default/files/2020-12/Casino%20RFQ%20RFP%20-%20Final.pdf; “Pamunkey Indian 
Tribe out of Richmond casino race following city rejection” (March 2021), https://www.wric.com/news/
local-news/richmond/pamunkey-indian-tribe-out-of-richmond-casino-race-following-city-rejection/
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TABLE 1
GAMBLING BY TYPE IN VIRGINIA, 2021
Type Definition
Casino gaming Table games (such as craps, roulette, baccarat, poker, etc.) and wagering played with cards and electronic gaming 
devices where players wager money. Video lottery machines (slot machines) have become one of the most popular 
forms of gambling in casinos.
Charitable gaming Bingo, charity game tickets, raffles and charity fundraising permitted by the Office of Charitable and Regulatory 
Programs throughout Virginia. There were 37 charitable gaming permits operating in Hampton Roads as of March 
2021.*
Fantasy sports betting Players create a fantasy sports team and compete against other teams to win money. Virginia introduced legal fantasy 
sports betting regulation in 2016. 
Games of skill Games of skill are slot-like machines that appeared in restaurants, bars and convenience stores. The outcome of these 
games is determined by a player’s mental or physical skills rather than by chance. These machines operated in a “grey 
area” of the law until they were banned in 2020 but were then granted a reprieve in return for tax collections. Skill 
games were banned again on July 1, 2021.
Historical horse racing machines Electronic gambling system that allows players to bet on the outcome of horse races that have already been run. These 
machines appear very similar to a traditional slot machine. Users can select their horse “winners” with each wager or 
use an auto cap feature for random horse selection. 
Live horse race betting Individuals place in-person bets on the outcome of a live horse race.
Lottery (scratchers, state lottery) Prize drawings where entrants pay for a chance to win a large jackpot or instant prizes by scratch “reveal” tickets
Online horse race betting Individuals place bets on live horse races via an online website or a smartphone app from the comfort of their own 
home.
Sports betting Placing bets on a particular outcome or winner of a domestic or international sports event (including straight, total line, 
money line, parlay and teaser bets)
Sweepstakes sites A contest in which participants enter for a chance to win a range of prizes (from houses to cars to money), and winners 
are drawn at random 
Source: Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University  
Note: *Online Directory of Bingo Sessions in Virginia, https://www.vdacs.virginia.gov/pdf/bingo_events.pdf
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The Rise Of Mobile Betting
When Virginia launched, it was our most successful 
launch to date, with more users on the first weekend 
than any state before it.
– Kevin Hennessy, FanDuel Director of Publicity13
The bet on casinos by Bristol, Danville, Norfolk and Portsmouth (and, we 
expect, Richmond after the November election) is being made at a time when 
the gambling industry is experiencing a period of profound change. Two 
decades ago, the thought of sitting on your couch and placing real-time bets 
on whether the next football pass will be completed, a basketball game beats 
the over/under or an MMA boxer lands more punches than an opponent in 
a particular round was just a glimmer in the eyes of entrepreneurs. Today, 
not only does this technology exist, but also consumers are embracing it 
enthusiastically. While the number of casinos remains relatively stable and 
lottery revenue growth has slowed, sports betting revenue nationally is 
projected to increase from $2.5 billion in 2021 to $8 billion in 2025.
Virginia legalized sports betting in April 2020 with the passage of Senate 
Bill 384, which allows for up to 12 online sports-betting providers in the 
Commonwealth.14 Table 2 lists the online and mobile sportsbook applications 
that have already launched or will launch in Virginia. FanDuel was the first, 
followed quickly by DraftKings, BetRivers, BetMGM and William Hill. Currently, 
nine providers are either operating or have been approved to operate a 
mobile sportsbook in the state. Physical sportsbook locations are anticipated 
to open in spring 2022. JLARC estimates that the mobile sports-betting market 
will generate between $22 million and $55 million annually in tax revenue for 
the Commonwealth.
13   https://www.13newsnow.com/article/news/local/mycity/norfolk/virginia-leading-the-way-for-popular-
sports-betting-platform-fanduel/291-888e7fff-3a1a-4433-8c6c-0920e4951d89.
14   https://www.americangaming.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/AGAGamingRegulatoryFactSheet_
Virginia-2021.pdf.
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PointsBet TBD TBD TBD
bet365 TBD Hard Rock Bristol
Source: Sports Handle, https://sportshandle.com/virginia/, updated as of Aug. 30, 2021
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Games Of Skill Or 
Games Of Chance?
While Virginia was debating whether to approve commercial casinos, gaming 
machines began appearing in restaurants, bars, convenience stores and truck 
stops throughout the state. These machines  – actually, electronic, computerized 
terminals – were  played by inserting money in hopes of winning a cash prize. 
On the outside, there appeared to be no fundamental difference between a 
virtual slot machine and these games; however, operators argued that these 
machines required skill, rather than chance, to win. 
The distinction between skill and chance is important from a legal perspective. 
If the outcome of a game is determined by the player’s ability, then it is not 
a random event. A popular game of skill mimics the Simon memory game, 
whereby a player must remember color combinations of increasing complexity. 
Another version requires a player to identify patterns among nine different 
pictures, much like a pictorial tic-tac-toe game, but with time limits and “wild 
cards.” These games of skill differ considerably from a slot machine where the 
player’s only input is a bet and the push of a button to start the gamble.
HB 881 defines a skill game as an “electronic, computerized, 
or mechanical contrivance, terminal, machine, or other 
device that requires the insertion of a coin, currency, 
ticket, token, or similar object to operate, activate, or play a 
game, the outcome of which is determined by any element 
of skill of the player and that may deliver or entitle the 
person playing or operating the device to receive cash; cash 
equivalents, gift cards, vouchers, billets, tickets, tokens, or 
electronic credits to be exchanged for cash; merchandise; or 
anything of value whether the payoff is made automatically 
from the device or manually.”
Games of skill occupied what one could consider an ill-defined legal space. 
The machines were not taxed or regulated and, while some were skills-based, 
others appeared to cross the line into games of chance. Virginia planned to 
ban these games in 2020, even though many small-business owners argued 
that the revenue from these machines allowed them to make capital investments 
and expand staff. Dave Willis, a restaurant/bar owner in Norfolk, introduced 
the gaming machines around 2018 when his business was struggling, and that 
decision proved to be invaluable. After adding these games, Willis was able to 
afford a small remodel and increase his employees’ wages. In Virginia Beach, 
a similar story was told by Melody Weekly, owner of Mel’s place, a bar and 
grill. Weekly found that the gaming machines not only provided additional 
revenue, but also contributed to an increase in food and beverage sales. The 
extra money allowed her to upgrade the building and hire more staff.15
As the COVID-19 pandemic rolled across Virginia in spring 2020, however, 
social distancing and restrictions on economic activity threatened to overwhelm 
many of these same businesses. Legislators, fearing a significant downturn 
in state revenues, decided to allow these machines to operate legally in the 
Commonwealth and to use the tax revenues and license fees for COVID-19 
relief, problem gambling and local community support. The tax was $1,200 
15   https://www.pilotonline.com/business/vp-nw-games-of-skill-ban-rally-20200301-
rct4toj7xzcnjgd3ktiy3uke2u-story.html.
A GAMBLER PLAYS A SKILL GAME AT A LOCAL CONVENIENCE STORE IN HAMPTON.
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per machine every month a machine was operated in Virginia, and game 
distributors were subject to the tax. With over 10,000 machines and $198.4 
million in wagers placed in May 2021, the legalization of these machines was 
welcomed by many small-business owners and their patrons (Table 3). The 
Commonwealth collected over $100 million in taxes while the machines were 
legal in Virginia.16
Even though these machines produced a boon for the state and business 
owners, the Commonwealth banned games of skill on July 1, 2021. One 
argument was that these games bring gambling and its associated social 
costs into local neighborhoods, though, curiously, the same argument could 
be made about lotteries and mobile betting. In all likelihood, the primary 
rationale was the fear that these machines competed with lottery sales and  
also posed a threat to the state’s nascent casino industry. A 2019 presentation 
by the Virginia Lottery Board attributed slowing growth in lottery sales to 
the prevalence of gray market machines.17 However, in a December 2020 
presentation to the Virginia House Appropriations Committee, Dan Timberlake, 
director of the Virginia Department of Planning and Budget, noted that gray-
machine revenue had fallen short of expectations. When asked why, he 
replied: “One reason we believe the gray-machine revenue is not what was 
originally forecasted is because people weren’t going into the stores (to play 
them). But what they were doing, to our surprise, is that they were buying 
lottery tickets. The lottery is not seeing the loss of revenue from the fact that the 
gray machines are still out there.”18
If the state reaped revenues from both games of skill and 
lottery sales, it should have been indifferent to where the 
money originates. The short-lived experiment with games of 
skill generated revenue for businesses and the Commonwealth 
and was obviously welcomed by many Virginians. Arguments 
that one form of gambling displaces another should fall 
on deaf ears, as it should not be the responsibility of the 
Commonwealth to choose winners and losers.
16   https://www.fox5dc.com/news/some-va-business-owners-fight-against-ban-on-skill-games
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TABLE 3
MONTHLY REPORT OF SKILL GAME MACHINES IN THE COMMONWEALTH, MAY 2021  
Region Total Wagered Total Awarded In Play Warehoused Total Machines
Region 1 (Roanoke) $20,697,585 $15,240,639 1,065 13 1,078
Region 2 (Lynchburg) $32,046,065 $26,841,343 1,056 47 1,103
Region 3 (Staunton) $10,660,184 $8,177,235 557 8 565
Region 4 (Alexandria) $24,862,133 $19,137,080 994 38 1,032
Region 5 (Fredericksburg) $10,708,016 $7,877,868 542 27 569
Region 6 (Richmond) $40,456,679 $32,056,971 1,666 104 1,770
Region 7 (Hampton) $21,251,730 $17,414,045 922 38 960
Region 8 (Chesapeake) $29,829,243 $22,337,921 1,539 36 1,575
Region 9 (Charlottesville) $7,889,460 $5,936,468 369 11 380
Other* $0 $0 18 1,163 1,181
Grand Total $198,401,095 $155,019,571 8,728 1,485 10,213
Source: https://rga.lis.virginia.gov/Published/2021/RD162/PDF 
*Eighteen machines were improperly reported by the distributors as being warehoused, but according to ABC’s records they were still subject to the monthly tax.
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Bright Lights, Big Gamble? 
Casinos In Hampton Roads
With the legal framework now in place for five casinos to operate throughout 
the Commonwealth, how will the casinos in Hampton Roads fare? They 
will face increasing competition from a variety of sources. First, the rise of 
mobile and online gambling, as well as the existence of established forms 
of gambling (lotteries, historical horse racing), means that the casinos will 
enter an increasingly competitive marketplace. Second, Hampton Roads will 
be the only region in Virginia (for now) with two casinos in relatively close 
proximity. Third, there are a growing number of alternatives for one who wants 
to gamble within 250 miles of Hampton Roads, a fact that poses a challenge 
to casinos attempting to attract new visitors to the region for the purpose of 
gambling (Table 4). These factors may lead to a casino “arms race,” where 
“more casinos are expected to be increasingly dependent on local patrons or 
convenience gamblers to support their operations and will likely use proven 
marketing approaches to attract potential gamblers who live near their 
facilities” (e.g., frequent player incentives, free/discounted dining and drinking 
programs, and entertainment discounts).19
Increasing competition, discounts and reliance on local 
patrons would diminish the economic impact of the casinos 
on Hampton Roads over time. Competitive pressures would 
reduce demand for casino gambling, while incentives 
and discounts would diminish the revenue per patron. An 
increasing reliance on local residents would merely recycle 
spending in the regional economy, diminishing the casinos’ 
contribution. With these proverbial headwinds in mind, we 
turn to the task of estimating the potential economic impact of 
these projects on the region.
19   Julia M. Camp, Carol A. Hartley and Patrick T. Kelly, “The Expansion of Casino Gambling in the United 
States – State Revenues and Public Interest Implications,” Accounting and the Public Interest (2018) 18 (1): 
96, https://doi.org/10.2308/apin-52199.
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TABLE 4
CASINOS AND RACETRACKS/CASINOS WITHIN 250 MILES OF HAMPTON ROADS
Name Location Type Racing Type Gaming Machines Table Games
Horseshoe Casino Baltimore, MD Casino - 2,200 168
Ocean Downs Casino 
and Racetrack
Berlin, MD Horse Track/Casino Harness 900 10
Hollywood Casino at 
Charles Town Races
Charles Town, WV Horse Track/Casino Thoroughbred 1,300 90
Horseshoe Casino Danville, VA Casino (Proposed) - 2,000 75
Dover Downs Hotel & 
Casino
Dover, DE Horse Track/Casino Harness 2,600 58
Rosie's Gaming 
Emporium
Dumfries, VA Gaming Emporium - 150 -
Rosie's Gaming 
Emporium
Hampton, VA Gaming Emporium - 700 -
Live! Casino & Hotel Hanover, MD Hotel and Casino - 4,000 250
Harrington Raceway and 
Casino
Harrington, DE Horse Track/Casino Harness 1,800 51






New Kent, VA Gaming Emporium - 600 -
HeadWaters Resort and 
Casino
Norfolk, VA Casino (Proposed) - 3,000 150
MGM National Harbor Oxon Hill, MD Casino - 2,900 170
Rivers Casino Portsmouth, VA Casino (Proposed) - TBD TBD
Rosie's Gaming 
Emporium
Richmond, VA Gaming Emporium - 700 -
One Casino + Resort Richmond, VA Casino (Proposed) - 1,800 100
Source: Casino City, an independent directory and information service free of any gaming operator’s control, www.casinocity.com 
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HEADWATERS RESORT AND CASINO IN NORFOLK
In September 2019, Norfolk’s City Council initially authorized a land deal 
with the Pamunkey Indian Tribe that included a hotel, restaurants and an 
entertainment venue.20 The proposal would have designated the land as 
sovereign to the Pamunkey, not subject to taxation, and outside the jurisdiction 
of Norfolk. In November 2019, after complaints of a lack of transparency, 
doubts about the benefits of the deal and a signature petition that forced 
the council to schedule public hearings, a new vote was scheduled on the 
proposal. Two months later, Norfolk Mayor Kenny Alexander announced the 
Pamunkey Tribe would go through the Commonwealth of Virginia. This change 
reduced the initial investment plans from approximately $700 million to about 
$500 million, although these estimates continue to evolve. Tennessee billionaire 
and casino-gaming mogul Jon Yarbrough teamed up with Golden Eagle, the 
tribe’s development partner, on the project.
In 2020, the city of Norfolk and the Pamunkey Indian Tribe came to a final 
agreement, and the tribe signed a deal to purchase land to build the casino 
resort. The new deal ensures the land will not become sovereign land and 
Norfolk will receive tax revenue. The tribe has also been confirmed as a 
preferred casino partner and will construct the HeadWaters Resort and Casino 
near Harbor Park, home of the Norfolk Tides minor league baseball team. 
As of May 2021, the HeadWaters Resort and Casino was projected to have 
3,000 slot machines, 150 table games and a sportsbook. Additionally, the 
casino resort will have 300 hotel rooms, live music and entertainment venues, 
bars and restaurants, indoor and outdoor pools, and a spa and fitness center. 
City officials project total annual revenues to be between $415 million and 
$485 million on a stabilized basis, with annual gaming revenues estimated 
to be between $350 million and $400 million. Nongaming revenues, which 
include profits from the hotel, food and beverage, and other amenities, are 
estimated to be between $65 million and $85 million on a stabilized basis. 
Payments to the city of Norfolk in the form of direct payments and taxes are 
20   The Pamunkey were the first Virginia tribe to receive official sanction from the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs 
in July 2015. The reservation is located near the Chesapeake Bay on the north side of the James River, 
approximately 90 miles northwest of downtown Norfolk. It is one of two original reservation lands assigned 
from a treaty with the English colonial government.
projected to be between $26 million and $31 million annually.21 Press releases 
from Capital Results, the firm that handles media relations for the Pamunkey 
Indian Tribe, suggest that the opening could occur as early as 2022.
RIVERS CASINO PORTSMOUTH 
Portsmouth’s road to casino gambling has been much smoother than that of its 
across-the-river neighbor. On Nov. 3, 2020, Portsmouth residents resoundingly 
voted in favor of a casino – a proposal state Sen. Louise Lucas has supported 
for more than 20 years. The hotel-casino, Rivers Casino Portsmouth, will 
be built by Rush Street Gaming, just off Victory Boulevard near Tidewater 
Community College, and eventually grow to include restaurants, a sportsbook 
and other entertainment amenities. “For Portsmouth, this means $16.3 
million in tax generation … [where] $16.3 million is an additional 7% of our 
GDP,” said Robert Moore, director of economic development for the city of 
21   Projections assume stabilized operations in year three of the project, as well as the third year of operation of 
all planned properties in the competitive market, https://www.norfolk.gov/DocumentCenter/View/61651/
Criteria-For-Selection-of-Gaming-Operator.
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Portsmouth. In addition to tax generation, the casino promises to create 1,400 
temporary construction jobs, as well as 1,300 permanent jobs.22
Before work can begin on either the Norfolk or Portsmouth casino, licensing 
must be obtained through the Commonwealth of Virginia, as well as the 
Virginia Lottery Board. Once licenses have been granted, construction can 
begin. Originally, the timeline called for shovels to break ground in November 
2021, with the Portsmouth casino opening scheduled for 2023. More recently, 
however, a spokesperson for the casino said the plans have been pushed 
forward. Construction is currently expected to last 18 to 24 months, with the 
venue opening its doors in late 2022.
22   https://www.krem.com/article/news/local/casinos-are-on-their-way-to-norfolk-portsmouth-heres-when-
theyll-be-completed/291-58cfae8e-aa50-4617-a1ab-728901d33cad.
It’s All Good – Until It Isn’t
We caution that survivorship bias tends to cloud the perceptions of casino 
projects. We often hear of success stories but rarely learn about casinos that 
fail to meet expectations. Presentations to city councils and state governments 
highlight potential jobs and tax revenues, leading one to believe that a 
casino (or most any gambling venture) is a sure bet. Experience has shown 
(repeatedly) that, as the novelty wears off, gambling revenues plateau, if 
not decline outright. Graph 2 illustrates how, after accounting for inflation, 
casino revenues in Detroit declined from a peak in 2006 ($1.65 billion) to a 
prepandemic low in 2019 ($1.41 billion). Locally, we need only point to the 
performance of the Virginia Lottery at the end of the most recent decade, and 
its push to introduce mobile betting as a means of addressing the stagnation in 
sales, to highlight how consumer fatigue can lead to an ever-widening search 
for gambling options to sustain revenues.
For Norfolk and Portsmouth, several questions and concerns arise from the 
public-facing announcements. First, have the cities sufficiently accounted for 
the operation of two casinos in relatively close proximity? Second, the expected 
approval and operation of the Richmond casino likely will limit the gains from 
repatriation by Virginia gamblers to Hampton Roads (the return of gambling 
expenditures from other states to the Commonwealth). Will the cities and state 
government revisit their revenue projections for the Norfolk and Portsmouth 
casinos? Third, the rapid rise in mobile betting may not bode well for more 
traditional, location-based forms of gambling. We ask whether the projections 
account for the disruptive impact of technology on gambling preferences 
and revenue. While we recognize that these questions are not 
likely to win one accolades at city council or General Assembly 
meetings, it is better to ask now rather than face questions in 
the future of why revenue projections have fallen short. 
THE PROPOSED RIVERS CASINO PORTSMOUTH WILL BE BUILT AT I-264 AND VICTORY BOULEVARD, NEXT 
TO TIDEWATER COMMUNITY COLLEGE. IT WILL BE DEVELOPED AND OPERATED BY CHICAGO-BASED RUSH 
STREET GAMING.
THE STATE OF THE REGION  |  HAMPTON ROADS 202194
GRAPH 2
REAL (INFLATION-ADJUSTED) DETROIT CASINO REVENUE, 2000-2019
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Who’s Coming To The 
Casinos In Hampton Roads?
The promise of the casinos in Norfolk and Portsmouth (and elsewhere in the 
Commonwealth) is that these gambling establishments will attract visitors, 
create jobs, increase incomes and contribute to their respective city coffers. 
Yet, there are other impacts to consider, especially when one draws back to the 
regional level. A dollar spent in a casino in Norfolk or Portsmouth is one less 
dollar spent in a restaurant, bar or movie theater in Hampton, Newport News, 
Chesapeake, Suffolk or Virginia Beach. While Norfolk or Portsmouth 
might “win” by attracting more dollars from other cities in 
Hampton Roads, the displacement of spending from other 
forms of entertainment to the casinos means that the economic 
impact of the casinos on the region is likely to be small, not 
transformative. 
To gauge the potential economic impact of the casinos on the Hampton Roads 
economy, we first need to ask from whence the casino patrons will come. The 
more customers that come from outside the region, the greater the potential 
economic impact of the casinos. Much like tourists visiting the Oceanfront who 
“inject” money into the regional economy, nonresidents traveling to Hampton 
Roads to gamble at the casinos will bring “new money” with them, adding to 
the impact of the gambling establishments. 
Graph 3 illustrates JLARC’s 2019 estimates of the percentage of net gaming 
revenue that will derive from spending by out-of-state customers. These 
estimates suggest that the Hampton Roads casinos are unlikely to generate 
a significant amount of revenue from out-of-state visitors. While there is a 
possibility for the repatriation of spending from other states (i.e., Virginians 
gambling in other states returning to gamble in the Commonwealth), the 
proposed casino in Richmond would most likely stand to benefit substantially 
from repatriated spending due to its closer proximity to casinos in Maryland 
and West Virginia.
Who, then, will frequent the casinos in Norfolk and 
Portsmouth? According to JLARC and the consulting firm The 
Innovation Group (TIG), only 4% to 10% of casino revenue 
is generated by customers who live outside the local market 
area (within two hours’ driving distance). Only the Las Vegas 
and Atlantic City markets have sustained higher proportions 
of gaming revenue from out-of-market visits. For Hampton 
Roads, this means that the revenue from out-of-state customers 
would come from North Carolina, rather than states to the 
north, due to the projected casino development in Richmond. 
In other words, because of the geographical limitations of the 
Hampton Roads market and the projected development of 
casinos in Richmond and other areas of the Commonwealth, 
most of the Norfolk and Portsmouth casino patrons will 
come from within our metropolitan area. It would be difficult 
to attract customers from Northern Virginia and Richmond 
to Hampton Roads with a casino in Richmond occupying a 
blocking position. While some might argue that summer 
visitors to the Oceanfront will visit the casinos, this argument 
also recognizes that some spending will be displaced from 
restaurants, bars and other venues to the casinos.
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GRAPH 3
PERCENTAGE OF NET GAMING REVENUE FROM OUT-OF-STATE CUSTOMERS
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A Short Primer On Economic 
Impact Analysis
When considering the economic impact of a policy, economists focus on two 
broad effects: displacement and additionality. Changes in public policy may 
cause economic agents (consumers and businesses) to alter their behavior. The 
question is whether the policy change results in spending that is additional or 
whether it displaces economic activity from one sector to another.
Additionality occurs when a policy change causes economic agents to 
engage in behavior that they would not have taken in absence of the policy. 
Economic agents do not shift expenditures from elsewhere in this case. If a 
new advertising campaign, for example, influences a family from Pennsylvania 
to come to Virginia Beach for a vacation that they otherwise would not have 
taken, then the expenditures associated with the visit and the consequent 
economic activity are additional to the economy.
Displacement, on the other hand, occurs when a policy change causes 
economic agents to shift their behavior such that they reduce spending in one 
area to increase spending in another area. The additional spending as a result 
of the updated policy must be balanced against the reductions in spending 
elsewhere to determine the economic impact. For example, if a consumer shifts 
spending from going to a movie theater instead of a restaurant, the consumer 
is merely “moving” spending from one form of entertainment to another. If one 
fails to make allowances for displacement, the overall economic impact of a 
project will be overstated.
To visualize how the economy reacts to a change in investment or employment, 
imagine a pebble dropped in a puddle. The direct impact on employment, 
sales and employee compensation ripples through the rest of the economy 
like the waves moving outward through the puddle. These ripples represent 
the indirect and induced impacts that come about through the 
interconnectedness of the local economy. 
The indirect impact comes from economic activity at companies frequented 
by casino employees and companies that provide services to the casinos. The 
induced impact comes via additional spending due to increases in income 
generated by companies directly and indirectly affected by casino employment 
or spending. These spillovers create a total economic impact that is larger than 
the direct impact. 
The notion of an economic multiplier summarizes the total economic impact 
of a change in economic activity. If a firm invests $1 million (direct impact) 
that in turn generates $300,000 in indirect economic impacts and $200,000 
in induced economic impacts, then the economic impact multiplier effect is 
($1,000,000 + $300,000 + $200,000) / $1,000,000 = 1.5.
From this perspective, consider the impact of going to the gym. If you usually 
use the elliptical machine but switch to the treadmill for the same amount 
effort and time, the marginal impact on your fitness is negligible. On the other 
hand, if you were only working out two days a week and increase to five days 
a week, there will be a discernable impact on your fitness. Our question is 
whether the casinos attract “new” money or recycle “old” money within the 
region.
Analysts’ estimates of economic impact can often seem 
confusing. We explain below some of the more common 
terms they use:
• Compensation – the total payroll cost of employees, 
including wages, salaries and all benefits.
• Employment – the annual average of full-time, part-time 
and seasonal employment in an industry or region.
• Output – the measure of the total value of goods produced 
in an industry. However, output from one industry utilizes 
output from other industries, so the measure overstates the 
contribution of an industry to GDP.
• Value Added – the total market value of all final goods and 
services produced in a region in a given period of time. Value 
added is the measure of the increase or decrease in GDP.
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Estimating The Economic 
Impact Of Casinos In 
Hampton Roads
To estimate the economic impact of each casino, we use projections of three 
economic inputs: capital investment (buildings, furnishings, equipment and 
so on), direct employment and annual casino revenue (Table 5). Of course, 
our estimates depend on the accuracy of the projections of these economic 
inputs. Given the continued evolution of the scale and scope of the casinos in 
Norfolk and Portsmouth, our estimates should be viewed as informative rather 
than authoritative. For these assumptions, we draw upon JLARC analysis, 
news reports and staff analyses from the cities of Norfolk and Portsmouth. We 
estimate aggregate economic impacts of the casinos on Hampton Roads.23
TABLE 5







Norfolk $500 million $350 million $45 million
Portsmouth $300 million $150 million $20 million
Sources: City of Norfolk (2020), “Staff Report – Impacts of a Casino Hotel on the City of Norfolk”; WAVY.
com (2021), “Portsmouth Casino Developer Commits to Building Hotel, but Won’t Say When”; and the Dragas 
Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University
ESTIMATED IMPACT OF CONSTRUCTION
Unlike some other recent projects in Hampton Roads, the 
construction of the two casinos will not receive any state or 
local government tax incentives or grants. Instead, private 
funds will be used to fund construction. The injection of new capital 
into Hampton Roads for the building of the casinos and associated properties 
will temporarily boost jobs and output in the region. However, one must also 
23   We use IMPLAN from the IMPLAN Group and JOBSEQ from Chmura Economics and Analytics to model the 
economic impacts. The results presented in this chapter were generated using IMPLAN.
recognize that not all the expenditures on these projects will stay in the region. 
Some building supplies, furnishings, machines and services will be sourced 
from outside Hampton Roads, so it would not be appropriate to act as if all 
these expenditures were occurring in the region. We conservatively estimate 
that 40% of capital investment expenditures will occur within Hampton Roads, 
while the remaining spending will take place outside the region. This means 
that of the $800 million in projected capital investments in the two casinos, 
approximately $320 million will be spent within Hampton Roads.
We estimate that construction of the two casinos will temporarily lift 
employment in Hampton Roads by approximately 4,200 jobs and add $291.9 
million to nominal GDP (Table 6). These jobs and increases in GDP are 
transitory; that is, once the construction is complete, the jobs and increases in 
output will largely dissipate. To place these estimates in context, the increase in 
output, if it occurred within one year, would amount to approximately 0.3% of 
Hampton Roads’ 2019 GDP.  
TABLE 6
ECONOMIC IMPACT: PROPOSED INVESTMENTS IN 
CASINOS IN NORFOLK AND PORTSMOUTH
Direct Indirect Induced Total
Employment 2,875 424 908  4,207
Value Added 
(Millions)
$171.0 $42.3 $78.6 $291.9
Compensation 
(Millions)
$166.5 $25.2 $39.1 $230.8
Sources: Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University, and IMPLAN Group. 
Estimates may not sum due to rounding.
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IMPACT OF SUSTAINED OPERATIONS
To estimate the annual economic impact of the fully operational 
casinos, we must first consider the question of displacement. If, 
as noted by JLARC and TIG, the casinos in Norfolk and Portsmouth generate 
about 10% of net gaming revenues from out-of-state customers, and the 
casino in Richmond is approved, then the pool from which the casinos will 
draw will be limited compared to the casinos in Bristol, Danville or Richmond. 
Furthermore, the literature and practice show that casinos tend to draw 
customers predominantly from their local market area. This means that much 
of the revenue generated by the Norfolk and Portsmouth casinos will be the 
result of spending that is reallocated by Hampton Roads residents. While 
one might quibble about the extent of displacement, it will clearly occur, and 
will invariably reduce the overall impact of the casinos on regional economic 
activity.
Graphs 4 and 5 illustrate the projected annual economic impact of spending 
in the Hampton Roads casinos. If one completely ignores displacement and 
assumes (unrealistically) that all spending in the casinos will come from outside 
the region, then the industry output would increase by about $868 million. 
However, since we want to avoid double counting (a flaw in some projections 
of the impacts of casinos), we focus on the impact on regional GDP measured 
by value added, which would be approximately $462.2 million. Completely 
ignoring displacement would lead one to conclude that the casinos would 
create almost 7,300 jobs in Hampton Roads. 
We cannot ignore displacement, of course, and studies that 
shrug displacement effects aside or provide estimates of 
economic impact based on industry output alone should be 
viewed with a healthy dose of skepticism.24 For example, 
if the casinos generated $500 million annually in gambling 
revenue, but 50% of that revenue originated from within 
Hampton Roads, then only the impact of the “new” spending 
24   If displacement occurs, where displacement occurs, and the magnitude of displacement by casinos remain 
a matter of debate in the economics literature. Leven and Phares (1998) estimated that about half of casino 
revenues in Missouri were the result of displacement spending. Siegel and Anders (1999) found that 
casino spending displaced other forms of entertainment spending in 11 Missouri counties. Chhadra (2007) 
estimated that about 30% of Iowa gamblers would have participated in other entertainment activities if 
casinos were not locally available. Wiley and Walker (2009), on the other hand, found a complementary 
effect between casinos and retail property values in the Detroit urban area.
($250 million) should be considered. To do otherwise ignores 
the impact of consumers shifting dollars away from local 
restaurants, bars, movie theaters and other establishments to 
spend on gambling, rooms, and food and drink in the casinos. 
Using value added (the addition to regional GDP) and 
accounting for displacement yields more realistic estimates 
of the casinos’ impact. If 50% of spending is from outside 
the region (an optimistic estimate), the casinos will add $231 
million to regional GDP and create more than 3,600 jobs. 
However, if only 10% of casino patrons are from outside the 
region, the net annual economic impact of the casinos shrinks 
to only $46 million and 730 jobs. 
The fiscal impact of the casinos depends on where one stands. While 
projections vary, the casinos in Norfolk and Portsmouth are expected to 
generate about $350 million and $150 million, respectively, in revenue 
annually. The budgets of Norfolk and Portsmouth will undoubtedly benefit from 
the spending at the casinos. In September 2020, the city of Norfolk projected 
that the Norfolk casino would generate between $24.8 million and $44.5 
million annually.25 A November 2020 release from the city of Portsmouth stated 
that the Portsmouth casino would generate more than $16 million annually.26 
We do not argue that the cities where the casinos are located will benefit from 
increases in tax revenue; however, we need to point out that as displacement 
rises, the revenues of other cities and counties in Hampton Roads may decline 
as consumers shift some of their spending to Norfolk and Portsmouth.
25   https://www.norfolk.gov/DocumentCenter/View/62929/Casino-Hotel-Staff-Report-Final.
26   https://www.accessportsmouthva.com/news-and-press/rush-street-gaming-casino-approved-by-voters-in-
portsmouth-virginia.
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GRAPH 4
ESTIMATED ANNUAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CASINOS ON OUTPUT AND GDP: HAMPTON ROADS, 
NET OF DISPLACEMENT
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GRAPH 5
ESTIMATED ANNUAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CASINOS ON EMPLOYMENT: HAMPTON ROADS,  
NET OF DISPLACEMENT 
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Problem Gambling
According to The Recovery Village Drug and Alcohol Rehab treatment facility, 
an estimated 10 million Americans struggle with gambling addiction in the 
United States. The social costs attributed to gambling vary, depending on the 
type of gambler. Gambling addiction can affect anyone of any age or gender, 
and it impacts not only the individual with the problem but also close family 
and friends. This addiction is more common in adults than in adolescents, but 
the exposure to and participation in gambling at a younger age increases the 
risk of developing a gambling problem later in life. Approximately 1 in 20 
college students are said to exhibit signs of compulsive gambling, a rate that is 
higher than that for the overall adult population.27 Table 7 lists local programs 
that specialize in gambling addiction.
For many people, addiction to gambling isn’t an isolated problem. Individuals 
who are most at risk of developing gambling problems typically have 
preexisting addictions or disorders. A correlational link exists between 
gambling and depression, and one study found suicidal ideation in nearly 
half of its respondents.28 Substance abuse is also prevalent among these 
individuals, with the connection to alcoholism being most common. Although 
little data exist on gambling addiction among adults in Virginia, research 
suggests the estimated percentage of Virginia adults with a gambling problem 
is between 5% and 10%.29 Previous estimates of the general public afflicted 
with a gambling disorder range from approximately 0.5% to 2%. Hampton 
Roads is home to approximately 1.8 million people, so there may be between 
9,000 and 36,000 problem gamblers in the region. Yet, with the advent of the 
mobile lottery, online sportsbooks and games of skill, the argument that casinos 
will be the impetus for problem gambling seems to have lost some steam. 
The challenge for cities and counties in Hampton Roads will likely be meeting 
the rising demand for mental health services due to the increasing range of 
gambling choices available to the public. It may be appropriate to allocate 
more funds to behavioral health services in order to meet this demand.
27   The Recovery Village, Gambling Addiction Facts and Statistics, https://www.therecoveryvillage.com/
process-addiction/compulsive-gambling/related/gambling-statistics/, and the National Center for 
Responsible Gaming, https://www.icrg.org/sites/default/files/oec/pdfs/ncrg_fact_sheet_gambling_
disorders.pdf.
28   https://preventionlane.org/gambling-vulnerable-populations.
29   https://www.virginiamercury.com/2020/02/24/as-virginia-preps-for-casinos-and-sports-betting-experts-
say-state-needs-sharper-focus-on-problem-gambling/
TABLE 7
GAMBLING ADDICTION TREATMENT PROVIDERS: 
HAMPTON ROADS, 2019
Name Location 
Middle Peninsula Northern Neck 
Counseling Center
9228 George Washington 
Memorial Highway 
Gloucester, Virginia 23061
Norfolk Community Services Board
7460 Tidewater Drive 
Norfolk, Virginia 23505
Sentara Norfolk General Hospital 
Gambling Addiction Treatment
600 Gresham Drive 
Norfolk, Virginia 23507
Virginia Beach Mental Health 
Substance Abuse Division
289 Independence Blvd., 
Pembroke 3, Suite 245 
Virginia Beach, Virginia 23462
Hampton Veterans Affairs Medical 
Center/Mental Health SATP
100 Emancipation Drive, Unit 116-A 
Hampton, Virginia 23667
Mental Health Support Services 
Alpha Counseling
2278 Executive Drive 
Hampton, Virginia 23666
Gordon Wellness LLC
610 Thimble Shoals Blvd., Suite 403 
Newport News, Virginia 23606
A. Richards Counseling and 
Psychotherapy
720 Rodman Ave. 
Portsmouth, Virginia 23707
Virginia Beach Department of DHS 
MHSA Div Adult Day Treatment
1045 Lynnhaven Parkway 
Virginia Beach, Virginia 23452
Western Tidewater Community 
Services Board
7025 Harbour View Blvd., Suite 119 
Suffolk, Virginia 23435
Source: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Administration (2019)
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Do Casinos Increase Crime?
Opponents of casinos rely on a straightforward argument: 
Casinos attract people with money to spend, and criminals, 
being profit-maximizing individuals, are quick to offer illicit 
services (drugs and prostitution, for example) or prey on 
those with money (confidence scams, robbery and the like). 
Proponents of casinos argue that the evidence supporting 
the casino-crime hypothesis is overstated. It turns out the 
evidence, depending on how one looks at it, can support either 
perspective.
Since the 1980s, more than 30 peer-reviewed studies have examined the 
influence of commercial casinos on criminal activity and public safety. A 
2019 review of these studies found that some of them concluded criminal 
activity increased after casinos opened; other studies reported that some 
crimes increased and some decreased (a mixed effect); and still others saw 
no statistical evidence to support the hypothesis that casinos influence criminal 
activity (Table 8). Yet, as with academic studies, one must read past the 
abstract to discern the nuance of the findings.
TABLE 8






Increase in crime 4 13%
Mixed effect (increases 
and decreases in crime)
9 28%
No impact on crime 19 59%
Source: Jay Albanese (2019), “Casino gambling impacts on crime and public safety: A review of 30 years of 
research,” International Journal of Criminal Justice Sciences 14 (2), 320-338
First, the demographics of casino patrons indicate that they are less likely to 
be involved in crimes typically measured by these studies. Crime statistics show 
that, on average, younger individuals are more likely to perpetrate and be 
victims of crime than older individuals, especially street crimes. Casinos attract 
an older and higher-income clientele, who are more likely to go out less often, 
go home earlier and visit less desirable places than younger people. Casino 
patrons who are in their 40s and 50s are likely to behave much differently 
than theme park, bar and beach visitors in their 20s and 30s.
Second, revenue from casinos may fund the growth of public safety services, 
which, in turn, uncover more criminal activity. Most studies fail to account 
for the level and composition of public safety resources prior to and after the 
introduction of a commercial casino. This is not to say the area surrounding the 
casino is safer or less safe, just that there are more public safety resources. This 
leads to more interactions with the public, which, in turn, leads to more reports 
of criminal activity.
Third, many studies are geographically limited and cannot be extended to 
other locations. A 2019 study of casinos in Southern California found that 
perceived staff friendliness and casino popularity on Yelp were significantly 
related to higher crime rates. However, the nature of the study meant that its 
results were only specific to the area being examined. 
A 2021 study suggested that criminal activity around a casino may “behave” 
much like casino revenues – increasing at opening and then returning to pre-
opening levels.30 The JACK Casino opened in Cincinnati’s central business 
district in 2013. Within the casino’s neighboring area, criminal activity 
decreased during construction (2012) and the year of opening. Criminal 
activity increased from 2014 to 2016, even while the city experienced an 
overall decline in property crimes. Criminal activity then dropped to the pre-
opening level.
The latest findings in the literature suggest that psychology 
may play an important role in the casino-crime hypothesis. 
Increases in crime appear to occur after casinos open, but 
these increases may subside after the initial surge. Upticks in 
crime tend to be frequently reported (one need only watch 
the evening newscast or read the morning paper to see how 
criminal activity is often featured), while statistics that show 
decreases in crime rarely make the news. 
30   Minxuan Lan, Lin Liu and John Eck (2021), “A spatial analytical approach to assess the impact of a casino 
on crime: An example of JACK Casino in downtown Cincinnati,” Cities 111, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
cities.2020.103003.
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Both sides appear to be partially correct; there is evidence that 
casinos do result in more criminal activity, and there is also 
a lack of evidence that casinos result in more crime. The risk 
for decision makers in Norfolk and Portsmouth is to assume 
that all will turn out well. It would be better to be prepared 
by investing now in public safety resources rather than to be 
surprised when criminal activity increases after the casinos 
open. Being optimistic about crime is not a tenable policy 
position.
Final Thoughts
Over the last decade, Virginia has doubled down on its bet on legalized 
gambling. Today, a resident of Hampton Roads can place a bet through an 
online or mobile sportsbook, buy a physical or virtual lottery ticket, visit a 
historical horse racing establishment and look forward to gambling at a casino 
in Norfolk or Portsmouth in the near future. This is a marked change from three 
decades ago when Virginia did not even have a state lottery.
With this in mind, we offer some final observations about the expansion 
of gambling and the opening of casinos in Hampton Roads and across the 
Commonwealth.
Governments in Virginia are increasing their reliance on taxes 
that are more sensitive to economic conditions. Proponents of 
casinos and other forms of gambling invariably point to the contributions to 
local and state budgets to support these projects. While we do not deny that 
gambling will enhance the bottom lines of Norfolk and Portsmouth, we also 
note that casinos are sensitive to changes in economic conditions. Given that 
the casinos in these cities will primarily attract patrons from Hampton Roads, 
their fortunes may rise and fall in relation to decisions made in Washington, 
D.C., regarding the size and composition of the federal budget. As most of us 
are aware, the strength – or lack thereof – of our regional economy is closely 
tied to federal defense spending.
Casinos will create jobs and increase output in Hampton 
Roads, but the impact across the region is likely to be small. 
An increase in the number of jobs in the region would be welcome news, 
especially given the relatively anemic job growth over the decade prior to the 
COVID-19 pandemic. However, these jobs are likely to be concentrated in the 
leisure and hospitality sector, which continues to struggle to attract workers in 
the aftermath of the pandemic. Even our most optimistic estimates suggest that 
the casinos might lift output by 0.4% on an annual basis, an incremental rather 
than monumental gain. Experience in the gambling industry shows that, after 
the novelty has worn off, revenues tend to plateau, if not outright decline. We 
caution readers to view promises of sustained, fulsome impacts over time with 
a wary, informed eye.  
Displacement effects should not be cast aside in the 
conversation about casinos or other projects. The majority of 
benefits from the casinos are likely to accrue to Norfolk and Portsmouth. With 
about half of workers in Hampton Roads living in one community and working 
in another, there are likely to be some spillovers across the region in terms of 
spending and employment. However, the economic impact of the two Hampton 
Roads casinos is likely to be lower than that produced by casinos in other 
Virginia regions where the proportion of out-of-state visitors is expected to 
be higher. Hampton Roads would need visitors to the region to increase their 
spending rather than substitute casino patronage for other forms of leisure 
activity. One dollar cannot be spent at the same time in different places.
Gambling is here, thus we should plan accordingly for the 
social costs. We know that problem gambling and criminal activity are 
likely to occur at higher rates as gambling opportunities increase, so we should 
act now. Enhancing our investment in behavioral and mental health services 
is not only a wise course of action to help residents cope with gambling 
addiction, but also to address other economic and social shocks. Investing 
more in policing, including community-based approaches to nonviolent crimes, 
appears to be a sensible response to the projected increases in visitors to the 
casinos. Finally, working across jurisdictional boundaries will be necessary, 
given that many local residents will travel to the casinos to work or gamble. As 
with other challenges and opportunities in Hampton Roads, collaboration can 
help increase the gains for the entire region.
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WHITHER OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY?
I don’t get no respect.
– Comedian Rodney Dangerfield’s iconic catchphrase 
I
n August 2020, the respected Times Higher Education Impact Rankings placed Old Dominion University among the Top 100 institutions in the world in terms of its 
ability to reduce economic inequality and provide students with upward social and economic mobility. The ranking reflected the large number of first-generation 
college students at ODU and their subsequent social and economic success. ODU was the only university in Virginia to crack the Top 100 and one of only 12 from 
the United States within this group.1  
The reaction to this news? Underwhelming, to say the least. This achievement 
received scant coverage by regional media and zero mentions in the Richmond 
Times-Dispatch and The Washington Post.   
However, when U.S. News & World Report subsequently issued its annual 
rankings of institutions, there were headlines and stories galore. Much was 
made of the number of highly ranked Virginia campuses, which included the 
University of Virginia at No. 26 among national universities, William & Mary 
at No. 39 and Virginia Tech at No. 74. The slightly improved rankings of 
institutions such as Tech were noted in the media and trumpeted by the favored 
institutions.2 Independently, in 2018, SmartAsset, a financial technology 
company, proclaimed that Virginia had the best higher education system in the 
nation.3  
Because they have an impact on ODU, it is instructive to take a closer look at 
ranking systems such as those used by SmartAsset and U.S. News & World 
Report. These are narrowly tailored metrics that pay almost no attention 
1   “Impact Rankings 2020 by SDG: Reduced Inequalities,” Times Higher Education, www.timeshighereducation.
com/rankings/impact/2020/reducing-inequalities#!/page/3/length/25/sort_by/rank/sort_order/asc/
cols/undefined.
2   For example, Virginia Tech moved up from No. 76 to No. 74 in the national university rankings and proudly 
made note of this: https://vtnews.vt.edu/articles/2019/09/provost-usnewsrankings-2020.html. In the same 
rankings, the University of Virginia fell out of the Top 25: Justin Mattingly, “University of Virginia Falls Out of 
the Top 25 in College Rankings List,” Richmond Times-Dispatch (Sept. 9, 2019), https://richmond.com/news/
local/university-of-virginia-falls-out-of-top-25-in-college-rankings-list/article_cab477eb-8e2e-5708-81a2-
6203e8fc2394.html.
3   “Top Ten States for Higher Education,” SmartAsset (May 7, 2018), https://smartasset.com/student-loans/top-
states-for-higher-education-2018-edition.
to the distinctive needs of part-time students, distance learning students or 
more mature students. But in fall 2020, 35.3% of students at public four-year 
institutions attended part time.4 Further, in fall 2017, 42% of students attending 
public institutions were age 25 or older5 and in fall 2018, 35.3% were taking 
at least one distance learning course.6  
Nor do the most popular of today’s campus ranking systems give more than 
passing attention to the racial and ethnic makeup of student bodies. U.S. News 
& World Report does not seem to care that only 7% of undergraduates at UVA 
self-identified as being Black in fall 2019 (the comparable percentage at ODU 
was 32%). Indeed, since 2012, ODU has enrolled more Black students than 
Norfolk State University, but this is of no consequence to the magazine.  
U.S. News & World Report’s ranking system does assign a 5% weight to the 
six-year graduation rate of each institution’s Pell Grant recipients – students 
who come to campuses from lower-income households. The other 95% of the 
magazine weights, however, focus on traditional high school graduates who 
proceed to college immediately after graduation and the quantity of resources 
each institution devotes to its mission.  
4   “Total Fall Enrollment in Degree-Granting Postsecondary Institutions,” Table 303.40, College Navigator, 
National Center for Education Statistics, https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d19/tables/dt19_303.40.
asp.  
5   “Characteristics of Postsecondary Students” (April 2020), National Center for Education Statistics, 
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_csb.asp.  
6   “Distance Learning,” College Navigator, National Center for Education Statistics, https://nces.ed.gov/
fastfacts/display.asp?id=80. One-sixth of all students were taking only distance learning courses. Doubtless 
COVID-19 has increased this percentage.
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Even though it has been well established that household 
income is an important determinant of whether students can 
attend college and subsequently persist and graduate, ranking 
systems like those of U.S. News & World Report pay scant 
attention to this. This matters in the Commonwealth of Virginia. Consider 
that in 2015 the average undergraduate student at W&M came from a 
household whose annual income ranked it in the 81.8th percentile nationally, 
while at ODU, the comparable statistic was the 61.4th percentile.7  
The bottom line is that the established ranking systems place ODU in 
a quandary. The University has evolved into an institution that not only 
champions access and mobility, but as the Times Higher Education ranking 
reveals, also has experienced substantial success in providing such. The 
problem is that, historically, these principles and activities have not been valued 
highly – either in Virginia or nationally. Lip service may be given to access and 
affordability, but these are campus characteristics that have remarkably little to 
do with elevated rankings or institutional prestige.
Institutions such as UVA, Virginia Tech and W&M historically 
have filled important roles in the Commonwealth. They have 
assembled impressive records in admitting and graduating 
talented students who (predictably) do well after they leave 
these campuses. Their graduates perennially play important 
roles in society. Nevertheless, the future viability and cohesion 
of the Commonwealth in the 21st century more likely will 
be determined on campuses like ODU, for it is there that 
the critical societal mobility task is being addressed in a 
meaningful way.  
The relevant societal test with respect to Virginia’s public colleges and 
universities is not whether highly intelligent students who come to those 
campuses from wealthy households can succeed. They nearly always do, 
even if they do not graduate (Bill Gates, Steve Jobs, Larry Ellison and 
Mark Zuckerberg, for example). Instead, the pertinent challenge facing the 
Commonwealth is whether less well-situated students coming from less-wealthy 
7   Raj Chetty, John Friedman, Emmanuel Saez, Nicholas Turner and Danny Yagan, “Mobility Report Cards: 
The Role of Colleges in Intergenerational Mobility,” Opportunity Insights, https://opportunityinsights.org/
education.
households also can ultimately climb the ladder of success. It is the fate of these 
graduates that will indicate whether the American dream is still alive and well.   
If higher education institutions similar to ODU succeed in 
moving students upward, then our society will be opportunity-
based, optimistic and stable. However, if the ODUs of 
the world fail or their efforts are sidetracked, then the 
possibility that we will experience societal upheaval increases 
significantly. Those who pooh-pooh this assessment should 
recall certain pre-COVID-19 public events and demonstrations 
that occurred around the country (including those in 
Charlottesville and Richmond), as well as the postelection 
storming of the U.S. Capitol. While the issues motivating these 
demonstrations varied from one site to another, collectively 
they reflected a common circumstance: a world that has 
become more volatile and less happy because increasing 
numbers of citizens perceive that they do not have realistic 
opportunities for upward mobility. 
With this as prologue, let us focus on ODU, where Brian O. Hemphill, Ph.D., 
has just assumed the role of president. We begin by examining measures of 
the University’s size and then discuss its performance.  
Enrollment
Graph 1 reveals that Old Dominion’s headcount enrollment ended the previous 
decade just about where it was when the decade started – between 24,000 
and 25,000 students. Since the University always has enrolled many part-
time students, the conversion of headcount enrollment to full-time equivalents 
(FTEs) is important because state funding is substantially connected to FTEs. 
According to the U.S. Department of Education, ODU’s 12-month FTE 
enrollment in 2018-19 was 19,291, which constituted 79.8% of its headcount 
enrollment. Interestingly, this percentage has not changed significantly in recent 
years despite the University’s commitment to instruction via the internet.  
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Counter to expectations, and despite the COVID-19 pandemic, ODU’s 
fall 2020 headcount enrollment grew more than 2%, even though college 
headcount enrollments nationally were declining by 2.5%. This was the ninth 
consecutive year that national higher education enrollments had deteriorated.  
The mix of ODU’s students has changed gradually. Between 2010 and 2020, 
the University lost approximately 1,000 graduate students, but this was 
counterbalanced by a gain of about 1,000 undergraduate students.8 This 
shift reflected a variety of factors, including the opening of new on-campus 
housing for undergraduates and a thriving economy that diminished the desire 
of some to pursue graduate degrees. The University’s undergraduate student 
body progressively has become more female. In fall 2004, 52.31% of ODU 
undergraduates were women. By fall 2018, this percentage had climbed to 
59.05%.9
The student body also has become substantially more diverse in terms of race. 
Over an approximate quarter-century (1994 to 2018), the percentage of 
self-identified Black (non-Hispanic) students doubled. Graph 2 highlights the 
year 2012 because this was the first year in which ODU enrolled more Black 
students than NSU. With respect to Black students, ODU’s student body now 
roughly reflects the Black population in Hampton Roads.
The phenomenon of increasing diversity has not been confined to Black 
students. The percentage of Hispanic/Latino students at the University more 
than quadrupled over the same period (Graph 3). The same cannot be said for 
students who self-identify as Asian, however, as Graph 4 illustrates. Although 
the percentage representation of Asian and Asian American students on the 
ODU campus has been edging upward in recent years, it remains below its 
2003 level (Graph 4). Various reasons have been posed as explanations for 
this and most relate to the perceived levels of comfort of Asian and Asian 
American students at ODU. More persuasive, perhaps, is the paucity of people 
living in Hampton Roads who self-identify as Asian or Asian American – it is 
only 3.5%, well below the Commonwealth’s 6.9%.10
18   International undergraduate students were not part of this expansion, however. During the first decade of this 
century, ODU enrolled an average of 35 new undergraduate international students per year. This number 
has fallen to about 20 in recent years, U.S. Department of Education, Integrated Postsecondary Education 
Data System (IPEDS), “Fall Enrollment: Residence and Migration of First-Time Freshmen,” https://nces.
ed.gov/ipeds.
19  IPEDS.
10   U.S. Census, Quick Facts, www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/VA,US/PST045219.
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GRAPH 1
HEADCOUNT ENROLLMENTS: OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY, 
FALL 2010-FALL 2020
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GRAPH 2
PERCENT OF BLACK (NON-HISPANIC) STUDENTS: 
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY, 1994-2018
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GRAPH 3
PERCENT OF HISPANIC AND LATINO STUDENTS: 
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY, 1994-2018
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GRAPH 4
PERCENT OF ASIAN AND ASIAN AMERICAN STUDENTS: 
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY, 2003-2019




Percent of Asian and sian American Students: 
Old Dominion University, 2003-2019 
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Faculty And Administrators
In 2020, Old Dominion’s faculty numbered 901, and it had 546 administrators 
and administrative professionals. In addition, the University employed 1,053 
classified staff and 562 part-time workers. It ranked as the 17th-largest 
employer in Hampton Roads.11  
DIVERSITY
Asians and Asian Americans are more heavily represented among the 
University’s faculty than in its student body. In 2020, almost 13% of faculty 
were Asian or Asian American. Approximately 37% of the faculty members 
were non-white.12  
ODU enjoys the distinction of having had the first woman president of a four-
year public university in Virginia. JoAnn Gora, who was the provost for nine 
years, served as acting president in 1995. Subsequently, Roseann Runte served 
as president between 2001 and 2007.
FACULTY RECOGNITION
Stanford University recently compiled a world listing of faculty members whose 
work has been most frequently cited by others. Stanford limited the group to 
the Top 2% in that regard in 22 scientific fields and 176 subfields. It is notable 
that 53 ODU faculty members were recognized by Stanford as members of this 
prestigious academic club.13 Not bad for an institution that began in 1930 as 
a two-year division of the College of William & Mary. This achievement has 
received only sparse recognition in the media, however. Rodney Dangerfield 
would have understood this. 
11   “Facts and Figures,” Old Dominion University, www.odu.edu/about/facts-and-figures. Data are as of 
December 2020.
12   Faculty Demographics, www.odu.edu/acadaffairs/faculty-diversity/faculty-demographics. Data are as of 
December 2020.  
13   John P.A. Ioannidis, Kevin W. Boyack and Jeroen Bass, “Updated Science-Wide Author Databases of 
Standardized Citation Indicators,” PLOS Biology, 18(10), 2020, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.
pbio.3000918.
INSTITUTIONAL MISSION
A tension sometimes emerges on campus between those who see ODU 
as a research institution and those who view it as an institution that offers 
opportunity and upward mobility in society to students who often come to 
it from lower-income households. “ODU is attempting to ride two horses at 
once,” was the pungent observation of a former president, “and the two horses 
aren’t going the same direction.” Opined another external observer, “You can 
excel at one but seldom at both.” 
It is not the function of the State of the Region Report to determine ODU’s 
mission or the goals that are placed in front of its faculty and staff. It is 
appropriate, however, for us to note that no higher education institution can 
be all things to all people. Given limited resources, choice-making cannot 
be avoided. Better that ODU (or any organization) understand the choices 
confronting it than to evolve unknowingly into an amorphous entity that reflects 
accident rather than design. Are the University’s undergraduate admission 
practices consistent with its role as a research institution?
Conventional Institutional 
Performance Measures
Were one to ask a random citizen or legislator to identify the metrics that 
best measure university performance, likely they would mention retention, 
graduation rates and the ability of graduates to obtain good-paying jobs after 
receiving their diploma. Research institutions might add the amount of each 
institution’s externally funded research to this list.14  
Consensus deteriorates when one attempts to add metrics to the previous list. 
Because the missions of institutions differ, metrics designed to illuminate the 
performance of a flagship land-grant institution should not be the same as 
those constructed to evaluate the activities of a historically black college or 
university (HBCU), a metropolitan institution such as Old Dominion or 
14   “University Performance Metrics,” Strategy2Act, www.strategy2act.com/solutions/university-performance-
metrics.htm.
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a regional baccalaureate institution such as the University of Virginia’s College 
at Wise.  
However, it is not easy to convince citizens, legislators and especially the 
media not to evaluate all institutions using the same criteria. Applying the same 
metrics to all institutions at first glance might seem reasonable and proper, 
but often this results in apples-and-oranges comparisons. Nevertheless, let us 
consider how ODU performs with respect to three conventional criteria: student 
retention rates, graduation rates and the subsequent employment success of 
graduates.  
RETENTION
College students who drop out are expensive, both to institutions and to 
themselves. Job markets pay large salary premiums to individuals who have 
earned a baccalaureate degree compared to those who dropped out prior to 
graduation.15 
Graph 5 reports the retention rate from freshman to sophomore year for first-
time, full-time undergraduate students at ODU. The national average rate 
at four-year public institutions was 81% between 2018 and 2019. ODU’s 
retention rate was 80%, not bad given the nontraditional nature of its student 
body.    
Nonetheless, institutions in Virginia that perhaps are comparable exhibit 
higher retention rates – George Mason University retains 86% and Virginia 
Commonwealth University retains 83%. These data represent a chink in ODU’s 
armor when “How well are you doing?” discussions occur among citizens and 
decision makers. 
GRADUATION
Students who drop out of college between their freshman and sophomore 
years are unlikely to ultimately graduate from college. Therefore, given its 
retention rate, it is predictable that ODU’s graduation rate is not impressive. 
The University’s six-year graduation rate for all first-time, full-time freshmen 
15   In 2017, individuals ages 25-29 earned an average of $19,034 more annually than those who completed 
some college but did not graduate: Wesley Whistle, “Ripple Effect: The Cost of the College Dropout Rate,” 
Third Way (Jan. 28, 2019), www.thirdway.org/report/ripple-effect-the-cost-of-the-college-dropout-rate.
was 52.8% in 2019 (Graph 6). Reflecting national trends, the graduation rate 
for ODU men (48.3%) was substantially below that for ODU women (57.0%).  
Once again, graduation rates at GMU (71%) and VCU (61%) were higher 
than that at ODU. With respect to its retention and graduation rates, ODU 
can point out that it serves a less wealthy student body than the other two 
institutions and that the SAT/ACT scores of its students are not as high as those 
at the other two. The average household income national percentile of ODU 
students was the 61.4th, while it was the 69.3rd at GMU and the 70.8th at 
VCU.16 Meanwhile, for freshmen who entered these institutions in fall 2019, the 
median SAT score in mathematics was 520 at ODU, but 560 at VCU and 600 
at GMU. Thus, the average undergraduate attending ODU is less wealthy and 
less academically prepared than the average student at either GMU or VCU, 
and this is reflected in graduation rates.17  
Table 1 summarizes the simple correlation coefficients between retention rates, 
graduation rates, the incomes of the households from which students come, 
students’ SAT/ACT scores and the percentage of undergraduates receiving Pell 
Grants. The data are paired observations for the 2018-19 academic year from 
a sample of 235 four-year public colleges and universities. It is apparent that 
both retention and graduation rates are strongly associated with household 
incomes and standardized test scores. Many national studies have concluded 
that cause-and-effect relationships exist among these variables.  
These data suggest that it would be wise for the State Council of Higher 
Education for Virginia (SCHEV) to publish statistically adjusted retention and 
graduation rates for each institution, controlling for their respective household 
family incomes and standardized test scores. One could then obtain a better 
idea of how well each institution is performing, given its student body.18  
16   Raj Chetty, John Friedman, Emmanuel Saez, Nicholas Turner and Danny Yagan, “Mobility Report Cards: The 
Role of Colleges in Intergenerational Mobility,” https://opportunityinsights.org.
17   “Admissions: First Time Freshman Profile,” State Council of Higher Education for Virginia, https://research.
schev.edu//enrollment/B10_FreshmenProfile.asp. 
18   There could be some “moral hazard” attached to such a policy. Institutions might perceive a reduced need to 
recruit and admit qualified students.  
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GRAPH 5
FIRST-TIME, FULL-TIME RETENTION RATES: 
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY, FALL 2006-FALL 2019
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GRAPH 6
SIX-YEAR GRADUATION RATES: 
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY, 2007-2019




Six-Year Graduation Rates: 
ld ominion niversity, 2 07-2009 
 
Source: IPEDS, the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds 
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TABLE 1
SIMPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN SELECTED VARIABLES: 
235 FOUR-YEAR PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS, 2018-2019




Full-Time Retention Rate 1.00 .893 .699 .782 .077
Six-Year Graduation Rate .893 1.00 .753 .061 .086
Median Household 
Income of Students
.699 .770 1.00 .941 -.899
Brookings SAT/ACT .782 .839 .941 1.00 -.908
Undergraduate Pell 
Percent
.077 .071 -.899 -.908 1.00
Sources: IPEDS for graduation rates, retention rates and Pell Grant percentages; Opportunity Insights for median household incomes; and the Brookings Institution for the hybrid SAT/ACT score, which is the normalized institutional 
statistic that reflects both ACT and SAT scores. The 235 four-year public university sample is described in James V. Koch and Richard J. Cebula, “Runaway College Costs: How College Governing Boards Fail to Protect Their Students” 
(Johns Hopkins University Press, 2020).
Two public policy questions emerge from these data. First, should the 
Commonwealth recognize the challenges associated with serving students 
who may not be as well prepared for the rigors of higher education? If so, 
should the General Assembly allocate funding to colleges and universities and 
increase financial aid to these students? Virginia’s 2020 legislative session 
witnessed an important change in legislative behavior – one that did take into 
account the makeup of most of today’s public university student bodies. ODU 
received a special $5 million General Fund allocation to address its distinctive 
needs as well as a healthy upward bump in the allocation it received for 
student financial aid. The ascendancy of several Black legislators to positions 
of power and influence has made the General Assembly more sensitive to 
issues relating to lower-income students and student bodies that do not fit the 
traditional mold.19  
19   The state of Oregon recently changed its higher education funding formulas to provide greater financial 
support to institutions with more racially diverse and lower-income student bodies: Jordyn Brown, “Oregon 
universities will see a shift in funding under new model,” The Register-Guard (Feb. 16, 2021), www.
registerguard.com/story/news/2021/02/16/oregon-universities-see-shift-funding-under-new-state-
model/6729930002. Colorado has been doing so for some time.
A second policy consideration relates to whether Virginia should direct less-
prepared students to community colleges rather than four-year institutions. 
The answer to this question is not clear. While it is less expensive for the 
Commonwealth to educate a student on one of its community college 
campuses, that same student is less likely to eventually obtain a baccalaureate 
degree if he or she does go the community college route. Much depends upon 
the student’s major course of study, however.  
INSTITUTIONAL CONTRIBUTION TO LABOR MARKET SUCCESS
Many citizens believe the most important thing colleges and universities do 
is prepare their students for employment after graduation. In this view, the 
success of our higher education institutions should be measured by jobs 
filled and incomes earned. For several years, SCHEV has been collecting 
data on the postgraduation jobs and income earned by the students who 
complete their baccalaureate degrees at a Virginia public institution of higher 
education. These data are interesting but less useful than some might believe. 
For one, more than half of graduates from a typical college or university 
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do not participate in the survey and it seems likely they do not constitute a 
random sample of all graduates. Second, the incomes earned by graduates 
are quite sensitive to the locations where they are working. In May 2019, 
average weekly wages in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan region were 
63.4% higher than in Lynchburg and 33.4% higher than in Hampton Roads.20 
Third, much depends on a student’s major course of study. The Bureau of 
Labor Statistics reported in May 2019 that the average weekly wage for 
computer systems analysts in Hampton Roads was 56.9% higher than that for 
educational guidance counselors.21  
Thus, comparing the wages of graduates can be a fraught enterprise. The 
Brookings Institution, however, has developed an interesting method to 
estimate the “value-added” of specific institutions of higher education to 
their graduates’ incomes, whatever those incomes are. Brookings’ value-
added measure is an estimate of how much a specific institution contributed 
to a student’s postgraduate income over and above what that student would 
have earned had he or she majored in the same discipline at the typical 
institution nationally. Table 2 records Brookings’ estimates of the value-added 
contributions of selected Virginia public institutions in 2015.  
20   Bureau of Labor Statistics, “May 2019 National, State, Metropolitan and Nonmetropolitan Area 
Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates,” www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes_abo.htm.
21   Bureau of Labor Statistics.
TABLE 2
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION ESTIMATES OF INSTITUTIONAL 
VALUE-ADDED FOR BACCALAUREATE RECIPIENTS AT VIRGINIA 
FOUR-YEAR PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS COMPARED TO THE 
AVERAGE INSTITUTION
Institution Brookings Value-Added Estimate
Christopher Newport University -1%
George Mason University 20%
James Madison University 13%
Norfolk State University NA
Old Dominion University 14%
Radford University -4%
University of Mary Washington 5%





Virginia State University 1%
William & Mary 18%
Source: Jonathan Rothwell and Siddharth Kulkarni, “Beyond College Rankings: A Value-Added Approach to 
Assessing Two-Year and Four-Year Schools” (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2015)  
EXTERNALLY FUNDED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES
Is the glass half full or half empty when we discuss ODU’s funded research 
activities? Graph 7 reports the University’s research and development 
expenditures over the past decade. Note that the sharp reduction after FY 
2013 reflects a change in how ODU reported its own contributions to these 
expenditures rather than a dramatic decline in funding from external sources 
such as the National Science Foundation or the Department of Defense.22  
What should we make of the data presented in Graph 7? The glass is half full 
if one considers that ODU opened its doors in 1930 as a two-year division 
22   Old Dominion’s new methods of reporting its research and development expenditures put it in conformance 
with National Science Foundation guidelines.
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of the College of William & Mary with a total budget of only several hundred 
thousand dollars. Few people would have forecast that 90 years later the 
University would be expending more than $67 million from all sources to fund 
its research and development activities. However, the glass may be half empty 
if one compares ODU’s performance in this arena with similar institutions.  
Total research expenditures are sensitive to institutional scale (the number of 
students and faculty) and whether or not an institution has a medical school. 
Graph 8 reports research expenditures per full-time equivalent (FTE) student 
at several Virginia institutions in FY 2019. UVA, VCU and Virginia Tech have 
medical schools. (FTE faculty numbers were not available.)  
National Science Foundation data ranked ODU only 185th nationally among 
all U.S. institutions of higher education in terms of the size of its research and 
development expenditures in FY 2019. ODU ranked fifth among Virginia 
institutions in this regard, but fell to sixth when the computation was performed 
on a per-FTE student basis.23 
The only topical research and development area where ODU cracked the top 
100 nationally was physics (97th). The University’s best performance in terms 
of funding sources was with NASA, where it ranked 83rd.24  
These are acceptable performances, but ODU must improve if it intends to 
increase its economic impact on Hampton Roads and expects to augment its 
roles in public health and the medical sciences. Improved performance will 
not occur magically, however. Careful attention must be given to faculty hiring 
decisions, the expectations placed in front of faculty, compensation, and 
promotion and tenure decisions.
23   The research and development expenditures come from the National Science Foundation, Higher Education 
Research and Development: fiscal year 2019, https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsf21314#data-tables. FTE 
student numbers come from the State Council of Higher Education for Virginia, https://research.schev.edu/
info/reports.
24   National Science Foundation.
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GRAPH 7
UNIVERSITY EXPENDITURES ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: 
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY, FISCAL YEAR 2011-FISCAL YEAR 2019
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GRAPH 8
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES PER STUDENT FTE, 
FISCAL YEAR 2019
Sources: Research and development expenditures are from the National Science Foundation, Table 20, Higher Education R&D Expenditures, Ranked by FY 2019 R&D Expenditures: FYs 2010-2019, https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/
nsf21314#data-tables. FTE student numbers are from the State Council of Higher Education for Virginia, https://research.schev.edu/info/reports. 8 
 
GRAPH 8 
Research and Development Expenditures Per Student FTE, 
Fiscal Year 2019 
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The Commonwealth’s 
Financial Support
Virtually every state agency believes it deserves more support from Virginia’s 
General Fund, and Old Dominion University is no exception. However, 
before assessing ODU’s case in this regard, it is appropriate to provide some 
background. The Commonwealth’s respected Joint Legislative Audit and Review 
Commission (JLARC) has noted that Virginia is a high-tuition, low-tax-support 
state insofar as higher education is concerned.25 This view has been confirmed 
by the similarly respected State Higher Education Executive Officers (SHEEO) 
organization, which notes that in FY 2017, the average state devoted 5.8% of 
its tax and lottery revenues to higher education, while in Virginia only 5% was 
allocated for the same purpose.26  
Virginia’s state appropriations per full-time equivalent (FTE) college student 
were only $5,805 in FY 2019, well below the national average of $8,196. On 
the other hand, tuition and fee revenues were above average at $9,786 per 
FTE, compared to the national average of $6,902. Virginia seals its situational 
fate by also being a below-average student financial aid state – the national 
average amount of student financial aid provided in FY 2019 was $808 per 
FTE, but Virginia supplied only $716.27  
Thus, it is true that Virginia provides less tax support and financial aid to its 
public college students than the typical state, and those students pay higher 
than average levels of tuition and fees. The reasons for this are complex, but 
it is fair to observe that in times of fiscal stress, legislators often regard public 
higher education budgets as a bank account upon which they can draw for 
funds needed in other agencies. When cornered, legislators typically assert 
that most, if not all, Virginia colleges and universities can raise tuition and 
fees in order to avoid severe financial problems. If they have the University 
of Virginia in mind, then this likely is true. In the 10 years between the 2008-
09 academic year (when the Great Recession began) and 2018-19, UVA 
25   Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission, “Addressing the Cost of Public Higher Education in Virginia,” 
(November 2014), http://jlarc.virginia.gov/pdfs/reports/Rpt461.pdf.
26   State Higher Education Executive Officers, State Higher Education Finance, 2019, https://shef.sheeo.org/
wp-content/uploads/2020/04/SHEEO_SHEF_FY19_Report.pdf.  
27   State Higher Education Executive Officers, State Higher Education Finance, 2019.
increased its “sticker price” tuition and fees 84.8%, while the consumer price 
index rose only 19.2%.28 However, it is not clear that the same logic applies to 
institutions such as ODU (where the comparable increase was only 48.6%).29  
How has ODU fared? Between FY 2005 and FY 2019, the 
University’s general fund appropriation per full-time equivalent 
student rose 41.09%, one of the highest percentage increases 
of any higher education institution in Virginia (Table 3). This is 
an outstanding performance and credit is largely due to former 
President John R. Broderick and his staff. 
Of course, in absolute terms, this still left ODU well behind institutions such as 
NSU and VCU, but ahead of UVA and Virginia Tech. Broderick performed 
exquisitely well in terms of enhancing ODU’s financial support from the 
General Assembly during his presidency. Further, these data do not include 
the results of the most recent (2021) General Assembly session, when the 
University emerged with significant additional funding.
Thus, even though ODU’s mission and institutional positioning are not highly 
valued by external ratings agencies, and often not by Virginia media and 
opinion leaders either, this has not prevented the General Assembly from doing 
well by the institution – at least in recent years. As one legislator put it to us, 
“None of my children really considered attending Old Dominion when they 
were high school seniors, but I think it has been doing a great job.” 
28   UVA’s published tuition and fees come from The Chronicle of Higher Education, “Tuition and Fees, 
1998-99 Through 2019-20” (Dec. 30, 2019), www.chronicle.com/article/tuition-and-fees-1998-99-
through-2018-19. The CPI data represent the midpoint of each academic year (January) and come from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, www.bls.gov/regions/mid-atlantic/data/consumerpriceindexhistorical_us_table.
htm.
29   “Tuition and Fees 1998-99 Through 2019-20,” The Chronicle of Higher Education.
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TABLE 3
GENERAL FUND SUPPORT FROM THE COMMONWEALTH PER FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT STUDENT: 
SELECTED VIRGINIA INSTITUTIONS, FY 2005 TO FY 2019
Institution FY 2005 FY 2008 FY 2012 FY 2015 FY 2018 FY 2019
Percent Change 
FY 2005 to 
FY 2019
GMU $4,933 $6,815 $4,692 $5,011 $5,258 $5,392 +7.98%
JMU $3,910 $4,680 $3,531 $3,889 $4,183 $4,445 +13.68%
NSU $8,833 $10,177 $7,550 $9,284 $12,142 $12,364 +39.97%
ODU $5,578 $7,387 $5,551 $6,374 $7,471 $7,689 +41.09%
UVA $6,006 $7,615 $4,994 $5,972 $6,382 $6,297 +4.85%
VCU $7,445 $8,624 $6,387 $7,320 $8,298 $8,717 +17.09%
VA Tech $5,824 $6,647 $4,984 $5,445 $5,412 $5,527 -5.11%
W&M $5,955 $7,281 $5,221 $5,504 $5,683 $6,060 +1.76%
Sources: General fund support numbers are from Old Dominion University; calendar year full-time equivalent enrollment data are from IPEDS.
Student Debt
The high-tuition, low-state-support model of financing higher education 
adopted by Virginia has had predictable effects on the volume of debt incurred 
by students to finance their education. The U.S. Department of Education’s 
College Navigator website reports that the 65% of full-time, beginning 
undergraduate students at Old Dominion who took out loans to finance their 
education did so to the tune of $7,426 in 2018-19.30 Extrapolated over four 
years, this suggests the typical graduate incurs student debt of almost $30,000, 
which is slightly above the national average.  
The relatively modest median household incomes of ODU students (at least 
compared to most other Virginia four-year public universities) increase the 
amount they borrow. However, ODU’s status as a lower-cost institution within 
Virginia has the opposite effect and reduces the amounts students need to 
30   College Navigator.
borrow to finance their education. Compare ODU’s $7,426 average student 
borrowing level in 2018-19 to that of $8,323 at GMU and $8,367 at VCU.31 
Loans must be paid back. A total of 5,668 former ODU students began to 
repay their loans in 2016. Three years later, 6.9% of these students had 
defaulted on their loans. The national average default rate was 9.3%.32  
Student loan default rates were lower at GMU (2.1%) and VCU (4.1%), but 
higher at NSU (11.3%).  
It is not difficult to see why the increased allocation of student financial aid 
grant funds that ODU received from the 2020 General Assembly was so 
welcome.  
31   College Navigator.
32   “Debt and Loan Default Rates,” College Factual, www.collegefactual.com/colleges/old-dominion-university/
paying-for-college/student-loan-debt/.
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A Measure Of 
Operating Efficiency
It is not easy to assess the operating efficiency of a college or university 
because many campus activities generate costs but no revenue. Further, 
efficiency usually is measured with respect to some type of output. But what is 
the “output” of an institution such as Old Dominion University? It is more than 
the number of graduates or credit hours generated, and includes activities 
ranging from intercollegiate athletics and free lectures to the provision of 
preschool and free or low-cost dental hygiene services. In addition, cross-
subsidies and below-cost activities abound at a modern university. Vital, but 
complex, public-private partnership arrangements (ODU’s University Village is 
one example) complicate things, as does the existence of foundations. Thus, it 
is difficult to measure university efficiency unless one can agree upon what the 
universities are supposed to be doing. 
With these caveats, we will peek at the services that often are termed 
“administrative.” These include the activities and expenditures of offices 
ranging from the registrar to public safety. Our measure of the efficiency of 
these offices is each institution’s average “institutional support cost” per FTE 
student, which is reported by institutions to the U.S. Office of Education.33 We 
adjust these magnitudes for changes in the consumer price index over time so 
that the numbers in one year are comparable to those in another year.  
The University of Virginia, William & Mary and Norfolk State University easily 
report the highest “real” (price-adjusted) instructional support costs per FTE 
student. W&M witnessed a dramatic 94.94% increase in what most would 
label administrative overhead (Graphs 9 and 10). Someone must pay for 
such expenditures and since the Commonwealth’s General Fund support has 
declined in real terms, this means that institutions have relied substantially upon 
increases in their tuition and fees to fund their increased expenditures.  
33  Another caveat is in order. Institutions retain some flexibility in terms of how they report their expenditures to 
the U.S. Office of Education, and therefore, one should not regard these data as beyond reproach.  
How does ODU rate on this efficiency scale? Rather well. The 
University’s institutional support expenditures per FTE put it 
with GMU and JMU in a category much lower than that of 
the other five institutions. In addition, ODU’s percentage rate 
of increase in these expenditures, FY 2005 to FY 2019, was 
second-lowest among the eight institutions. A professor asked 
to assign a grade to this performance likely would say it 
merits at least a B, if not a B+ or A-.     
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GRAPH 9
REAL INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT EXPENDITURES PER FTE STUDENT: 
SELECTED VIRGINIA INSTITUTIONS, FY 2005 AND FY 2019
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GRAPH 10
PERCENT INCREASE IN REAL INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT EXPENDITURES PER FTE STUDENT: 
SELECTED VIRGINIA INSTITUTIONS, FY 2005 AND FY 2019
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Areas Of Distinction
Every academic program at Old Dominion University that is eligible for 
external disciplinary accreditation holds that status. It is fair to say that 
educational quality is present across the length and breadth of the institution. 
Nevertheless, institutions with merely adequate or good 
academic programs seldom achieve distinction. It is only when 
multiple programs of significance achieve consistent national 
recognition as excellent or path-breaking that what might be 
termed a “halo effect” spreads across and benefits the entire 
institution. When this halo effect exists, it improves the reputations of 
programs throughout the institution. 
The consensus of external senior academic leaders is that it takes at least three, 
and more likely five or six, nationally recognized programs to generate a halo 
effect. Their view is that ODU currently does not meet this threshold but has the 
potential to do so.
External authorities have high regard for the University’s program in nuclear 
physics but note that because it does not generate easily recognizable 
commercialized innovations and products, it is not as potent or visible as other 
academic programs. In terms of raw academic power and prestige, however, it 
is one of the best in the nation, boasts some very accomplished faculty and has 
invaluable connections to the Jefferson Lab in Newport News.  
The academic areas with the greatest potential for ODU to gain legitimate 
national distinction focus on societal problems and needs. Rising sea levels 
and resiliency provide a cogent example of an academic thrust that clearly 
addresses local, regional and national needs and builds on existing University 
strengths in areas such as oceanography. The ever-expanding roles of health 
and medical care in the United States strongly suggest that the incipient School 
of Public Health must be a major point of emphasis when additional funds are 
allocated. What is required now is a combination of well-designed faculty 
additions; active pursuit of foundation and grant funds; more rigorous and 
focused salary, promotion and tenure decisions; and political acumen. ODU 
can achieve these goals if it recognizes what can be accomplished and acts 
accordingly. 
There was a time at the turn of the century when ODU occupied a national 
leadership position in distance learning. The University’s Teletechnet 
programs were both well known and highly regarded. A variety of external 
circumstances and some self-inflicted wounds resulted in decreased emphasis 
on distance learning at ODU, and today the University no longer can claim 
national leadership in this important arena. Other institutions now enroll 
100,000 or more distance learning students annually, while as one can infer 
from Tables 4 and 5, ODU’s number now ranges between 10,000 and 15,000 
in a typical semester. While the University remains very capable in distance 
learning and produces programs of high quality, the rapidly changing distance 
learning world has, in some ways, passed it by.   
It remains the case, however, that ODU is more heavily immersed in distance 
learning than any other Virginia public institution. Tables 3 and 4 collectively 
disclose that more than 49% of ODU students either are taking exclusively 
distance learning courses or taking some distance learning courses. It seems 
likely that this is a reason why the University’s headcount enrollment increased 
in fall 2020 when it was declining nationally and on a majority of Virginia 
public and private campuses. Thus, national leader or not, distance learning 
has had salutary effects on ODU.  
Is it too late for the University to regain national leadership? The answer is 
“no” if the focus is to be upon the provision of specific academic programs 
in well-defined areas such as nursing or engineering management. The 
distance learning market is highly partitioned and therefore amenable to the 
development and growth of specific, well-orchestrated academic programs. 
Because it is easier to enter distance learning markets not already dominated 
by an existing competitor, attention ought to be given to offering online some 
of the University’s newest programs. Cryptology, perhaps, presents such an 
opportunity.  
However, if ODU’s ambition is to offer most of its current stable of academic 
programs to customers around the world, it would do well to recognize that 
this train already has departed. Significant economies of scale exist in the 
provision of distance learning programs, and those that entered the market 
early and expanded now enjoy visibly lower costs per unit because they can 
spread their fixed costs over much larger student bodies.  
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Regardless, distance learning has become critically important 
to the University’s future, and the onset of COVID-19 
underlined this reality. Even prior to the pandemic, about half 
of all ODU students were taking at least one distance learning 
course. This proportion seems likely to increase. Therefore, 
whether the University stakes out a viable national presence 
in distance learning or not, it must ensure that it continues to 
offer high-quality distance learning opportunities to its regular 
student body. It is apparent from Tables 4 and 5 that Virginia’s public 
university students are interested in distance learning courses.
TABLE 4
PERCENT OF VIRGINIA PUBLIC COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY 
STUDENTS TAKING SOME DISTANCE LEARNING COURSES    
Institution FY 2013 FY 2015 FY 2017 FY 2019
CNU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GMU 15.17 19.94 25.67 35.19
JMU 9.92 9.57 8.95 4.59
LU 3.05 2.65 2.70 2.34
NSU 36.12 42.33 41.46 59.06
ODU 14.97 17.71 24.19 29.85
RU 12.08 18.65 22.08 29.46
UVA Wise 13.39 5.63 56.51 4.02
UMW 2.90 3.46 5.83 6.28
UVA 1.55 1.36 2.01 7.62
VCU 17.26 23.74 25.40 30.86
VMI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
VA Tech 23.32 27.35 32.90 28.80
VSU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
W&M 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17
Source: College Navigator
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TABLE 5
PERCENT OF VIRGINIA PUBLIC COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY 
STUDENTS TAKING ONLY DISTANCE LEARNING COURSES
Institution FY 2013 FY 2015 FY 2017 FY 2019
CNU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GMU 1.32 1.86 2.06 2.54
JMU 0.27 0.73 0.81 1.18
LU 3.05 0.04 0.00 5.83
NSU 2.37 2.82 3.48 3.48
ODU 12.00 13.97 16.92 19.29
RU 0.57 0.97 0.93 1.61
UVA Wise 22.77 41.32 19.94 35.69
UMW 0.07 0.00 0.28 2.36
UVA 1.09 0.86 1.82 2.05
VCU 0.98 2.07 1.90 2.41
VMI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
VA Tech 0.23 0.24 0.19 0.19
VSU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
W&M 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09
Source: College Navigator
Fundraising
The Old Dominion University Educational Foundation holds nearly all 
University endowment assets. As Graph 11 demonstrates, the foundation’s 
values have increased nicely over time. Thus, in 2000, the Educational 
Foundation’s assets ranked ODU 341st among colleges and universities 
nationally in terms of size; this ranking improved to 310th in 2010 and 288th 
in 2019. Not a bad achievement for a foundation that was established only in 
1955.
National rankings of foundations in terms of their size are not a pure measure 
of success because some gifts immediately are spent to achieve a specific 
purpose, for example, the generous gift of Richard and Carolyn Barry to 
construct the Barry Art Museum at ODU. Such gifts do not increase the value 
of the endowment although in the case of the Barrys, their generosity also 
extended to gifts that did enter the foundation’s endowment.  
Alonzo Brandon, ODU’s vice president for university 
advancement, and recently retired President John R. Broderick 
proved to be adept fundraisers. ODU reported $325.4 million 
in new gifts and commitments between 2008 and 2020. This 
success reflects hard work and dedication to the university, but also the reality 
that in 2020, ODU, in contrast to many other institutions, was not riven 
by discord and divisive issues. Broderick deserves considerable praise for 
nurturing this milieu.
There is one financial issue relating to the Educational Foundation (and 
analogous college foundations nationally) that merits exploration. It has to do 
with how foundations manage and invest the funds entrusted to them. Most 
academic foundations pay for the active management of their asset portfolios 
by financial professionals. This seems a reasonable approach until one learns 
that actively managed funds (some of which are referred to as hedge funds) 
have not performed as well as indexed, low-cost equity funds that are not 
actively managed and whose asset distributions replicate entire large market 
segments. Each year, 60% to 80% of actively managed funds typically do not 
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fare as well as low-cost, indexed funds that reflect the entire equity market.34 
A 2019 compilation by economist Mark Perry found that over the previous 15 
years, 88.97% of all actively managed equity funds did not perform as well as 
the S&P Composite 1500 Index.35
Why is this so? First, active managers believe they know more than the 
collective wisdom of the entire equity market and conclude they can “beat it.” 
Second, their active management and trading practices drive up transaction 
costs. Third, active managers themselves usually command high salaries, which 
end up being paid for by the college foundations.   
The ODU Educational Foundation appropriately diversifies its investments 
and on June 30, 2020, stocks (both domestic and foreign) accounted for 
45.9% of its holdings. Given the data we have presented concerning indexed 
investments, we believe it would be wise for the foundation to increase its 
use of low-cost indexed equity funds. The remainder of the corpus of the 
foundation is invested in fixed income assets, hedge funds, tangible real 
assets and private equity. Indexed funds exist for some of these asset types (for 
example, fixed-income vehicles such as bonds) and the lessons of indexing 
should be applied to these asset segments as well. 
Our recommendation does not imply that all active asset managers do not 
“beat the market.” Some do, but most do not. The foundation should consider 
the weight of this evidence and see how it measures up.   
The point to be taken here is that the ODU Educational 
Foundation’s general performance represents a success story 
that many similarly situated foundations would, if they could, 
gladly emulate.   
34   This is a point famously made in 1973 by Burton G. Malkiel in his classic, A Random Walk Down Wall Street 
(New York: W.W. Norton). Vanguard’s VTSMX, which indexes all segments of American equity markets, 
represents an excellent example. Yahoo Finance (www.yahoofinance.com) says VTSMX carries an enviable, 
very low expense ratio of only 0.14%, providing it with an approximate .5% head start over most actively 
managed funds. 
35   Mark J. Perry, “More Evidence That It’s Really Hard to ‘Beat the Market’ Over Time,” Carpe Diem Blog 
(March 19, 2019), www.aei.org/carpe-diem/more-evidence-that-its-really-hard-to-beat-the-market-over-
time-92-of-finance-professionals-cant-do-it-2.
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GRAPH 11
VALUATION OF OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION ENDOWMENT 
AS OF JULY 1, 2003-2020




Valuation of Old Dominion University Education Foundation Endowment 
as of July , 003-2020 
 
Source: National Association of College and University Business Officers, “Historic Endowment Study Data,” www.nacubo.org/Research/2020/Historic%20Endowment%20Study%20Data 
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Intercollegiate Athletics
Old Dominion University has assembled an enviable history of success in 
intercollegiate athletic competition. Its men’s basketball teams have won more 
than 59% of their contests and almost 77% of those played at Chartway Arena. 
The women’s basketball teams have emerged victorious in more than 70% 
of their games and have won more than 74% of contests at home. ODU has 
captured 28 team and five individual national championships in sports ranging 
from sailing and field hockey to women’s and men’s basketball. 
ODU teams consistently attract large numbers of fans, and it is not unusual 
for both the men’s and women’s basketball teams to lead Conference USA 
(C-USA) in attendance. However, intercollegiate athletic success nearly 
always is accompanied by substantial financial investments in facilities, 
coaches and financial aid for athletes. So also, it has been at ODU. Table 
6 reports intercollegiate athletic revenues and expenditures 
at the University from FY 2003 to FY 2019. Both revenues 
and expenditures quadrupled during this period, and the 
compound average growth rate in expenditures was a 
hefty 8.68% annually. The primary reason for the increased 
costs was the advent of football at ODU and the University’s 
membership in C-USA.  
The modern-era Monarch footballers (the “Division” played football as the 
William & Mary Norfolk Braves from 1930 to 1940) played and won their first 
game in 2009 against Chowan University, 36-21. ODU competed successfully 
in the Colonial Athletic Association in 2011 and 2012, and in 2013 joined 
C-USA, a diverse collection of mostly public Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) 
institutions sprinkled geographically from Miami to El Paso, Texas. The 
Monarchs spent 2013 as an independent and began to compete for the 
C-USA football title in 2014. The team won the Bahamas Bowl in 2016 against 
Eastern Michigan University and currently boasts seven alumni who play in the 
National Football League.  
Along the way, the Monarch football program generated excitement. Until 
recently, the teams typically played before sellout crowds, and contests were 
preceded by lively pregame festivities. Quarterback Taylor Heinicke set 
Football Championship Subdivision (FCS) records for the most passing yards 
in a single season as well as for the most completions in a season and in 2012 
won what is considered the Heisman Trophy of the FCS, the Walter Payton 
Award. In the otherwise down season of 2018, the Monarchs stunned No. 13 
Virginia Tech, beating the Hokies 49-35.
Those are some of the highlights. Losing seasons, including a 1-11 finish in 
2019, have taken the shine off ODU football, and attendance at games has 
fallen significantly. COVID-19 forced the cancellation of the 2020 season and 
eliminated an important revenue stream. However, this did not eliminate the 
need to service the bonds sold to finance newly constructed and attractively 
renovated S.B. Ballard Stadium.   
It is worth noting that Central Florida, Western Kentucky, Coastal Carolina, 
Florida Atlantic and Georgia Southern all suffered losing seasons after moving 
up to the FBS. But they hired prominent coaches, prospered and played in 
nationally televised games because of the success they experienced in the 
FCS. ODU recently hired a new head coach in Ricky Rahne, a former Penn 
State offensive coordinator, who has made a promising start in rebuilding the 
program. Acquiring the offensive coordinator from one of the nation’s most 
storied football programs constitutes a visible boost for the football program.
While attendance has fallen in recent years, revenue has not. 
Since moving to FBS, ticket revenue has increased an average 
of 2.5% annually (though it has suffered recently) and ODU’s 
fundraising has increased significantly. In calendar year 
2010, the Old Dominion Athletic Foundation (ODAF) raised 
$4,220,550. In 2018, annual fundraising rose to $16,755,345, 
a 297% increase. Even in 2020, when the pandemic reduced 
the University’s revenues, ODAF still raised $10,464,240.
In 2019, ODU received $1.57 million in guarantees for playing 
football games on the road. Additionally, C-USA shares in 
revenue from the College Football Playoff, of which ODU 
receives about $1 million annually. Three road games have 
been scheduled in the next few years with Southeastern 
Conference programs that will pay ODU between $1.5 million 
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and $2 million per game. These revenues would decline, 
though not disappear, if ODU were playing in the FCS. A good 
payday when an FCS school plays an ACC or SEC opponent is 
$500,000 to $700,000. 
Students have proven to be diffident concerning Monarch football, and their 
attendance has been disappointing. Nevertheless, in 2019-20, a full-
time undergraduate student paid a mandatory $1,935.38 
per academic year athletic fee to finance ODU intercollegiate 
athletics. For a full-time undergraduate who takes 30 semester 
hours in an academic year, this translates to $64.51 per credit 
hour, or $193.54 per three-hour course. These data come from 
SCHEV.36  
One will search in vain on the ODU website for specific data relating to the 
athletic fee. The website diplomatically notes: “The University term ‘tuition’ 
refers to a per-credit-hour comprehensive rate that includes payment for 
instructional programs, academic services and activities, recreational 
sports, and intercollegiate athletics which includes a student activity fee 
of $125.69 per credit hour for Norfolk campus courses, $109.55 per credit 
hour for Higher Education Centers, Distance Learning, and online courses not 
at designated distance learning locations.”37 However, despite the size of the 
fee, the University’s 2020-21 Schedule of Tuition, Fees, and Service Charges 
does not mention it by name.38 This schedule did, however, find room to list 
hundreds of other obscure fees, including a diaper provision fee ($6 per week) 
and a paraffin bath fee ($30).  
Note in Table 6 that in the year when ODU began to play football (2009), 
annual intercollegiate athletic expenditures rose about $7.5 million, and when 
the University moved up to FBS football in 2012, annual expenditures rose 
another $7 million. These expenditures were deemed necessary to pay for the 
accoutrements of bigger-time football, including the transformation of Foreman 
36   “2019-2020 Tuition and Fees Report,” Appendix D-1, State Council of Higher Education for Virginia, 
https://schev.edu/docs/default-source/Reports-and-Studies/2019/201920tuitionandfeereport.pdf. Note 
that six institutions (W&M, CNU, UVA Wise, JMU, LU and VMI) assessed their undergraduate student 
athletic fees even higher than Old Dominion. Strong reliance upon student fees to fund intercollegiate athletic 
programs is distinctive to Virginia.
37   Old Dominion University, 2020-2021 tuition rates, https://odu.edu/tuition-aid/costs-tuition/tuition/tuition-
rates.
38   Old Dominion University, “2020-2021 Schedule of Tuition, Fees, and Service Charges,” file:///H:/AEA%20
Journals/tuition-fee-schedule.pdf.
Field into S.B. Ballard Stadium. Attractive though it clearly is, S.B. Ballard is 
a 21,000-seat stadium that appears to suit the needs of an FCS-level team 
rather than an FBS-level program. Absent the appearance of a financial angel, 
however, the critical dimensions of the stadium are unlikely to change.  
While ODU’s athletic expenses have increased, productive 
fundraising has mitigated the impact on students and student 
fees. Between the 2012-13 athletic season (the University’s 
last in the CAA) and 2018-19, athletic expenditures financed 
by student athletic fees rose only from $27,089,358 to 
$28,784,075, according to the Virginia Auditor of Public 
Accounts. This reflects the impact of a state statute enacted 
in 2015 that limits ODU to funding no more than 55% of its 
athletic budget from student fees.  
The Commonwealth’s restrictions are far less cumbersome 
for FCS programs, which can fund up to 70% of their athletic 
budgets with student fees. James Madison University, for 
instance, spent $27,011,357 in student fees in 2012-13, but 
unrestrained by the 55% FBS limit, expended $41,576,716 in 
2019.  
It is no secret that ODU’s membership in C-USA has presented 
challenges. Yes, it enabled the Monarchs to move their football 
program into the FBS but failed to offer the University any 
natural geographic rivals. Fans may yawn when the Monarchs play 
Middle Tennessee State University or the University of Texas at San Antonio.39 
It is not that these institutions are not capable of producing strong teams; they 
are. But, fan interest in, say, a matchup between ODU and the University 
of Southern Mississippi (another C-USA member) is low compared to what 
it would be if the opponent were JMU, William & Mary or the University of 
Richmond. Fans would attend games against these latter opponents even if they 
believed the Monarchs were likely to lose. Not so for C-USA contests.
However, moving to FBS has allowed ODU to play a much more attractive 
nonconference schedule that has included home games with North Carolina, 
39   We suspect much the same attitudes hold true in Tennessee and Texas with respect to Old Dominion. 
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N.C. State and Virginia Tech. The Monarchs’ 2018 victory over Tech gave the 
University a week’s worth of national publicity that reached tens of millions of 
people. Defeating the Hokies in Norfolk was one of the biggest moments in 
ODU athletic history. 
Beginning in 2022, Virginia Tech will visit ODU five times over the ensuing 10 
seasons. Virginia and Wake Forest also will come to Norfolk, as will Army and 
East Carolina. None of these home games would have been possible had ODU 
not moved up to the FBS.  
Modest fan interest in the C-USA has translated into low revenue from 
television contracts. Television contracts reflect the number of people who watch 
contests. Realistically, this number is small for most C-USA athletic events.    
C-USA membership also brought with it vastly increased travel costs. As 
the crow flies, it is 1,755 miles from Norfolk to El Paso, the home of C-USA 
member the University of Texas at El Paso. It is expensive to take teams to such 
locations, to say nothing of the class time the student-athletes forfeit. C-USA 
has massaged its scheduling to reduce travel distances and travel times, but in 
the end, reality is that C-USA members are geographically dispersed.  
The C-USA has evolved into a different league than the one 
ODU initially joined, while the CAA similarly is a far different 
league from the one the University left. East Carolina, Tulsa 
and Tulane were C-USA league members in 2013; ECU almost 
surely would have become a major rival for the Monarchs. 
However, those schools left for the American Athletic 
Conference. One of the primary reasons for leaving the CAA 
was the impending loss of traditional rivals GMU and VCU, as 
their transition to the A-10 Conference was imminent. 
Given ODU’s attractive but smallish football stadium, the general lack of fan 
interest in C-USA opponents, the absence of a lucrative C-USA television 
arrangement, the costs associated with being a member of that conference 
and the costs of playing FBS football rather than FCS football, many external 
observers who do not have a horse in the race believe it would be in the 
University’s best interests to move Monarch football back to the FCS (which 
would mean returning to the CAA in football). Other sports, especially men’s 
and women’s basketball, could conceivably join a conference such as the 
Atlantic 10, where traditional opponents such as GMU, Richmond and VCU 
compete.
The conference movements just described might not be easy to accomplish. 
Some “hat in hand” approaches, apologies and even payments might be 
required. Nevertheless, this could well be the beginning of a viable path to 
long-term financial stability and increased fan interest in ODU intercollegiate 
athletics.   
There are other scenarios. Moving ODU out of C-USA, playing 
football as an FBS independent and moving other sports to 
the A-10 is another possible path forward. Liberty University 
and the University of Connecticut recently became football 
independents at the FBS level and have had no problem 
scheduling quality games or signing TV contracts with 
national networks. FBS independents such as Brigham Young 
University, Notre Dame, Army and others are eligible for bowl 
games, have the flexibility to schedule regional opponents 
and multiple guarantee games in a season, and benefit 
from the exposure of playing at the highest level of college 
football. Additionally, UConn has seen a significant increase in 
fundraising because it moved basketball and other sports back 
into the Big East. Liberty finished the shortened 2020 football 
season in the Top 25.
Another potential option that has been gaining momentum 
would see C-USA and the Sun Belt Conference exchange 
members to create an East-based league, of which ODU would 
be a part. This would address the issues of travel costs, missed 
class time and undesirable league opponents, among other 
things. While long considered, discussions on this proposal 
have become more serious as of late.
All three of the possibilities just described would be challenging 
to implement but are worth exploring and possibly pursuing. 
The inherent obstacle to moving to another conference is that 
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it would require many other universities and commissioners 
involved to agree. It is fair to say this is an unstable 
environment subject to rapid change. ODU should continually 
evaluate its circumstances and be prepared to act if and when 
more favorable options become available.
TABLE 6
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS REVENUES AND EXPENSES: 























Source: U.S. Department of Education, “Equity in Athletics Data Analysis,” https://ope.ed.gov/athletics/#/
A Few Missteps
Fortunately, Old Dominion has avoided many of the mistakes 
that have waylaid the prosperity of other institutions, though 
as already noted, one exception was the institution’s failure to 
capitalize upon its enviable position in distance learning. Even 
so, perfect foresight never will exist, and dozens of real and 
bogus opportunities compete for the attention of presidents, 
administrators and faculty members. Hence, we should not 
expect flawless performances year after year.   
In the 1990s, under the leadership of Provost JoAnn Gora, the University 
moved to guarantee every undergraduate student a practicum connected to his 
or her course of study. Of course, many practicums already existed in the form 
of student teaching, the training of nurses and physical therapists, internships 
and the like. The aims of the practicum guarantee, an idea that originated with 
Northeastern University in Boston, were twofold. First, it would improve the 
undergraduate experience and connect classroom instruction to the real world. 
Second, it would constitute an attractive recruiting device. Somewhere along 
the way, this initiative withered and disappeared.  
Less than optimal decisions also include the financial arrangements that ODU, 
via its Real Estate Foundation, negotiated in its University Village development 
on the east side of Hampton Boulevard. The University committed itself to a 
60-year leasing arrangement that includes a 3% annual escalation in lease 
payments. Although this agreement has floated under the radar, it has proven 
to be expensive.
As this is being written, consideration is being given within the region to ways 
in which three of the area’s major health/medical players – Sentara, ODU and 
Eastern Virginia Medical School – might join forces to improve the provision 
of health care and (not to be ignored) spur the region’s long-term economic 
development. With respect to this latter point, one of the obvious differences 
between Hampton Roads and other mid-Atlantic metropolitan regions that are 
growing faster than ours is the comparative absence of a vigorous “ed-med” 
complex in our area. Several opportunities to achieve a blending or merger 
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of ODU and EVMS existed in the past but either were ignored, fumbled or 
opposed by members of the regional power structure.
In late 2020, EVMS staked out a position of public opposition to anything that 
involved merger and mounted a public relations blitz to amplify its objections. 
The Virginian-Pilot did not react favorably to those efforts,40 however. 
Significant members of the regional power structure, including Sentara, believe 
the merger notion has some merit. There are economies of scale to be realized 
and possibilities for the sharing of resources, especially where faculty are 
concerned and with respect to ODU’s distance learning capabilities as they 
might apply to telemedicine. Sentara wields immense influence; it employs 
more than 30,000 people at 12 hospitals and earned revenues of $3.9 billion 
even in the first six pandemic-affected months of 2020.41  
Taking a longer view, when the Virginia General Assembly decided in the late 
1960s to merge the Medical College of Virginia into the Richmond Professional 
Institute, leading to the creation of Virginia Commonwealth University in 1969, 
this idea met with strident opposition from MCV-related individuals, who said 
the combination would never work and would do serious damage to MCV’s 
reputation.42 Lawsuits were filed and attempts made in the General Assembly 
to reverse the merger, but all came to naught.  
Fifty years later, it is apparent that the MCV/RPI merger into VCU was one of 
the smartest things ever done by the Richmond metropolitan region. Today’s 
VCU Health is a leader in health care and a massive contributor to the 
economic dynamism of the Richmond area. It seems reasonable to expect a 
similar evolution were ODU and EVMS to merge, accompanied by significant 
financial support from Sentara.
40   “Editorial: Time for a Discussion About the Future of EVMS,” The Virginian-Pilot (Dec. 3, 2020), www.
pilotonline.com/opinion/vp-ed-editorial-evms-future-1204-20201203-pjnojurupvayfeabv6t5g4rhpu-story.
html.
41   Ayla Ellison, “Sentara’s Health Plan Revenue Helps Offset COVID-19s Financial Damage,” Becker’s Health 
Care Hospital CFO Report (Aug. 17, 2020), www.beckershospitalreview.com/finance/sentara-s-health-plan-
revenue-helps-offset-covid-19-financial-damage.html.
42   See one example: “Warren Brandt, VCU’s President in a Time of Transition and Turmoil, Dies at 93,” VCU 
News (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.news.vcu.edu/article/.  
Covid-19 And “The Cliff”
The COVID-19 pandemic has changed higher education in a variety of 
ways, good and bad, but its impact on enrollments represents an existential 
threat to colleges and universities. Headcount enrollments declined once 
again in fall 2020, making it the ninth consecutive year that such enrollments 
have declined in American higher education. We should expect to see some 
institutions shutter their doors over the next year, even if effective vaccines are 
deployed, because of their already parlous financial condition, deteriorating 
demographic prospects (which we cite subsequently) and changing student 
tastes.   
As already noted, Old Dominion was a welcome exception to the continuing 
trend of declining enrollments. The University’s ability to offer quality 
distance learning courses plus one of the lowest COVID-19 infection rates 
on any Virginia public campus proved to be attractive to students. It does 
seem possible that vaccines and adjustments in behavior will overcome the 
challenges thrust on ODU by COVID-19, but some of the habits students and 
faculty have acquired during recent restrictions are not going to disappear. 
Increased use of distance learning will remain with us, as will versions of less 
centralized, locationally distributed administrative models.
It will be challenging in the coming years for ODU to maintain its current 
headcount enrollment unless it develops new markets and/or implements new 
enrollment approaches and strategies. Table 7 reports the number 
of high school graduates the Western Interstate Commission 
for Higher Education (WICHE) projects for Virginia between 
2020-21 and 2036-37. The projections are uniformly negative 
– WICHE foresees a 4.60% decline in high school graduates in 
Virginia, 9.69% in the mid-Atlantic region and 6.18% in the 
United States. Some now refer to this anticipated decline as a 
cliff.43 Whatever the label, this phenomenon must be a matter 
of concern for ODU.   
43   Eric Hoover, “The Demographic Cliff: 5 Findings from New Projections of High School Graduates,” The 
Chronicle of Higher Education (Dec. 15, 2020), www.chronicle.com/article/the-demographic-cliff-5-
findings-from-new-projections-of-high-school-graduates.
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Since the University already has drifted in the direction of becoming an 
open-admission institution at the undergraduate level (ODU admitted 89% of 
undergraduate applicants in fall 2019),44 there is little room for downward 
adjustment in terms of admission standards, a traditional remedy for 
enrollment-pressed institutions. If the University is going to maintain its current 
headcount, it must develop new admission markets and/or become more 
effective in existing markets.  
TABLE 7
PROJECTED NUMBER OF HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES IN 
VIRGINIA, THE MID-ATLANTIC REGION AND THE 













2020-2021 467,890   
 2036-2037 422,540 -9.69%
United States 2020-2021 3,750,170
2036-2037 3,518,410 -6.18%
Source: “Knocking at the College Door: Projections of High School Graduates,” Western Interstate Commission 
for Higher Education, 2020, www.knocking.wiche.edu
The population growth nexus of Virginia is banana-shaped, with the tip of the 
banana starting in Northern Virginia, extending south through the Richmond 
metropolitan area and ending with the tail of the banana at the oceanfront in 
Virginia Beach. With a few exceptions, such as Charlottesville and Blacksburg, 
population in the rest of Virginia will decline over the next two decades. 
Admission efforts need to focus intently on Northern Virginia, where ODU’s 
image is hazy, and its recognition currently is not high. Retrospectively, it 
was a mistake for the University not to nurture the superbly 
located center it opened in Loudoun County in the 1990s. Not 
44   National Center for Education Statistics, College Navigator, https://nces.ed.gov/collegenavigator/?q=old+d
ominion&s=all&id=232982#admsns.
only could that center have enrolled significant numbers of students, but also it 
would have given ODU badly needed visibility in Northern Virginia and made 
it much more of a player in the region and statewide.  
Today, any intelligent ODU admission strategy must include 
a dramatically increased emphasis on Northern Virginia. 
Pragmatically, this is where the students are, and the 
University’s admission efforts and resource allocations must 
recognize this.   
Historically, institutions often have turned to international students to fill 
their ranks. However, both the actions of the Trump administration and the 
effects of COVID-19 have reduced the flow of international students into the 
United States. The Biden administration’s approach to international students 
differs, and we all hope that vaccines and other preventive measures will put 
COVID-19 in our proverbial rearview mirror. International student recruitment 
is not inexpensive, however, and international students require extra attention 
when they arrive on campus. They add positively to the campus milieu in many 
ways, but more so than domestic students, require additional resources. The 
potential to increase international student enrollment over the 
next two decades is significant, and the University’s internal 
resource allocations should reflect this.
Several counties in North Carolina are included in the Hampton Roads 
metropolitan region by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, which 
defines such things. Students from these North Carolina collar counties, 
however, pay out-of-state tuition to attend ODU. The University should pursue 
legislative approval to grant in-state tuition to any student coming to it from 
within this larger Virginia Beach/Norfolk/Newport News metropolitan region. 
Finally, ODU should discuss openly its enrollment strategies 
and admission standards. Simply put, Virginia is not a state that 
historically has valued institutions with minimal admission standards. Thus, 
while the evolution of ODU toward providing greater access and controlling 
cost increases may have immense social value, it is not a strategy that is likely 
to result either in editorial kudos or parents bragging that their son or daughter 
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just gained entrance. It certainly will not result in higher U.S. New & World 
Report rankings.  
As recently as 2005, the University admitted only 69.4% of its undergraduate 
admission applicants;45 it now admits almost 90% of applicants, approximately 
40% of whom are Pell Grant recipients. This is a step in the direction of helping 
make Virginia a more opportunity-oriented, equitable place to live. However, 
as we have noted, this is not viewed as a propitious development – at least in 
the realm of higher education – by many influential Virginians, whose views 
reflect the historically restrictive character of Virginia society and the state’s 
public higher education system.  
Any set of admission standards involves tradeoffs between societal equity (as 
evidenced by access and affordability) and prestige (external rankings and 
restrictive admissions are the primary indicators). More of one often means less 
of the other. There are both benefits and costs attached to ODU’s admission 
evolution, which has focused on equity rather than prestige.      
Query what the best admission policy is for ODU to pursue as it faces a 
decline in the number of high school graduates throughout the nation. Ours is 
not to tell the University what its admission standards should be, but instead 
to suggest that the costs and benefits of various sets of admission standards 
should be discussed in appropriate offices on campus so that those affected 
understand the tradeoffs.  
45   IPEDS, the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, National Center for Education Statistics, 
https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds.
Final Observations
Old Dominion University as an entity is now 91 years old. More innovative 
than most institutions of higher education in Virginia, it has on several 
occasions chosen paths that set it apart from other four-year public universities, 
especially those designated research institutions, as is ODU.  
Two examples will suffice. Early in the 1990s, ODU began to make a serious 
commitment to distance learning. This effort was greeted with warm approval 
by students and elected officials but pooh-poohed by a significant number of 
its counterpart institutions in the Commonwealth. Time has a way of fashioning 
judgments and more than 25 years later, other institutions strive to come within 
shouting distance of what ODU has accomplished in the distance learning 
arena.   
The jury is still out with respect to the other departure from conventional 
higher education wisdom in Virginia, namely, ODU evolving into an institution 
that places a high value on being both accessible and affordable. This is a 
departure from the restricted-entry, high-cost model that historically has been 
the coin of the realm in Virginia higher education. Plaudits and prestige always 
have gone to the institutions that have evinced high admission standards and 
enrolled small proportions of lower-income and minority students.       
In recent years, ODU has emphasized the provision of opportunities to a wide 
range of students and has recorded the lowest increase in its sticker price 
tuition and fees of any four-year public Virginia university between 2000-01 
and 2020-21.46 It has assembled a racially diverse student body, and 45% 
of its first-time, full-time undergraduate students in 2018-19 were Pell Grant 
recipients, well above the Virginia four-year public institution average.    
The 2020 and 2021 sessions of the General Assembly, after dealing with the 
complications of COVID-19, gave ODU special General Fund additions to 
help it deal with its challenges, and at the same time recognized the extensive 
financial need of its student body by means of larger student financial aid 
allocations. These represented the first significant occasions when the governor 
46   These ranged from Old Dominion’s 173.9% increase to the stratospheric increases of Christopher Newport 
University (379.65%), William & Mary (394.3%) and the University of Virginia (345.2%).    
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and the General Assembly have acknowledged the distinctive nature of ODU 
among the state’s research institutions. There is more to be done in this regard.
John R. Broderick concluded a very successful presidency in 
summer 2021 – one marked by record-setting performances 
in a variety of critical areas, including prodigious campus 
construction and expansion, highly productive fundraising and 
unprecedented legislative success. He left the institution in far 
better shape than the one he inherited.  
Challenges remain, however, for example, the University’s relationships 
with EVMS and Sentara Healthcare. Helping supercharge Hampton Roads 
out of its decade-long pattern of modest economic growth must be a high-
priority undertaking for the University. Improving retention and graduation-
rate performances is also a top-drawer goal. Despite conspicuous success, 
redefining the institution’s intercollegiate athletic future may be required. And, 
as previously noted, there is an enrollment “cliff” looming just over the horizon. 
This list could go on, but to lengthen it would imply that ODU is beset by 
problems. It is not. Even so, Rodney Dangerfield’s “I don’t get no respect” 
calling card often does apply to the University. It will take high-quality, 
visionary leadership combined with sterling faculty and staff performances to 
alter this reality.   

Bad News: The Decline 
of Local Journalism
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BAD NEWS: THE DECLINE OF LOCAL JOURNALISM
The lowest form of popular culture – lack of information, misinformation, disinformation, and a contempt for the truth 
or the reality of most people’s lives – has overrun real journalism. Today, ordinary Americans are being stuffed with 
garbage.
– Carl Bernstein, American investigative journalist and author
L
ocal journalism is in peril. Newspapers all over the country are reducing coverage, cutting back staff, abandoning physical newsrooms or shuttering 
operations altogether at a breathtaking pace. The United States has lost fully one-fourth of its newspapers since 2004, including 70 dailies and more than 
2,000 weeklies or other nondaily papers. Weekday circulation of the remaining newspapers has fallen even more sharply in the same time period – from 
nearly 55 million in 2004 to 24 million in 2020 (Table 1). Correspondingly, there are now fewer reporters covering news in our local communities. The Pew 
Research Center reports that U.S. newspapers have lost 57% of their newsroom employees since 2008.1
This chapter examines how these worrisome trends have affected local1 
journalism in Hampton Roads. Newspapers – whether print or online – have 
long provided the vast majority of “iron core” news, a term we borrow from 
the distinguished journalist Alex S. Jones. The iron core is fact-based, serious 
reporting; it includes bearing witness at crime scenes, protests and school 
board meetings, but also digging deeper to provide context and explain 
complex stories, to shine a light on corruption and injustice, and to hold those 
in power accountable.2 Columnists, pundits, news aggregators, your neighbors 
who post on social media and talking heads on cable television all depend 
on the iron core, although they generally contribute little to it themselves. 
The breadth and depth of local coverage in our region’s 
newspapers has shrunk dramatically in the past two decades, 
but no similarly comprehensive, critical source of news and 
information has emerged to fill the gap. The newspaper crisis points 
to a deeper crisis in the functioning of our civic institutions. Without a robust, 
1   Penelope Muse Abernathy, “News Deserts and Ghost Newspapers: Will Local News Survive?” (2020), pg. 11, 
at: https://www.usnewsdeserts.com/reports/news-deserts-and-ghost-newspapers-will-local-news-survive/; 
Pew Research Center, Newspapers Fact Sheet (July 9, 2019), at: https://www.journalism.org/fact-sheet/
newspapers/; and Elizabeth Grieco, “U.S. newspapers have shed half of their newsroom employees since 
2008” (April 20, 2020), at: https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/04/20/u-s-newsroom-employ-
ment-hasdropped-by-a-quarter-since-2008/.
2   Alex S. Jones, Losing the News: The Future of the News That Feeds Democracy (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 1-6.
reliable and independent source of fact-based news, there can be no common 
basis for understanding, discussing or enhancing the state of our region.
The initial trigger for the crisis in local journalism was the digital revolution. 
In the early years of the 21st century, newspapers lost their near-monopoly as 
a comprehensive source for up-to-date information about local communities 
and beyond. Readers and advertisers increasingly turned to various internet 
sites instead. Consumers were (and are) reluctant to pay for digital content, 
and media enterprises that had thrived for decades suddenly struggled to find 
a viable model for producing and delivering the news. The Great Recession of 
2007-2009 coincided with the widespread adoption of the smartphone and 
social media, and advertising dollars for traditional news outlets plummeted. 
Between 2004 and 2020, annual advertising revenue in the U.S. newspaper 
industry sank from $48 billion to $8 billion, a staggering decrease of 82% 
(Table 2).
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TABLE 1
TOTAL ESTIMATED CIRCULATION 
















Sources: Pew Research Center Newspapers Fact Sheet (June 29, 2021), at https://www.journalism.org/
fact-sheet/newspapers/, and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University. 
Figures after 2004 take both print and online readership into consideration.
TABLE 2
ESTIMATED ADVERTISING AND CIRCULATION REVENUE OF 
THE U.S. NEWSPAPER INDUSTRY, SELECTED YEARS
Year Advertising Revenue Circulation Revenue
1968 $5,232,000,000 $2,288,215,000 
1972 $6,939,000,000 $2,929,233,000 
1976 $9,618,000,000 $4,087,303,000 
1980 $14,794,000,000 $5,469,589,000 
1984 $23,522,000,000 $7,368,158,000 
1988 $31,197,000,000 $8,046,287,000 
1992 $30,639,000,000 $9,163,534,000 
1996 $38,075,000,000 $9,969,240,000 
2000 $48,670,000,000 $10,540,643,000 
2004 $48,244,000,000 $10,988,651,000 
2008 $37,848,257,630 $10,086,956,940 
2012 $25,316,461,215 $10,448,561,493 
2016 $18,274,943,567 $10,910,460,499 
2020 $8,833,842,400 $11,091,733,928 
Source: Pew Research Center Newspapers Fact Sheet (June 29, 2021), at https://www.journalism.org/fact-
sheet/newspapers/ 
The collapse of the for-profit business model that sustained newspapers 
in the 20th century has been accompanied by an unprecedented wave of 
buying and selling, resulting in the massive consolidation of the 21st-century 
newspaper industry. A handful of very large publicly traded chains that are 
dominated by various investment entities now “control the fate of more than 
1,000 papers, including a third of the nation’s dailies, and more than half of 
total circulation.”3 These include Hampton Roads’ two daily newspapers, The 
Virginian-Pilot and Daily Press, both owned by Tribune Publishing Co. Earlier 
this year, Tribune was fully acquired by its largest shareholder, the hedge fund 
3   Abernathy, “News Deserts and Ghost Newspapers,” 21 and 33.
Alden Global Capital LLC. Privately held regional chains, including Boone 
Newspapers Inc. and Landmark Media Enterprises LLC, own or manage many 
of the remaining U.S. newspapers. (Table 3)
The coronavirus pandemic has placed local journalism under further stress. 
Steven Waldman, an astute observer of the crisis, notes that “even before 
COVID-19, the local media system was a strong breeze away from collapsing. 
A hurricane is now blowing through the local news landscape.”4 The Pew 
4   Steven Waldman, “A Replanting Strategy: Saving Local Newspapers Squeezed by Hedge Funds,” Center 
for Journalism & Liberty (Sept. 28, 2020), 4, at: https://www.journalismliberty.org/publications/replanting-
strategy-saving-local-newspapers-squeezed-by-hedge-fund.
THE STATE OF THE REGION  |  HAMPTON ROADS 2021146
Research Center has tracked how the advertising revenue of publicly traded 
newspaper companies – already at a historic low – fell precipitously in the 
first quarter of 2020. The companies responded by slashing payrolls, selling 
property and closing newsrooms, reducing print days or stopping production 
of some papers altogether.
Hampton Roads is immune to none of these trends. In fact, 
our region provides both an exemplary case study and a 
cautionary tale of the decline of local journalism. This decline 
merits our attention no less than our region’s economic 
recovery or ability to create high-paying jobs. The well-
being of Hampton Roads depends on reliable information, 
community dialogue, accountable leadership and well-
functioning institutions – all of which are fostered by high-
quality local journalism. Conversely, regions without a 
thriving press have been shown to have lower levels of voter 
participation and civic engagement, higher rates of municipal 
borrowing and government inefficiency, and a diminished 
sense of community. Residents of communities without a 
newspaper are more likely to view local affairs through a 
national political lens, or to get their information from bogus 
or overtly partisan news sources.
This chapter provides an overview of the local press in Hampton Roads, 
and how it has evolved over time. We show how the fate of our regional 
news media reflects broader developments around the country, including the 
transformation of longstanding publications into “ghost newspapers” and the 
ominous spread of “news deserts.” These terms were coined by Penelope Muse 
Abernathy, visiting professor at Northwestern University’s Medill School of 
Journalism (formerly at the University of North Carolina’s Center for Innovation 
and Sustainability in Local Media). Her work provides an essential resource for 
this chapter. Finally, we underscore the importance of local journalism, even (or 
especially) in the changed media landscape of the 21st century, and we point 
to potential models for its economic sustainability in the years ahead.
TABLE 3
LARGEST 10 NEWSPAPER OWNERS, RANKED BY 
NUMBER OF PAPERS OWNED, 2019



































Source: “News Deserts and Ghost Newspapers: Will Local News Survive?”,  https://www.usnewsdeserts.
com/reports/news-deserts-and-ghost-newspapers-will-local-news-survive/ 
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GRAPH 1
EMPLOYMENT IN NEWSPAPER NEWSROOMS: 
UNITED STATES, 2004-2020
Sources: Pew Research Center Newspapers Fact Sheet (June 29, 2021), at https://www.journalism.org/fact-sheet/newspapers/; Elizabeth Grieco, "U.S. newspapers have shed half of their newsroom employees since 2008" (April 20, 
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Sources: Pew Research Center Newspapers Fact Sheet (June 29, 2021), at: https://www.journalism.org/fact-sheet/newspapers/ Elizabeth Grieco, "U.S. newspapers have shed half of their newsroom employees since 
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The Newspaper Business 
In Hampton Roads: How We 
Got Here
Hampton Roads’ oldest newspapers have a long history. The Colonial-era 
Virginia Gazette (Williamsburg) first appeared in 1736, and numerous 
papers have adopted that name since, including the modern weekly that was 
founded in 1930 – and still operates today, publishing two issues a week. The 
Virginian-Pilot traces its roots back to 1865. The Suffolk News-Herald was 
established in 1873, the Daily Press (Newport News) in 1896, the Journal and 
Guide (Norfolk) in 1900 (known as the New Journal and Guide since 1991) 
and The Tidewater News (Franklin) in 1905. Over time, our region has been 
home to dozens of daily and weekly newspapers. Many were short-lived, but 
others circulated for years before going out of print or merging with other 
papers. 
Like nearly all other businesses, newspapers in the American South were once 
strictly segregated by race. With the exception of the New Journal and Guide, 
all of the aforementioned papers were originally produced by and for white 
readers. Many years ago, the Journal and Guide was one of numerous Black 
papers in our region, although it quickly became the most influential. By the 
1930s, the weekly publication had become the most widely distributed Black 
newspaper in the South and even introduced a national edition.
Newspapers became big business in the late 19th century. Technical advances 
enabled cheaper and faster printing, and publishers sought to attract a mass 
audience with exciting headlines, illustrations, puzzles and other popular 
features. A circulation war between the big-city newspapers of William 
Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer infamously gave rise to an era of 
sensational “yellow journalism.”
In towns all over the country, however, a different model of journalism 
ultimately took hold, governed by emerging professional standards of 
accuracy, fairness and public accountability. Penelope Muse Abernathy notes 
that general-interest newspapers “were largely owned by local residents. 
These publishers and their editors often had political clout in their states and 
cities, but – whether conservative or liberal – they had cultural and economic 
restraints. If they did not serve the interests of their readers and advertisers, 
they risked losing business to a competing paper.” The early newspaper barons 
– including Samuel Slover and his nephew Frank Batten Sr. at The Virginian-
Pilot and its related newspapers, and P.B. Young Sr. at the Journal and Guide 
– “established the modern, multi-subject newspaper and became the dominant 
advertising option for most local businesses.”5
As the 20th century progressed, these local newspapers reflected and were 
shaped by the following key trends:
• A business model that balanced profit seeking with civic responsibility. 
Local newspapers were not charitable enterprises; the most successful owners 
became quite wealthy and established family dynasties. At the same time, 
however, most took their civic responsibility seriously. They influenced their 
communities not only as businessmen, but also as philanthropists, board 
members and informal power brokers. They sometimes challenged political 
leaders or took controversial stands (witness The Virginian-Pilot’s Pulitzer 
Prize-winning editorials against lynching in the 1920s, and against massive 
resistance to racially integrated schools in the 1950s), which ultimately 
enhanced the papers’ reputation as independent truth-tellers.
• Consolidation and the rise of big newspaper chains. As radio and later 
television vied for consumers’ attention, entrepreneurial newspaper owners 
purchased additional media outlets in order to stay competitive. Samuel 
Slover’s purchase of the Portsmouth Star in 1955 led to the establishment of 
Norfolk-Portsmouth Newspapers Inc., which grew to become the diversified 
media company Landmark Communications Inc. in 1967. In Newport News, 
the Daily Press became part of the Tribune media chain in 1986. In all but 
the largest cities, competing newspapers and morning/afternoon editions 
merged or went out of business. In Hampton Roads, The Virginian-Pilot’s 
former afternoon publication, The Ledger-Star, ceased operations in 1995. 
The desegregation of formerly white newspapers ultimately diminished the 
influence of the independent Black press, which was no longer an exclusive 
source of news and information for Black communities.
5   Penelope Muse Abernathy, “The Rise of a New Media Baron and the Emerging Threat of News Deserts” 
(2016), 20, at: http://newspaperownership.com/newspaper-ownership-report/.
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• De facto monopolies. By the century’s end, most U.S. metropolitan areas 
were served by a single daily newspaper. This was also true in Hampton 
Roads, if we consider Southside and the Peninsula two separate metro areas. 
The Virginian-Pilot and Daily Press covered different localities and largely 
avoided direct competition. Warren Buffett (whose Berkshire Hathaway 
conglomerate once included dozens of local papers) described such market-
dominant newspapers as “unregulated toll bridges” because their owners “had 
the relative freedom to increase rates” when and as much as they pleased.6 
Local employers seeking new talent, movie theaters announcing show times 
and anyone selling almost anything locally relied on newspaper advertising. 
Profit margins ranged not uncommonly between 20% and 40%. The “public 
service of publishing iron core news”7 rarely paid for itself, but it didn’t have 
to; it was heavily subsidized by more profitable aspects of the newspaper 
business.
Local Journalism Today: Are 
We Losing The News?
This business model came crashing down in the first decade of the 21st century. 
A very small circle of newspapers with national or even global audiences 
(The New York Times, The Washington Post and The Wall Street Journal) have 
successfully reinvented themselves in the digital era, but most other papers are 
struggling. As Penelope Muse Abernathy notes, “There is simply not enough 
digital or print revenue to pay for the public service journalism that local 
newspapers have historically provided.”8
This dilemma is driven in part by the loss of readers, but even more by the 
business of digital advertising, which now accounts for more than half of all 
U.S. advertising spending. Just three companies – Facebook, Amazon and 
Google – receive nearly two-thirds of all digital advertising dollars, leaving 
6   Margaret Sullivan, Ghosting the News: Local Journalism and the Crisis of American Democracy (New York: 
Columbia Global Reports, 2020), 36.
7   Jones, Losing the News, 15.
8   Penelope Muse Abernathy, “The Expanding News Desert” (2018), 8, at: https://www.cislm.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/10/The-Expanding-News-Desert-10_14-Web.pdf; and Keach Hagey, Lukas Alpert and 
Yaryna Serkez, “Local News Fades Out: A Divide between Newspaper Haves and Have-Nots,” The Wall 
Street Journal (May 4, 2019), at: https://www.wsj.com/graphics/local-newspapers-stark-divide/.
the news media and all other businesses, large and small, to compete for the 
rest. Most Hampton Roads newspapers have turned to paywalls, which allow 
readers a limited number of page views before they must pay for an online 
subscription.
Since 2004, the United States has lost approximately 2,100 
newspapers. A growing number of cities and counties 
have become “news deserts” – that is, they have no local 
newspaper and/or “very limited access to the sort of 
credible and comprehensive news and information that feeds 
democracy at the grassroots level.”9 Most news deserts are 
in rural, economically struggling localities, particularly in 
the South; their residents tend to be older, poorer and less 
educated than the U.S. population at large. The University of 
North Carolina’s Center for Innovation and Sustainability in 
Local Media identifies our region’s North Carolina localities 
(Currituck, Camden and Gates counties) as three of 225 U.S. 
counties without a local newspaper. The weekly Yorktown 
Crier-Poquoson Post, which was still listed on the UNC site last 
year, folded in 2019. 
9   Abernathy, “News Deserts and Ghost Newspapers,” 18-20.
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The absence of reliable local news is troubling enough, but it has also provided an opening for “imposter” local news websites 
that promote an ideological agenda. Such sites often have titles that resemble legacy newspapers (Outer Banks Times, South 
Tidewater News), but their stories are algorithmically generated or repurposed from other sources. They typically have no local 
address, and most, though not all, have a partisan bent. Hundreds of such sites sprang up in 2020, with “a sharp acceleration in 
activity in the lead-up to the November elections.”10 Unsurprisingly, this activity was greatest in swing states; one study found 
that North Carolina had more partisan local sites than any other U.S. state except Iowa, while Virginia had almost none.
10   Priyanjana Bengani, “As election looms, a network of mysterious ‘pink slime’ local news outlets nearly triples in size,” Columbia Journalism Review (Aug. 4, 2020), at: https://www.cjr.org/analysis/as-election-looms-a-network-of-
mysterious-pink-slime-local-news-outlets-nearly-triples-in-size.php; and Jessica Mahone and Philip Napoli, “Hundreds of hyperpartisan sites are masquerading as local news,” NiemanLab (July 13, 2020), at: 
https://www.niemanlab.org/2020/07/hundreds-of-hyperpartisan-sites-are-masquerading-as-local-news-this-map-shows-if-theres-one-near-you/.
Source: NiemanLab (2020). “Hundreds of hyperpartisan sites are masquerading as local news. This map shows if there’s one near you.”
Mexico 
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A variety of traditional news sources persist in our Virginia localities. Hampton 
Roads’ two daily newspapers, The Virginian-Pilot and Daily Press, have long 
been key sources of iron core news, particularly in our urban centers. In 
addition, there are several general-interest newspapers (publishing less than 
daily) that cover smaller localities. The New Journal and Guide delivers news 
for Black readers throughout Hampton Roads.
The number and diversity of these sources bode well for the greater 
Hampton Roads region. However, this comparatively bright news landscape 
harbors two darker phenomena for the future of regional journalism: first, 
the transformation of longstanding publications into “ghost newspapers” 
characterized by less original content, fewer publication days and greatly 
reduced news teams; and second, these newspapers’ acquisition by larger 
entities with an uncertain commitment to our region. These phenomena are 
interrelated and driven by the greater economic crisis of the newspaper 
industry.
When the valuation of newspaper companies plummeted in the early 2000s, 
independent owners all over the country declared bankruptcy or sold their 
papers to chains. Many of these chains were themselves acquired by larger 
chains or various investment entities. Penelope Muse Abernathy estimates that 
roughly half of all U.S. newspapers changed ownership between 2003 and 
2018. In Hampton Roads, almost every legacy newspaper has a different 
owner now than at the start of 2000: the publicly traded Tribune Publishing 
(acquired by Alden Global Capital) or one of three smaller LLCs affiliated 
with Boone Newspapers. (The Daily Press and Virginia Gazette were already 
Tribune papers.) The Gloucester-Mathews Gazette-Journal and The New 
Journal and Guide are the last independent legacy papers in our region. 
The Princess Anne Independent News, established in 2015, serves southern 
Virginia Beach and the Oceanfront.
Tribune Publishing And 
Our Regional Dailies: 
The Virginian-Pilot And 
Daily Press
The seismic changes in the newspaper industry surely became apparent 
to Hampton Roads readers no later than January 2008, when Landmark 
Communications chairman Frank Batten Jr. announced his decision to sell the 
company. The Slover and Batten families had been at the helm of newspapers 
in our region for over a century. Soon after Batten’s announcement, NBC 
Universal purchased The Weather Channel, Landmark’s most lucrative asset, 
for $3.5 billion. The private company has since sold most, but not all, of its 
media holdings. Today, Landmark Media Enterprises is still the 10th-largest 
newspaper owner in the country, although it owns none in Hampton Roads. 
Most of its properties are smaller community papers in Kentucky, Florida and 
other states.
The sale of The Virginian-Pilot, including its downtown Norfolk headquarters 
and Virginia Beach printing plant, was finalized in May 2018. (The paper had 
already downsized substantially under Landmark. Between 2003 and 2009 
alone, its newsroom staff shrank from 272 to 193 employees.11) The sale price 
of The Pilot was $34 million. Decades earlier, Batten commented, the paper 
might have been worth “10 or 15 times” more. Indeed, Hampton Roads’ other, 
smaller regional newspaper, the Daily Press, had sold for $200 million in 
1986.
Now both newspapers are owned by the same entity, Tribune Publishing 
(briefly known as Tronc at the time of sale). In November 2019, Alden 
Global Capital acquired a 32% stake in Tribune Publishing, becoming its 
largest shareholder. In February of this year, Alden announced its intent to 
purchase all remaining Tribune shares. Despite a dramatic, 11th-hour effort 
spearheaded by Maryland hotel executive Stewart Bainum Jr. to assemble the 
11   Roger Chesley, “Alden sets its sights on Tribune and a shudder runs through what’s left of two Virginia 
newspapers,” Virginia Mercury (Jan. 22, 2021), at: https://www.virginiamercury.com/2021/01/12/
alden-sets-its-sights-on-tribune-and-a-shudder-runs-through-whats-left-of-two-virginia-newspapers/.
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funding for a counteroffer, Tribune shareholders approved the $633 million 
sale to Alden on May 21. 
Alden Global Capital is a New York City-based hedge fund that was founded 
in 2007. It began acquiring stakes in the newspaper industry two years later, 
and it is now the country’s second-largest newspaper owner. The financial 
twists and turns that have informed the recent history of Tribune Publishing 
and Alden Global Capital are too byzantine to describe here. More important 
in this context is that both entities are foremost examples of the “new media 
barons” that have come to dominate the 21st-century newspaper industry. 
Penelope Muse Abernathy identifies several defining characteristics of the new 
media barons, including: emphasis on maximizing short-term shareholder 
return over longer-term investment in local journalism, majority control by a 
small number of institutional investors (often a private equity company, hedge 
fund or pension fund), multiple financial restructurings and diverse portfolios 
with much movement among individual newspapers.
Alden has been called the “ultimate cash flow mercenary,” the “grim reaper 
of American newspapers,” and “one of the most ruthless of the corporate 
strip miners seemingly intent on destroying local journalism.”12 The fund’s 
president, Heath Freeman, asserts that it is rescuing newspapers that would 
otherwise have folded, although media watchers suspect that it has instead set 
its sights on a dying industry, calculating that “a lot of money can be made 
on the way down.”13 According to the Financial Times, Alden’s MediaNews 
Group achieved “about 20-25 percent operating margins in 2019 … more 
12   Jonathan O’Connell and Emma Brown, “A hedge fund’s ‘mercenary’ strategy: Buy newspapers, slash jobs, 
sell the buildings,” The Washington Post (Feb. 11, 2019), at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
economy/a-hedge-funds-mercenary-strategy-buy-newspapers-slash-jobs-sell-the-buildings/2019/02/11/
f2c0c78a-1f59-11e9-8e21-59a09ff1e2a1_story.html; Joe Pompeo, “The hedge fund vampire that bleeds 
newspapers dry now has the Chicago Tribune by the throat,” Vanity Fair (Feb. 5, 2020), at: https://www.
vanityfair.com/news/2020/02/hedge-fund-vampire-alden-global-capital-that-bleeds-newspapers-dry-has-
chicago-tribune-by-the-throat; and Margaret Sullivan, “Is this strip mining or journalism?” The Washington 
Post (March 5, 2018), at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/is-this-strip-mining-or-journalism-
sobs-gasps-expletives-over-latest-denver-post-layoffs/2018/03/15/d05abc5a-287e-11e8-874b-
d517e912f125_story.html.
13   Sarah Ellison, “Heath Freeman is the hedge fund guy who says he wants to save local news. Somehow no 
one’s buying it,” The Washington Post (June 11, 2020), at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/
media/heath-freeman-is-the-hedge-fund-guy-who-says-he-wants-to-save-local-news-somehow-no-
ones-buying-it/2020/06/11/9850a15c-884a-11ea-8ac1-bfb250876b7a_story.html; and Savannah 
Jacobson, “The most feared owner in American journalism looks set to take some of its greatest assets,” 
Columbia Journalism Review (June 29, 2020), at: https://www.cjr.org/special_report/alden-global-capital-
medianews-tribune-company.php.
than double that of peers such as Gannett or even The New York Times.”14 
Its business model for newspapers is no secret: dramatic cost-cutting through 
staff layoffs and buyouts, selling off real estate assets such as newsrooms and 
printing plants, and wringing out profits wherever it can.
This strategy should sound familiar to Hampton Roads 
residents. In January 2020, The Virginian-Pilot headquarters 
in downtown Norfolk was sold to an apartment developer 
for $9.5 million. All newsroom operations moved to the Daily 
Press’ leased office space in Newport News’ City Center – 
until it, too, closed in September 2020. In June, the landlord 
had filed a lawsuit against the paper for $110,000 in unpaid 
rent. (That same quarter, Tribune Publishing reported a profit 
of $1.55 million). This February, editor Kris Worrell told us 
there are no immediate plans to reopen a newsroom after 
the pandemic, although the company is still considering what 
arrangements will make the most sense. The Pilot’s Virginia 
Beach printing plant closed in July 2020. All of Tribune’s 
Virginia publications are now printed in Richmond.
The news staff at the Tribune papers has continued to grow leaner. In February 
2020, the company accepted a new round of buyouts from employees with at 
least eight years of work history in its Virginia news operations. A few months 
later, reporters making more than $40,000 a year were required to take 
three weeks of unpaid furloughs due to the economic effects of COVID-19. In 
January 2021, former Virginian-Pilot columnist Roger Chesley reported that 
the blended news team of Tribune’s four Virginia papers (including the Virginia 
Gazette and Tidewater Review, which serves localities north of Hampton 
Roads) numbered about 70.
Kris Worrell, the papers’ shared editor, and Shaun Fogarty, executive director 
of sales, had a wide-ranging conversation with us in early February, before 
the announcement of the Alden sale. We spoke about their intent to create 
a unified news operation, bridging the stubborn divide between Southside 
Hampton Roads and the Peninsula that has long been a stumbling block for 
regional cooperation and economic development. We agreed that The Pilot 
14   Anna Nicolaou and James Fontanella-Khan, “The fight for the future of America’s local newspapers,” 
Financial Times (Jan. 21, 2021), at: https://www.ft.com/content/5c22075c-f1af-431d-bf39-becf9c54758b.
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and Daily Press are an unparalleled resource for regional news and in-depth 
reporting – more essential than ever in an era of misinformation, as a growing 
number of citizens and even elected leaders have begun to choose their own 
“facts.” No other news organization in Hampton Roads has the capacity to 
produce such consistently high-caliber journalism. Stories about the unjust 
application of Virginia’s “three strikes” law (Tim Eberly, a Pulitzer Prize finalist 
for his reporting), strip searches at Virginia prisons (Gary Harki) and an 
ongoing series on Norfolk’s racial divides (Sara Gregory and Ryan Murphy) 
are a few recent outstanding examples.
Nevertheless, we would be remiss not to state the obvious – the ability of 
The Pilot and Daily Press to pursue such in-depth stories, and their everyday 
coverage throughout our region, has grown much thinner since their 
operations merged. Under only a few months of full ownership by Alden 
Global Capital, local reporting has grown thinner still. Two days after the 
May 21 acquisition, the new owners offered yet another buyout to newsroom 
employees at all of the Tribune papers. This round has been especially costly 
for The Pilot and Daily Press. According to NewsGuild statistics, newsroom 
union staff at the two papers decreased from 46 to 38, a loss of 17.4%, after 
six weeks of Alden ownership (including two of the reporters mentioned in the 
previous paragraph). 
Three years ago, we had two daily papers. Now we essentially have one that 
covers a wider region with a smaller and less experienced news staff. The 
great challenge faced by the Tribune papers is perhaps not only encouraging 
readers to think regionally but also persuading these readers to pay more for 
less coverage within their immediate communities.
Boone Community 
Newspapers In Western 
Hampton Roads
Hampton Roads’ western localities are not only served by The Pilot and Daily 
Press, but also by community newspapers that have been in print as long – 
or longer – than the two larger dailies. Many decades ago, The Tidewater 
News, The Smithfield Times and Suffolk News-Herald may have looked not all 
that different from their counterparts in Norfolk and Newport News. Today, 
these much smaller papers fill a distinct niche in our regional news ecosystem, 
providing hyperlocal coverage outside our urban core.
The three papers are affiliates of Boone Newspapers, and thus embody a 
separate ownership trend that has emerged alongside the rise of the new 
media barons. “As the economy began to recover from the recession in 2013 
and 2014,” Penelope Muse Abernathy writes, “Some of the smaller privately 
owned national and regional chains, which were largely debt-free, began 
quietly and selectively purchasing papers.”15 These smaller chains (Adams, 
Boone, Hearst, Ogden, and Paxton) are family businesses and in some ways 
resemble the newspaper chains of an earlier era. Jim Boone, current chairman 
of Boone Newspapers, succeeded his father as the publisher of the Tuscaloosa 
News in 1968. (Coincidentally, he had also served as the publisher of the 
Suffolk News-Herald before returning to Tuscaloosa.)
Abernathy observes that the smaller media chains “operate their newspapers 
as small businesses, with a singular focus on the bottom line and cash flow. 
In contrast to the mega-chains, they have lean corporate staffs and tend to 
keep low levels of debt. So, when hard times hit, they do not have to worry 
about paying off loans on ‘underwater’ properties. As a result, they tend to 
buy and hold properties, instead of trading them.”16 Many of their properties 
are community newspapers that publish less than daily and appeal to local 
advertisers within their smaller coverage areas.
15   Abernathy, “News Deserts and Ghost Newspapers,” 34.
16   Abernathy, “News Deserts and Ghost Newspapers,” 35.
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When Boone Newspapers began managing the Suffolk News-Herald in 2000, 
the company presided over 34 newspapers. Its network has since nearly 
doubled in size, to include 65 newspapers by 2019. The Tidewater News, 
owned and published by Hanes Byerly for 46 years (1960-2006), joined 
the Boone newspaper group in 2006. John and Anne Edwards owned The 
Smithfield Times for 33 years before selling the paper in 2019. Today, these 
three community papers are owned by separate limited-liability corporations 
with various ties to Boone Newspapers. Members of the Boone family are the 
majority owners of Suffolk Publications LLC, while Tidewater Publications LLC is 
part of Carpenter Newsmedia (which is owned by Todd Carpenter, president 
and CEO of Boone Newspapers). Steve Stewart, a Boone vice president (and 
former publisher of the Suffolk News-Herald), is the new majority owner of 
Smithfield Newsmedia LLC. When we spoke to Stewart this February, he was 
in the process of relocating from Frankfort, Kentucky, to Smithfield, Virginia, 
where he intends to put down roots.
Stewart explained to us that the LLCs pay a management fee to Boone 
Newspapers, and that the papers share accounting services, health insurance 
and numerous back-end functions (similar to the efficiencies enjoyed by the 
Tribune papers). He said that the community papers try to “be smart about how 
we share content,” with each maintaining its own point of view and distinct 
area of coverage. Each newspaper has its own physical workspace, although 
some staff members are shared. The Suffolk News-Herald and a new startup, 
the Windsor Weekly, are available for free at various locations, while the other 
two papers have a traditional newsstand price; all can be obtained through 
online or paper subscriptions.  
These newspapers are lean operations, and they have grown leaner in the 
past few years. A spike in the cost of newsprint following the introduction of a 
tariff on Canadian paper and the loss of advertisers during the pandemic have 
posed particular challenges to the small newsrooms. The Suffolk News-Herald 
reduced publication from six to five days a week in 2018, and again to two 
days a week in 2020. The Tidewater News became a weekly (down from two 
days a week) in 2020. A young Boone startup elsewhere in our region, the 
Yorktown Independent, and the older Gates County Index have recently ceased 
publication.
The Boone newspapers do not seek to compete with the regional or larger 
stories that The Virginian-Pilot and Daily Press regularly produce. However, 
as the two daily newspapers have reduced their footprint in western Hampton 
Roads, their smaller counterparts have become more essential. Steve Stewart 
pointed us to two recent stories by writer Stephen Faleski – about a Franklin 
wood-pellet producer’s longstanding air-quality violations, and a mismanaged 
decision to end curbside recycling in Smithfield – that might not have attracted 
public attention without the community papers. 
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The Hard Road For 
Independent Papers
Stand-alone newspaper ownership in the year 2021 is hard, but not 
impossible. Hampton Roads is home to three independent newspapers that 
have persisted against the odds.
NEW JOURNAL AND GUIDE
Brenda Andrews joined the staff of our region’s prominent Black newspaper in 
1982, and she is now its publisher and editor-in-chief. She has shepherded it 
through numerous storms – including Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the late 1980s, 
and an unprecedented six-week publishing hiatus in the spring of 2020 due 
to the upheavals of the coronavirus pandemic. The weekly New Journal and 
Guide is once again available at sites throughout Hampton Roads and via 
USPS delivery; it maintains a minimal online presence. When we spoke with 
Andrews in February, she underscored the important role the revitalized paper 
has played in disseminating information about COVID-19 and vaccinations 
and in covering ongoing racial disparities that have been widened by the 
pandemic. Environmental racism, food deserts in Black neighborhoods and 
the redevelopment of St. Paul’s Quadrant in Norfolk are among the issues 
the paper actively follows. Advocacy for the Black community is central to its 
mission.
GLOUCESTER-MATHEWS GAZETTE-JOURNAL
Formed by a merger of the Gloucester Gazette and Mathews Journal in 1937, 
this weekly newspaper has covered news in the two counties for more than 80 
years. Its longtime president and publisher was the late John Warren Cooke, 
who also was a speaker in the Virginia House of Delegates. His daughter Elsa 
Verbyla succeeded him in 2009. The Gazette-Journal is now the only Hampton 
Roads paper that still owns its own press; the newspaper’s printing business 
provides a steady source of additional revenue. Editor Charlie Koenig told 
us by email that “while TV stations and large daily newspapers only seem to 
find Gloucester and Mathews on the map when something major (and usually 
horrendous) happens, we are there week in and week out covering stories 
about what the school board or the county supervisors are doing, the exploits 
of our young people when they excel in school and on the sports field, and 
when a resident does something noteworthy.”
THE PRINCESS ANNE INDEPENDENT NEWS
Editor and publisher John-Henry Doucette jokes that he founded The Princess 
Anne Independent News in 2015 because it’s “the sort of thing middle-aged 
people fall into when they cannot afford a hot rod and are scared of buying 
marijuana.”17 In truth, he is a seasoned journalist who cares deeply about 
local news, and he was concerned about the dearth of coverage in his home 
community of Pungo and other parts of southern Virginia Beach. The Princess 
Anne Independent News is now distributed for free at more than 300 locations 
throughout Virginia Beach and Currituck County. The bimonthly newspaper 
specializes in stories about local government, rural life and agriculture, 
occasionally tackling larger issues that have gone uncovered by other news 
outlets. Its past reporting has shone a light on the campaign-related spending 
of political action committees and nonprofit organizations in Virginia Beach.
17   John-Henry Doucette, “From the Editor: Toward a Virginia Beach Task Force on Local Journalism,” The 
Princess Anne Independent News (Feb. 1, 2021), at: http://princessanneindy.com/2021/02/01/from-the-
editor-2/.
GAZETTE-JOURNAL 
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Can Local Journalism 
Survive? Models For 
The Future
The current local journalism crisis presents us with an opportunity to rethink 
how news operations are organized and how they might function better. Here, 
we highlight some of the proposals that have gained the most traction. None 
are mutually exclusive. Elements of all of these proposals can and should play 
a role in shaping our regional news landscape in the years ahead.
PUBLIC SUPPORT
The desperate situation faced by many local newspapers has reinvigorated 
discussions about public funding for public-interest journalism. The federally 
funded Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) already provides grants to 
local public media stations, which in turn purchase national news and other 
programming from the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) and National Public 
Radio (NPR). CPB funding in the future could conceivably play a larger role 
in supporting local news, whether broadcast or online. NPR launched a small 
team earlier this year to assist local stations with investigative reporting.
Hampton Roads’ public broadcaster, WHRO Public Media, established its 
own local news team in 2020, covering the core costs of the new initiative 
by leasing out parts of its broadcast spectrum. Its five-person news team now 
produces original local reporting that punctuates the station’s broadcasts. 
Longer stories are available on the WHRO website. Given its expansive 
broadcast area, WHRO has wisely chosen to focus less on breaking news than 
on contextual, explanatory reporting, with special emphasis on three areas: 
sea level rise and the environment, inequity and social justice, and military 
and veterans affairs. President and CEO Bert Schmidt tells us that WHRO is 
fundraising and exploring ways to grow the young program.
Public support for local journalism can take many forms. One widely discussed 
federal legislative proposal, the Local Journalism Sustainability Act, would 
provide tax credits to local news subscribers, relieve employers of some payroll 
taxes for the journalists they employ and subsidize small business advertising 
with local news outlets. The bill has more than 70 congressional co-sponsors 
from both political parties. Other proposals seek to address the imbalance of 
power between tech giants Google and Facebook and local news providers. 
A “safe harbor” antitrust exemption, for example, would allow newspapers to 
“come together to bargain with platform companies like Google and Facebook 
to get paid for the use of their news content.”18 In short, if we as a society 
agree that local journalism is essential to the functioning of democracy and 
our civic institutions, there is no shortage of public policy options that could be 
employed to sustain it.
NEW COMMERCIAL MODELS
Can local newspapers still make money?  The answer seems to be yes, but 
their operations will look quite different from those of generations past. Most 
observers agree that newspapers must depend less on traditional advertising 
and more on reader subscriptions and other kinds of revenue. Penelope Muse 
Abernathy has suggested that commercial newspapers can remain viable in 
communities with “average or growing economies or population,” as long as 
these papers are finely attuned to local needs – and thus, most likely, locally 
owned.19
Successful business models will necessarily vary from place to place. The 
Arkansas Democrat-Gazette moved readers from paper to digital subscriptions 
by lending them iPads, “smothering” them with customer service and keeping 
its local coverage as robust as possible; it now delivers a print newspaper 
only on Sunday. Other newspaper companies have created new revenue 
streams by holding in-person events, such as interviews with journalists, or 
panels and roundtables that discuss current topics; operating complementary 
businesses; or publishing lifestyle and business magazines.20 We note that 
under the banner of Virginia Media, Tribune not only presides over an array 
18   Rick Edmonds, “How many plans to save local journalism are too many?” Poynter (Oct. 27, 2020), at: 
https://www.poynter.org/locally/2020/how-many-plans-to-save-local-journalism-are-too-many/. See also 
Anya Schiffrin, “Saving Journalism: A Vision for the Post-Covid World,” Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (January 
2021), 11-14 and 24-25, at: https://www.kas.de/en/web/usa/single-title/-/content/saving-journalism. 
19   Waldman, “A Replanting Strategy,” 14. 
20   Mark Jacob, “The Arkansas Gamble: Can a Tablet and a Print Replica Rescue Local News?” Medill Local 
News Initiative (Jan. 13, 2020), at: https://localnewsinitiative.northwestern.edu/posts/2020/01/13/
arkansas-democrat-gazette-tablet/; and Lauren Harris, “The context for the crisis: A Q&A with Penny 
Abernathy,” Columbia Journalism Review (Aug. 19, 2020), at: https://www.cjr.org/business_of_news/the-
context-for-the-crisis-a-qa-with-penny-abernathy.php. 
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of specialized publications (including Inside Business, The Flagship military 
newspaper and niche publications in Richmond and the Outer Banks), but 
also offers website development, marketing research and other digital services 
to clients. The Boone newspapers in our region publish three accompanying 
lifestyle magazines: Suffolk Living, Western Tidewater Living and A Slice of 
Smithfield.
Owners of successful newspapers must be willing to make tough decisions, 
such as cutting back print days or laying off staff – but they also must be 
prepared to invest in their papers’ future. Tribune Publishing sold off its legacy 
newspapers’ valuable real estate assets and radically cut staff expenses, but 
the proceeds appear to have flowed largely to nonlocal shareholders. Had 
this money been reinvested in Hampton Roads newsrooms or expanding local 
coverage, our two daily papers would surely be in a better place today.
“BIG HEARTS AND BIG WALLETS”
Can struggling newspapers be saved? Jim Friedlich of The Lenfest Institute for 
Journalism answers bluntly: “Where local interests have successfully retaken 
control of major regional news properties from newspaper-group or hedge-
fund owners, it has invariably been a single, monied individual offering an 
aggressive price and surety of closing the deal, rather than a community group 
passing the hat. These buyers have two things in common: Big hearts and big 
wallets.”21
Jeff Bezos, who purchased The Washington Post in 2013, is surely the most 
famous billionaire newspaper owner. Glen Taylor, a former Minnesota 
state senator and owner of two professional basketball teams, bought the 
Minneapolis Star Tribune in 2014. Earlier this year, hotel magnate Stewart 
Bainum Jr. first sought to acquire The Baltimore Sun and other Tribune-owned 
papers in Maryland in a side arrangement with Alden that subsequently broke 
down. Not every billionaire newspaper owner succeeds (witness Equity Group 
Investments chairman Sam Zell’s ill-fated tenure at the Tribune Co.). However, 
Bezos, Taylor and a small circle of other very wealthy individuals now own 
commercial newspapers that have become at least moderately profitable 
(before COVID-19, anyway) through creative digital strategy and thoughtful 
21   Jim Friedlich, “Tribune Blues,” Columbia Journalism Review (Jan. 12, 2021), at: https://www.cjr.org/
first_person/tribune-blues.php.
investment. Media entrepreneur Gerry Lenfest purchased The Philadelphia 
Inquirer from Alden and another investor in 2014, and later gifted the paper 
to The Lenfest Institute for Journalism, a nonprofit organization (that he 
established) dedicated to promoting new models of sustainable journalism.
“Big hearts and big wallets” can also take the form of philanthropy. The 
people of Hampton Roads have benefited immensely from gifts to our 
region’s hospitals, colleges and universities, fine arts institutions and various 
charitable causes by generous leaders of our region. Some of the very largest 
of these gifts have come from the Batten family, who made their fortune in 
the newspaper business. Journalism has not traditionally been considered a 
charitable cause. Steven Waldman notes that U.S. donors “increased their 
commitment to journalism from $123 million in 2009 to $370 million in 
2018,”22 but this is still a tiny fraction of the hundreds of billions that are given 
charitably each year. The Hampton Roads Community Foundation and other 
grant-giving organizations and donors should consider if and how supporting 
local journalism could enhance the well-being of our region. This kind of 
philanthropy need not occur on a massive scale; underwriting even a single 
journalist could make a tremendous difference at a small newspaper.
NONPROFIT JOURNALISM
A small but growing number of nonprofit organizations such as The Lenfest 
Institute explicitly support local journalism. Other examples include The 
GroundTruth Project, which supports journalists in underserved areas, most 
notably through the national service program Report for America and the 
American Journalism Project, a “venture philanthropy organization” that 
seeks “to inject one billion new dollars on an annual basis that goes directly 
toward supporting local news gathering,” using an impact investment model 
that has previously been adopted in fields such as education and international 
development.23
Some legacy newspapers have reinvented themselves as nonprofit 
organizations. The Salt Lake Tribune is perhaps the most prominent example. 
22   Steven Waldman, “The Coming Era of ‘Civic News,’” Washington Monthly (November/December 2020), at: 
https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/november-december-2020/the-coming-era-of-civic-news/.
23   “Losing the News: The Decimation of Local Journalism and the Search for Solutions,” PEN America (Nov. 
20, 2019), 56-60, at: https://pen.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Losing-the-News-The-Decimation-of-
Local-Journalism-and-the-Search-for-Solutions-Report.pdf.
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The Philadelphia Inquirer is now a Public Benefit Corporation (owned by The 
Lenfest Institute). Earlier this year, the nonprofit Corporation for New Jersey 
Local Media (CNJLM) announced that it would work together with the New 
Jersey Hills Media Group to convert 14 weekly newspapers to nonprofit 
ownership. In the aftermath of the Tribune shareholders’ vote on May 21 
to accept the Alden deal, Stewart Bainum announced that he was “busy 
evaluating various options, all in the pursuit of creating locally-supported, 
not-for-profit newsrooms that place stakeholders above shareholders and 
journalistic integrity above all.”24 Steven Waldman has outlined an ambitious, 
two-part strategy for transforming commercial newspapers into nonprofit 
organizations – first, by establishing a private, nonprofit “replanting fund” that 
would identify and support likely candidates, and second, by instituting public 
policy changes “to make replanting more likely and to curb the deleterious 
effects of local news consolidation in general.”25
More than 300 digital-first, nonprofit local news websites have been 
established throughout the U.S. These organizations have much lower 
expenses than legacy newspapers, although they do not have the advantages 
of a longstanding subscriber base and must vie for readers’ attention. The 
Institute for Nonprofit News provides a helpful support network; its members 
must be “transparent about funding sources” and committed to independent, 
nonpartisan “investigative and/or public-service reporting.” Its three member 
organizations dedicated to local journalism in Virginia are Charlottesville 
Tomorrow, Foothills Forum (based in Rappahannock County) and the Virginia 
Center for Investigative Journalism (VCIJ). Founded by Virginian-Pilot alumni 
Chris Tyree and Louis Hansen, VCIJ produces in-depth, investigative stories and 
offers them to local news outlets free of charge. The reporting is currently done 
on a contract basis; VCIJ has no office or full-time staff. Tyree told us that an 
initial goal is to produce “one good story a month.” The first VCIJ story, which 
appeared in September 2019, revealed that the U.S. Navy had been dumping 
toxic firefighting chemicals into tributaries of the Chesapeake Bay for decades, 
contaminating wells on and near Hampton Roads military bases. 
24   Robert Channick, “Hedge fund Alden’s bid to buy Chicago Tribune, other papers approved by Tribune 
Publishing shareholders” (May 21, 2021), at: https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-chicago-
tribune-publishing-alden-shareholders-approve-20210521-2awcpedkfrervox7gfsqpm45ua-story.html.
25   Waldman, “A Replanting Strategy,” 2-3.
Virginia Mercury, which covers state government and policy, is another notable 
news nonprofit. It fills the gap that arose after daily newspapers closed their 
Richmond bureaus and reduced their General Assembly coverage. Virginia 
Mercury maintains a robust, user-friendly website and offers its stories to 
other news outlets free of charge. Its core funding for five full-time journalists 
and additional freelancers is provided by States Newsroom, a national 
nonprofit that oversees a growing network of similar state-based outlets. In 
2020, NiemanLab initially included States Newsroom affiliates on its map 
of “hyperpartisan sites masquerading as local news” because the nonprofit 
“previously received backing from the liberal Hopewell Fund and did not begin 
disclosing its donors until this year.” NiemanLab has since issued a correction, 
noting that sites such as Virginia Mercury are run by journalists with longtime 
newspaper experience and distinguished professional records.26 Nevertheless, 
the incident is a useful reminder that readers should approach all news outlets 
critically, particularly those online, and consider their funding sources and 
professional ethics.
26   See Mahone and Napoli, “Hundreds of hyperpartisan sites.” A list of all States Newsroom donors who have 
contributed more than $500 is available here: https://statesnewsroom.com/support/.
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Final Thoughts
Our local news organizations are doing very good work, but there is 
much less of it than just a few years ago. A flood of information (and 
misinformation) is available at our fingertips, but we know less about the 
local issues and institutions that directly affect our quality of life. In 2021, 
we may no longer need newspapers to perform many of the functions they 
once did – such as providing weather reports, sport scores, movie times and 
so forth. However, we urgently need fact-checked, contextual reporting that 
can dispel misinformation, shine a light on corruption and injustice, and help 
us better understand our own communities. We agree with Penelope Muse 
Abernathy that, “Ultimately, it doesn’t matter whether local news is delivered 
through ink-on-paper or over a mobile phone. What matters is that a local 
news organization reports on important issues and provides context and 
analysis so citizens can make informed decisions and hold their public officials 
accountable.”27
We are accustomed to thinking about the news as a purely commercial 
enterprise. However, events of the past two decades – and the more recent 
tide of misinformation and conspiracy theories surrounding the COVID-19 
pandemic and the insurrectionist violence of Jan. 6, 2021 – have shown 
us that public-interest journalism should also be considered a public good. 
Focused, investigative journalism produces benefits to the public by shining 
the proverbial spotlight on the misdeeds of public and private actors. Without 
journalists asking hard questions and persisting in getting answers from 
politicians and others who prefer to obfuscate or remain silent, the big question 
is: Who will do the work? We have ample evidence that social media is ill-
equipped to step into this role and often misinforms rather than informs.
The old model of commercial journalism that long sustained general-interest 
newspapers and provided a reliable source of iron core news is no longer 
viable. The challenge for regional and community newspapers today is not 
merely “going digital” – although successful news organizations must certainly 
maintain a robust and thoughtful online presence – but also finding a new 
economic model that will allow the reporting and delivery of high-quality local 
27   Abernathy, “The Rise of a New Media Baron,” 39.
news to continue into the future. As citizens of Hampton Roads, we all have a 
stake in this challenge. Unexamined institutions and the absence of a common 
basis for dialogue diminish us all. The better informed we are, the better we 
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SECURING RELEASE: CASH BAIL IN HAMPTON ROADS
Virginia’s current system of cash bail too often determines who has money, not who is dangerous, and we can’t have 
a justice system that determines fairness and freedom based on wealth and means.
- Virginia Attorney General Mark Herring, October 2018
I
n 2018, Virginia Attorney General Mark Herring called for cash bail reform in a letter to the Virginia State Crime Commission (VSCC). He argued that the current 
bail system too often leaves low-risk defendants in jail based solely on their inability to pay. Following Herring’s letter, at least five Virginia commonwealth’s 
attorneys, including Norfolk’s Greg Underwood, changed local policies with the intent of reducing or eliminating cash bail. In January 2021, commonwealth’s 
attorneys from Newport News, Portsmouth, Norfolk and Hampton joined eight other Virginia prosecutors in calling for an end to cash bail.1
Cash bail, also known as secured bonds, is a form of pretrial release where 
defendants must secure bonds with cash or property in order to be released 
from jail while awaiting trial. Cash bail provides an incentive for defendants 
to return for their court appearance, since the surety is not reimbursed unless 
the defendants return to court in accordance with the terms of their release. 
Proponents of the cash bail system argue that it provides a financial incentive 
for defendants to appear, lowers jail populations and increases accountability.1 
Critics, however, contend that the cash bail system often leaves low-risk 
defendants in jail for unduly long periods of time. The ability to pay determines 
whether one remains in confinement or is released into society. A 2013 study 
by the Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) found that 11% 
of defendants were still in jail seven days from their first appearance, simply 
because they could not afford to post a secured bond. Of those defendants, 
92% were held on bonds valued at $5,000 or less. Opponents contend that 
cash bail exacerbates racial disparities, as Black defendants are more likely to 
be denied bail and face higher bond amounts.2 Advocates for reform also note 
that cash bail raises constitutional concerns, since the unequal burden placed 
on indigent defendants is inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal 
1   A PDF copy of the letter is available at: https://www.pilotonline.com/news/crime/vp-nw-progressive-
prosecutors-20210104-i3zgfbrvqjag5nxzkuaalu52ny-story.html.
2   David Arnold, Will Dobbie and Crystal S Yang, “Racial Bias in Bail Decisions,” The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, vol. 133, issue 4, November 2018, pages 1885-1932, https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjy012.
protection clause. From this viewpoint, the arbitrary nature of bail decisions 
runs against the right to due process.  
In October 2020, Corey Hunter was held in a Fairfax jail for almost a week on 
a $2,500 secured bond for a DUI - a first offense that would not likely result 
in additional jail time. Unable to afford the bond, Hunter appealed the court’s 
decision. Fairfax Circuit Court Judge David Bernhard ruled that the use of cash 
bail in this case “would only be the product of resort to custom, instinct and 
arbitrary action and thus would be an unconstitutional application of Virginia’s 
statutory bail bond scheme and in derogation of the Due Process Clause of the 
United States Constitution.” Bernhard appeared to be the first Virginia judge to 
issue an opinion opposing the practice of cash bail.  
Recent research has found that pretrial detention for as little as two days can 
disrupt employment, child care and housing.3 Pretrial detention is associated 
with an increased likelihood of conviction, as detained defendants face 
additional pressure to accept an unfavorable plea bargain in order to be 
released with time served. Pretrial detention may also lead to higher rates 
of recidivism; research has found that detaining low- and moderate-risk 
defendants for a short time can increase their likelihood to reoffend during the 
3   Will Dobbie, Jacob Goldin and Crystal S. Yang, 2018, “The Effects of Pre-trial Detention on Conviction, Future 
Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges,” American Economic Review, 108 (2): 
201-40.
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pretrial and post-trial periods.4 Indigent defendants are less likely to secure 
release and are therefore more likely to face the negative consequences of 
pretrial detention. 
There appears to be a growing movement questioning the need for cash 
bail and seeking ways to reform the cash bail system without compromising 
public safety. Since 2017, New York, New Jersey, Alaska and Maryland, 
among other states, have passed legislation, and in some cases, constitutional 
amendments, with the intent of reducing the reliance on cash bail. On Feb. 
22, 2021, Gov. J.B. Pritzker of Illinois signed legislation making Illinois the first 
state to eliminate cash bail. In Virginia, and in particular, Hampton Roads, 
a number of commonwealth’s attorneys have publicly signaled a desire to 
significantly reduce (if not eliminate entirely in most cases) the use of cash bail.  
On any given day in 2019, there were over 3,154 pretrial 
inmates in Hampton Roads local and regional jails. While 
some of these inmates were not released due to the severity 
of their crimes or risks posed to the public, others languished 
in pretrial detention, unable to find enough collateral to gain 
release through a secured bond. Even though violent and 
property crimes have decreased since 1990, incarceration rates 
have increased in Hampton Roads, Virginia and the United 
States. From 2000 to 2018, the Hampton Roads pretrial inmate 
population rose by approximately 1.6% per year. In some 
cities and counties in our region, the pretrial population grew 
by more than 3% per year.
The most recent national data on pretrial detainees provide 
comparisons among Hampton Roads, Virginia and the United 
States. In 2019, on average, there were more pretrial inmates 
per 100,000 residents in Hampton Roads (183.5) than Virginia 
(135.9) or the United States (146.4).5 The conversation about 
how to reduce the pretrial population includes advocates 
of equity in the justice system, those concerned about the 
4   Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Marie VanNostrand and Alexander Holsinger, “The Hidden Costs of Pre-trial 
Detention,” National Institute of Corrections, November 2013.  
5   We use data from the Virginia State Compensation Board Local Inmate Data System for Hampton Roads and 
Virginia and data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics for the United States.
relatively high rates of incarceration in the United States and 
taxpayers concerned about the cost of housing, feeding and 
supervising the incarcerated.
We estimate that if Virginia were to enact cash bail reform, the 
average daily pretrial population in Hampton Roads would 
decline between 5% and 20%. Incarceration costs for cities and 
counties in Hampton Roads would decline between $5 million 
and $21 million a year. Cash bail reform would also reduce 
costs for those awaiting trial, not only in terms of having to 
pay for bail bond services, but also increasing defendants’ 
ability to work while awaiting trial. Every day in confinement 
is a potential day of lost wages for those who have not yet 
been convicted of a crime. We estimate that the economic 
impact of cash bail reform, assuming that those awaiting 
trial are released, could approach $80 million annually for 
Hampton Roads.
In this chapter, we look at the use of cash bail, its prevalence in bail conditions, 
average bond amounts and cash bail’s impact on pretrial detention. We cite 
statistics on the number of people in pretrial detention in Hampton Roads and 
consider who among them might be affected by bail reform. We examine the 
cost of pretrial detention to taxpayers in the region and determine whether 
there would be significant savings if cash bail were eliminated.
History Of The Cash Bail 
System 
While the origins of cash bail can be traced back to the Romans, America’s 
notion of bail primarily has English roots.6 The early American bail system 
embraced most of England’s bail practices, including the protection against 
excessive bail. In 1789, Congress passed the Judiciary Act, requiring 
defendants for all noncapital federal offenses to be considered for bail. The 
6   Timothy R. Schnacke, Michael R. Jones and Claire M.B. Brooker (2010), “The History of Bail and Pre-trial 
Release,” Pretrial Justice Institute. 
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right to bail under the Judiciary Act and the protection against excessive bail 
as laid forth in the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution became two of 
the central principles of the U.S. bail system. 
America’s early cash bail system also adopted the English bail practice of 
personal sureties.7 What would be considered an unsecured bond today, a 
personal surety is a promise by a family member or associate of the defendant 
to pay the debt in the event of default. The practice of personal sureties 
declined in the 1800s as fewer people wanted to take on the obligation of 
defendants without payment. In the absence of personal sureties, judges began 
utilizing secured bonds as a means of ensuring court appearance. The use of 
secured bonds changed the traditional American bail practice from release 
conditional on a promise to pay if default occurs, to release conditional on 
payment. The shift led to the rise of the commercial bail bond industry in the 
early 20th century. 
Criticism of the cash bail system began as early as the 1920s with rising 
concern about the impact of secured bonds on low-income defendants.8 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, research highlighted the disproportionate 
share of low-income defendants in jail awaiting trial. The 1966 Bail Reform 
Act was the first legal revision to bail since the Judiciary Act of 1789.9 This 
act instructed judges to favor the least restrictive form of bail conditions for 
noncapital federal defendants and to use bail only if release on recognizance 
was not feasible.
The 1984 Bail Reform Act required judges to consider the degree of danger 
defendants posed to public safety when determining bail. The U.S. Supreme 
Court, in U.S. v. Salerno (1987), upheld the constitutionality of this decision, 
resulting in a shift in bail practices. Before U.S. v. Salerno, the purpose of bail 
was to ensure a defendant’s court appearance. Following this ruling, most 
states, including Virginia, amended their bail statutes to instruct judges to use 
two main criteria when determining bail conditions: court appearance and 
public safety.
7   Muhammad B. Sardar (2019), “Give Me Liberty or Give Me . . . Alternatives? Ending Cash Bail and Its Impact 
on Pretrial Incarceration,” Brooklyn Law Review, vol. 84, issue 4.
8   Timothy R. Schnacke (2014), “Fundamentals of Bail: A Resource Guide for Pre-trial Practitioners and a 
Framework for American Pre-trial Reform,” National Institute of Corrections, https://s3.amazonaws.com/
static.nicic.gov/Library/028360.pdf.
9   Hayley E. Miller (2016), “Taming the Wild West: Using Unsecured Bail Bonds in Nevada’s Pretrial-Release 
Program,” Nevada Law Journal, https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1688&context=nlj.
Bail statutes in the Commonwealth have since set forth a general presumption 
to grant bail unless the defendant poses a risk to public safety or court 
appearance. The Virginia General Assembly amended its bail statutes in 
1996 to require a presumption against bail for certain felony offenses and 
circumstances. In 2000, the General Assembly required the use of secured 
bonds in certain circumstances. Virginia Code 19.2-123 states: “Any person 
arrested for a felony who has previously been convicted of a felony, or who 
is presently on bond for an unrelated arrest in any jurisdiction, or who is on 
probation or parole, may be released only upon a secure bond.” The provision 
can only be waived with the approval of both the presiding judge and local 
commonwealth’s attorney. 
The Pretrial Process
Bail conditions are one part of the entire pretrial process, which encompasses 
the various stages of a criminal case from arrest to trial and/or sentencing. If 
an arresting officer has probable cause to believe that someone has broken 
the law, the officer can issue a summons or take the person into custody.10 A 
summons is simply a written promise to appear in court. Once signed, the 
accused is free to go. If taken into custody and brought to jail, the defendant 
first receives a bail hearing. In Virginia, the local magistrate conducts bail 
hearings.
At the end of the bail hearing, the magistrate can deny bail (finding the 
defendant to be too high a risk to public safety or court appearance) or grant 
bail based on specified terms and conditions. There are three main forms of 
pretrial release. Release on personal recognizance requires a written promise 
to appear and compliance with any bail conditions imposed by the court. In 
the case of unsecured bonds, where a bond is issued in exchange for bail but 
does not need to be secured before release, the judge can forfeit the bond and 
enter judgment if the defendant fails to appear in court. 
The final form, secured bonds, or “cash bail,” requires the bond amount to be 
secured with either a cash deposit or solvent surety. If defendants do not have 
10   “Criminal Case Procedures,” General District Court Manual, http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/gd/
resources/manuals/gdman/chapter03.pdf.
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sufficient cash or collateral, they can use a third party. A third-party surety can 
be either a private surety who owns real property, such as a family member or 
friend, or a bail bondsman. Bail bondsmen guarantee the bond amount and 
charge the defendant a nonrefundable fee. The Virginia Code requires that the 
fee be no less than 10% and no more than 15% of the bond amount. In 2018, 
there were 375 actively licensed bail bondsmen in Virginia.11
Risk Assessment Tools 
Other than the presumptions against bail for some offenses and the 
requirement of secured bonds for certain circumstances, magistrates have wide 
discretion in determining bail. At a bail hearing, the job of a magistrate is to 
conduct a risk assessment of the defendant. Judges in the Commonwealth are 
required to consider a list of factors when making this assessment, such as the 
character of the accused, the nature of the offense and the defendant’s ability 
to pay the bond. The weight of these factors in determining bail, however, is 
left to the judge’s calculation. With no standardized system, judges must use 
their discretion to predict and mitigate a defendant’s risk with the right release 
conditions. The result of such a system not only creates disparate outcomes, but 
also relies on wealth to mitigate risk.  
Risk-assessment tools are used to replace the subjective nature of bail with a 
data-driven empirical system based on risk. These tools measure a defendant’s 
risk of pretrial failure (new arrest and court appearance) based on a series of 
risk factors. The goal of risk instruments is to reduce pretrial detention rates by 
properly identifying low-risk defendants for release, while also detaining fewer 
defendants based solely on their inability to pay by “replacing wealth with 
risk.”12
In a 2019 national survey, 2 in 3 cities and counties used a risk-assessment 
tool, and more than half reported implementing an instrument over the last five 
years.13 Virginia was the first in the country to implement a statewide research-
11   The Virginia State Crime Commission’s 2018 Annual Report, http://vscc.virginia.gov/2019/VSCC%20
2018%20Annual%20Report.pdf
12   “Making Sense of Pretrial Risk Assessments,” National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, https://
www.nacdl.org/Article/June2018-MakingSenseofPre-trialRiskAsses.
13   University of Pretrial, Pretrial Justice Institute, 2019, https://university.pre-trial.org/viewdocument/scan-of-
pre-trial-practices-pji-20.
based, pretrial risk-assessment tool in 2005. Known nationally as the Virginia 
Model, the Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument (VPRAI) has since been 
implemented in jurisdictions in 10 states and statewide in Maine. The VPRAI 
examines eight risk factors that are weighted to create a risk score. Results 
from the VPRAI are shared with the judge, prosecutor and defense attorneys. 
In 2017, the VPRAI was revised and supplemented with Praxis, a decision tool 
that incorporates the revised VPRAI and the defendant’s current charges to 
provide a recommendation of whether to deny or admit bail and, in the case of 
pretrial release, the level of supervision needed for the defendant.14 Where the 
VPRAI measures the risk of pretrial failure, the Praxis tool manages that risk by 
recommending the most efficient bail conditions. 
Risk Factors Scored on VPRAI-Revised15
1. Active community criminal justice supervision
2. Current charge is felony drug, felony theft or felony fraud
3. Pending charge at time of arrest
4. One or more adult criminal convictions
5. Two or more failures to appear
6. Two or more violent convictions
7. Unemployed at the time of arrest
8. History of drug abuse
In recent years, some criminal-justice advocates who once supported the use 
of risk-assessment tools have argued that the tools themselves can perpetuate 
racial disparities.16 Critics argue that the data and methodology used to derive 
risk scores, such as a defendant’s criminal history, reflect the structural and 
institutional racism inherent and only exacerbate existing disparities. Pretrial 
14  Virginia State Crime Commission, 2017 Annual Report, https://rga.lis.virginia.gov/Published/2018/
RD207/PDF.
15   Virginia State Crime Commission, 2017 Annual Report, https://rga.lis.virginia.gov/Published/2018/
RD207/PDF.
16   “Making Sense of Pre-trial Risk Assessments,” National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, https://
www.nacdl.org/Article/June2018-MakingSenseofPre-trialRiskAsses.
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risk-assessment tools have been around for some time, yet there is a lack of 
consensus on their efficacy in reducing cash bail and pretrial detention.17
New Jersey implemented a risk-assessment tool as part of its cash bail reform 
legislation in 2017. While the jail population in New Jersey declined, racial 
disparities persisted. Jail data for Virginia from the Vera Institute for Justice 
show that, on average, there were 1,388 Black or African American and 283 
white jail inmates for every 100,000 residents in 2005.18 In 2015, 10 years 
after the implementation of the VPRAI, the jail population rates for Black or 
African American and white individuals were 1,115 and 352, respectively. 
Relative to 2005, there was improvement in the incarceration rates for Black 
inmates relative to the Black population in Virginia. Yet, significant disparities 
in incarceration rates persist, as there were still roughly three times more Black 
inmates than white inmates per 100,000 residents in the Commonwealth.
Pretrial Services Agencies
In Virginia, pretrial services agencies (PSAs) serve two main functions: to 
collect and deliver information to assist judges in determining bail, and 
to supervise defendants on pretrial release to monitor compliance with 
bail conditions such as electronic monitoring, drug testing or maintaining 
employment. Established in the 1990s, PSAs are locality-based agencies, 
administered and funded by the Virginia Department of Criminal Justice 
Services and localities. As of 2019, 75% of Virginia’s cities and counties 
had a PSA. Only 4 of the 16 Hampton Roads cities and counties – Franklin, 
Southampton, Isle of Wight County and Suffolk – do not have one. 
Pretrial supervision is touted as a possible alternative to cash 
bail and pretrial detention for defendants deemed too high-
risk for a personal recognizance bond. However, data from 
the Virginia Pre-trial Data Project (VPDP) show that in fiscal 
year 2019, approximately 53% of all defendants placed on 
17   Evan Lowder, Carmen Diaz, Eric Grommon and Bradley Ray, “Effects of Pre-trial Risk Assessments 
on Release Decisions and Misconduct Outcomes Relative to Practice as Usual” (2021), Journal of 
Criminal Justice, vol. 73, March-April 2021, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/
S0047235220302488?dgcid=rss_sd_all.
18   “Virginia Incarceration Trends,” Vera Institute for Justice, https://trends.vera.org/rates/virginia.
pretrial supervision were also ordered to post a secured bond. 
The data do, however, show a high pretrial success rate. In 
2019, 93% of defendants on pretrial supervision returned for 
their scheduled court appearance and did not have their bail 
revoked due to a new arrest. 
The Commonwealth has long been recognized as a leader in bail system 
reform. States such as Illinois and New Jersey, which in recent years passed 
comprehensive legislative reforms aimed at eliminating cash bail, have made 
risk tools and pretrial supervision a central part of reform. These tools have 
been in place in Virginia for more than a decade. Nevertheless, as we show 
in the next few sections, cash bail remains a common form of pretrial release 
in the Commonwealth, and pretrial detention rates in Virginia and Hampton 
Roads are not far from the national average. The answer as to why cash bail 
persists as a method of pretrial detention comes down to judicial discretion, not 
enough oversight on the effectiveness and take-up rate of these reform tools, 
and statutory requirements that in some cases require secured bonds for bail.
Pretrial Detention
From 1990 to 2018, property and violent crimes in the United States trended 
down, while incarceration rates increased (1990-2008) and then declined 
back to levels observed near the turn of the century (Graph 1). From 1990 to 
2018, the rate of violent and property crimes per 100,000 Americans declined 
52.5% and 43.6%, respectively, while the jail incarceration rate increased by 
36.9%. As of May 2021, the United States had one of the highest reported 
incarceration rates in the world, with 639 inmates per 100,000 residents.19
Americans not yet convicted of a crime make up an increasing 
proportion of the jail population. From 1990 to 2019, the 
number of convicted inmates in local jails increased by almost 
30% (Graph 2). Over the same period, the number of pretrial 
inmates increased by approximately 132%. Pretrial inmates 
accounted for 66% of the U.S. jail population in 2019. The U.S. 
19   “Countries with the most prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants, as of May 2021,” Statista Research Department, 
June 2, 2021.
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leads the world in terms of the number of pretrial detainees, 
with nearly twice as many as any other country in the world.  
On an average day in 2019, more than 480,000 Americans 
confined in local jails had not yet been convicted of a crime. 
While some were deemed a flight risk or threat to public 
safety, other pretrial inmates remained in jail due to their 
inability to post bail.
Virginia mirrors national trends in the pretrial population. While the share 
of pretrial inmates in the total jail population in Virginia in 2018 (52%) 
was below that of the nation (65%), the rate of increase was faster in the 
Commonwealth than for the nation (Graph 3). For Hampton Roads in 2018, 
almost half of the inmates were pretrial detainees, a lower rate than that 
of Virginia or the nation. This share remained relatively constant over the 
previous decade.
On an average day in 2019, half of the 11,600 inmates in Virginia jails had 
yet to be convicted of a crime. Of these 11,600 inmates, 3,154 were confined 
in Hampton Roads jails. To better understand the types of charges for those 
held pretrial, we can look to statistics provided by Virginia’s Department of 
Criminal Justice Services (DCJS). These data capture the most serious offense 
types for the 170,000 pretrial commitments to Virginia jails in 2019.20 In half 
of these, the most serious charge was a misdemeanor. Approximately 12% 
were detained for a violent felony (Graph 4). In misdemeanor cases especially, 
pretrial detention can pose a significant problem, as defendants are more likely 
to plead guilty to gain release from jail.21
20   Pretrial commitments reflect the number of pretrial commitment events. This is not a count of unique people, 
as some individuals may be committed multiple times for the same or different offenses, if they were released 
and then returned to jail. The average daily pretrial population totaled 11,587 in 2019. 
21   Paul Heaton, Sandra G. Mayson and Megan Stevenson, “The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor 
Pre-trial Detention,” 69 Stanford Law Review 711 (2017).
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GRAPH 1
CHANGE IN VIOLENT CRIME, PROPERTY CRIME AND JAIL INCARCERATION RATES: 
UNITED STATES, 1990-2018
Sources: Vera, Incarceration Trends (2018), FBI Uniform Crime Reporting (2019) and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University 
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GRAPH 2
JAIL INMATE POPULATION BY CONVICTION STATUS: 
UNITED STATES, 1990-2019




Jail Inmate Population by Conviction Status: 
United States, 19 0-  
 
 













































































































































THE STATE OF THE REGION  |  HAMPTON ROADS 2021170
GRAPH 3
SHARE OF UNCONVICTED JAIL INMATE POPULATION: 
UNITED STATES, VIRGINIA AND HAMPTON ROADS, 2010-2018
Source: Vera, Incarceration Trends (2018) 
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GRAPH 3 
Share of Unconvicted Jail Inmate Population: 
United States, Virginia and Hampton Roads, 2010-2018 
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GRAPH 4
SHARE OF PRETRIAL COMMITMENTS BY MOST SERIOUS OFFENSE TYPE: 
VIRGINIA, 2019
Source: Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services 
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The Use Of Cash Bail
Unfortunately, data on pretrial release conditions at the national, state and 
local level are sparse at best. In a 2009 Bureau of Justice Statistics survey (the 
latest national data available), of the country’s 40 most populous counties, 
more than 40% of felony defendants were assigned monetary bail conditions, 
up 11% since 1990. Over the same period, the share of defendants released 
on recognizance declined 13%. Fortunately for the Commonwealth, a 2021 
study by the Virginia State Crime Commission (VSCC) provided insight on 
the use of different pretrial release mechanisms. We draw on this work in this 
section. 
The Virginia Pre-Trial Data Project (VPDP) tracked a cohort of defendants 
who were arrested and charged with an offense in October 2017 to the final 
disposition of their case. The purpose of the project, which will be replicated on 
an annual basis, was to address the lack of statewide data on bail conditions 
and pretrial outcomes in Virginia. Graph 5 shows the final pretrial mechanism 
for the 15,653 defendants in the 2017 VPDP cohort.22 
Of these 15,653 defendants, 4,227 received a summons 
and were released on their own recognizance and 11,426 
were taken into custody. Graph 6 shows the final bail type 
or detainment status for the 11,426 defendants taken into 
custody. Almost half (47%) were released on personal 
recognizance or an unsecured bond. Over a third (36%) were 
released on a secured bond. Almost 15% were denied bail, 
while 2% of the defendants were held with a secured bond 
the entire pretrial period. In other words, out of the 11,426 
defendants, 226 were unable to scrape together enough 
resources to secure a bond to obtain release from confinement 
for the entire pretrial period.
22   The study cohort consisted of 22,933 defendants. Descriptive statistics are available only on the 15,715 
defendants whose October 2017 arrest was the result of a new arrest, not related to a prior charge. Sixty-
two of these defendants were excluded from the analysis, as the information could not be verified.
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GRAPH 5
VSCC VIRGINIA PRE-TRIAL DATA PROJECT: STATEWIDE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF DEFENDANT COHORT, 
FINAL PRETRIAL RELEASE MECHANISM AND DETAINMENT STATUS OF DEFENDANT COHORT
Source: Virginia State Crime Commission’s Virginia Pre-trial Data Project (2021), statewide descriptive findings. Statistics reflect the outcomes of 15,715 total defendants charged with a new arrest in the study cohort, excluding 62 
defendants whose bond type could not be determined. (PR is personal recognizance and PSA is pretrial supervision.)
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GRAPH 5 
VSCC Virginia Pre-trial Data Project: Statewide Descriptive Statistics of Defendant Cohort, 
Final Pre-trial Release echanism and Detainment Status of Defendant Cohort 
 
Source: Virginia State Crime Commission's Virginia Pre-trial Data Project (2021), statewide descriptive findings. Statistics reflect the outcomes of 15,715 total defendants charged with a new arrest in the study cohort, excluding 62 
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GRAPH 6
VSCC VIRGINIA PRE-TRIAL DATA PROJECT: STATEWIDE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF DEFENDANT COHORT, 
PERCENT OF TOTAL DEFENDANTS BY PRETRIAL RELEASE MECHANISM AND DETAINMENT STATUS
Source: Virginia State Crime Commission’s Virginia Pre-trial Data Project (2021), statewide descriptive findings. Statistics reflect the outcomes of 15,715 total defendants charged with a new arrest in the study cohort, excluding 4,277 
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Source: Virginia State Crime Commission’s Virginia Pre-trial Data Project (2021), statewide descriptive findings. Statistics reflect the outcomes of 15,715 total defendants charged with a new arrest in the study cohort, excluding 4,277 
defendants released on a summons and 62 defendants whose bond type could not be determined. Released on personal recognizance (PR) or unsecured bond and released on secured bond includes unsupervised release and release 
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Pretrial Release 
Conditions May Change
Where defendants start in the pretrial release process does not necessarily 
define where they will end up. A magistrate may hold a defendant without 
bond or with a secured bond, or determine that a personal-recognizance or 
unsecured bond is appropriate. However, the decision can be (and often is) 
revisited, and the bail conditions modified, in due course. Turning again to the 
VPDP data, we note that of the 15,715 defendants shown in Graphs 5 and 6, 
4,227 were released at the time of arrest through the issuance of a summons, 
and 334 had incomplete data on initial or final bond or release status. 
We turn our attention now to the 11,154 defendants whose initial and final 
status was known (Graph 7). Of the 3,591 defendants who were initially held 
without bond, 1,696 (47.2%) remained in custody, 1,379 (38.4%) were later 
released on a secured bond, and 516 (14.4%) were released on personal 
recognizance or unsecured bond. For the 3,180 held initially on a secured 
bond, only 226 (7.1%) were not released, 2,665 (83.8%) were released on 
a secured bond and 289 (9.1%) were released on personal recognizance or 
unsecured bond. Of the 4,383 defendants held on personal recognizance or 
unsecured bond, almost all (99.7%) were released under the same conditions.
A majority of defendants (52.8%) who were initially held 
without bond were later released on bond. For defendants 
held initially on a secured bond, 92.9% were released on 
bond at some point. Of the 11,154 defendants in the VPDP 
sample, 82.7% were released on some type of bond, and the 
remainder (17.3%) were held without bond until their trial.
A defendant’s charge is one of the most significant factors in deciding bail. 
The most serious offense for roughly half of the defendants in the cohort 
was a jailable nonfelony charge. If judges are employing the least restrictive 
conditions, we should expect those charged with less serious, nonfelony 
offenses to be more likely to be issued personal recognizance or unsecured 
bonds. This distribution is illustrated in Graph 8. Among defendants in the 
cohort charged with a jailable nonfelony, 65% were released on a personal-
recognizance or unsecured bond followed by 27% released on a secured 
bond. A secured bond was the most common bail type for defendants charged 
with at least one felony.
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GRAPH 7
VSCC VIRGINIA PRE-TRIAL DATA PROJECT: STATEWIDE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF DEFENDANT COHORT, 
ULTIMATE RELEASE OR DETENTION TYPE BY INITIAL CONDITIONS
Source: Virginia State Crime Commission’s Virginia Pre-trial Data Project (2021), statewide descriptive findings for 11,154 defendants. (PR is personal recognizance.)
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GRAPH 7 
VSCC Virginia Pre-trial Data Project: Statewide Descriptive Statistics of Defendant Cohort, 
Ultimate elease or Detention Type by Initial Conditions 
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GRAPH 8
VSCC VIRGINIA PRE-TRIAL DATA PROJECT: STATEWIDE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF DEFENDANT COHORT, 
MOST SERIOUS CHARGE CLASSIFICATION BY ULTIMATE RELEASE OR DETENTION TYPE
Source: Virginia State Crime Commission’s Virginia Pre-trial Data Project (2021), statewide descriptive findings, Table 3. Excludes 19 defendants with undetermined charge classification and defendants released on a summons. (PR is 
personal recognizance.)  8 
GRAPH 8 
VSCC Virginia Pre-trial Data Project: Statewide Descriptive Statistics of Defendant Cohort, 
Most Serious Charge Classification by Ultimate Release or Detention Type 
 
 
Source: Virginia State Crime Commission's Virginia Pre-trial Data Project (2021), statewide descriptive findings, Table 3. Excludes 19 defendants with undetermined charge classification, and defendants released on a summons. (PR is 

































At Least One Felony Charge Jailable Non-Felony Charges Only■ ■ 
THE STATE OF THE REGION  |  HAMPTON ROADS 2021178
How Many Days Does 
Someone Spend In 
Jail Pretrial?
Graph 9 shows the number of days in pretrial detention for the 9,406 
defendants released on bond.23 Over 8 in 10 defendants released on personal 
recognizance or unsecured bond were released on the same day of their 
arrest. Only 44% released on a secured bond were released on the same 
day as their arrest. Approximately 4.3% of defendants ultimately released on 
personal recognizance or unsecured bond remained in jail more than 10 days. 
For those ultimately released via a secured bond, this climbed to 18.1%. 
Recent research has shown that even a day or two of pretrial detention 
can disrupt employment, housing and child care.24 Approximately 39% of 
defendants released on a secured bond were detained at least two days, and 
more than 1 in 4 secured-bond defendants were still in custody six days after 
the initial arrest. The longer time secured-bond defendants spend in jail, either 
scraping together the money or appealing for lighter bail conditions, lies at the 
heart of the cash bail debate. 
23   Of the 11,426 defendants in Graphs 5 and 6, 98 had missing information, 1,696 were held without bond 
and 226 were held the entire period with a secured bond. Removing these defendants from the analysis 
reduced the sample size to 9,406 defendants.
24   Will Dobbie, Jacob Godin and Crystal S. Yang, “The Effects of Pre-trial Detention on Conviction, Future 
Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges,” 2018, American Economic Review, 
vol. 108, no. 2, available at: https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/aer.20161503.
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GRAPH 9
VSCC VIRGINIA PRE-TRIAL DATA PROJECT: STATEWIDE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF DEFENDANT COHORT 
DAYS FROM ARREST TO RELEASE, PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL DEFENDANTS BY BOND TYPE
Source: Virginia State Crime Commission’s Virginia Pre-trial Data Project (2021), statewide descriptive findings. Released on personal recognizance (PR) or unsecured bond and released on secured bond includes unsupervised release and 
release with PSA supervision. 9 
GRAPH 9 
VSCC Virginia Pre-trial Data Project: Statewide Descriptive Statistics of Defendant Cohort 
Days from Arrest to Release: Percentage of Total Defendants by Bond Type 
 
 
Source: Virginia State Crime Commission’s Virginia Pre-trial Data Project (2021), statewide descriptive findings. Released on personal recognizance (PR) or unsecured bond and released on secured bond includes unsupervised release 
and release with PSA supervision. 
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Bond Amounts: 
Are They Affordable?
While more than 1 in 3 defendants released on a secured bond spent at least 
two days in jail, the average bond amount was less than $5,200. As illustrated 
in Graph 10, the average secured bond amount for nonfelony defendants in 
the sample was $2,928 and $5,182 for felony defendants. Bond amounts 
ranged from $100 to $200,000. Among defendants issued a secured bond, 
the average bond amount for those held the entire pretrial period was lower 
than for released defendants. This suggests that detention for the entire period 
was, in part, a function of income rather than risk to the community or the 
likelihood to appear in court. 
A defendant issued a secured bond has two main options to post bond: 
pay the entire bond amount in cash or use a solvent surety such as a family 
member, friend or bail bondsman. Defendants with the financial means to 
post the bond outright are fully refunded at the end of their case. Defendants 
without sufficient means could use a bail bondsman, but they must pay a 
nonrefundable fee ranging from 10% to 15%. Among the defendants in the 
cohort released on secured bond, 89% used a bail bondsman to post bond. 
The widespread use of bail bondsmen could be the result of the lower incomes 
of defendants and incarcerated people in general, the relative unaffordability 
of bonds or maybe even the low savings rate of average Americans. 
Given the relationship between crime and socioeconomic status, we would 
expect, on average, incarcerated individuals to have lower average incomes 
relative to the population. A Prison Policy Initiative (PPI) report in 2015 found 
that inmates prior to incarceration had a median annual income of $19,185 
in 2014 dollars, 41% less than the nonincarcerated population in a similar age 
group.25 The statistics from the Virginia Pre-trial Data Project do not provide us 
with income information for defendants. However, as a proxy for income, the 
data show that roughly half of all defendants in the sample were represented 
by a public defender or court-appointed attorney. The presence of a public 
defender was highest among defendants held on a secured bond the entire 
25   “Prisons of Poverty: Uncovering the pre-incarceration incomes of the imprisoned,” Prison Policy Initiative, 
2015, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/income.html.
pretrial period (83.2%), followed by defendants released on secured bonds 
(61.8%) and personal recognizance or unsecured bond (50.5%).
BAIL 
BOND,S 
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GRAPH 10
VSCC VIRGINIA PRE-TRIAL DATA PROJECT: STATEWIDE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF DEFENDANT COHORT 
AVERAGE BOND AMOUNT BY ULTIMATE BOND TYPE AND OFFENSE CLASSIFICATION
Source: Virginia State Crime Commission’s Virginia Pre-trial Data Project (2021), statewide descriptive findings, Table 6. Average bond amounts for defendants released with and without a pretrial service agency. Does not include 235 
defendants who were released on a personal recognizance bond only.
 10 
GRAPH 10 
VSCC Virginia Pre-trial Data Project: Statewide Descriptive Statistics of Defendant Cohort 
Average Bond Amount by Ultimate Bond Type and Offense lassification 
 
Source: Virginia State Crime Commission’s Virginia Pre-trial Data Project (2021), statewide descriptive findings, Table 6. Average bond amounts for defendants released with and without a pretrial service agency. Does not include 235 
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Failure To Appear Or 
Flight Risk? 
Failure to appear is one of the more contentious issues surrounding the cash 
bail reform debate. After cash bail reform in Harris County, Texas, 43% of 
defendants who were released without cash bail failed to appear for court 
between June and December 2017. In 2018, prosecutors in Atlanta claimed 
that bail reform doubled the rate of people failing to appear in court.26 
One problem is that the definition of failure to appear differs from state 
to state, if not jurisdiction to jurisdiction. If a person misses 10 court 
appointments, is this counted once or 10 times? The answer depends on local 
rules and preferences. Failure to appear, however, is not just a problem in 
the justice system. Estimates suggest that Americans, on average, fail to keep 
medical appointments between 15% and 30% of the time.27 
Is cash bail meant to encourage court appearance or reduce 
flight risk? This is an important question. Court appearance 
rates may suffer because defendants cannot take time off 
work, are indigent, lack transportation or have health care 
issues. Accommodating the needs of these defendants is in the 
interests of the defendant, the justice system and taxpayers. 
Incarcerating a low-risk defendant because of a missed court 
appointment is akin to having your car repossessed because 
you missed an appointment at the car dealership.
Flight risk, however, is an attempt to evade justice. These defendants typically 
need resources to flee. Flight risk is likely to be positively correlated with 
income. Monitoring these individuals is expensive and time-consuming, and 
thus identifying who is a flight risk is important. Indiscriminately using cash 
bail to prevent flight risk is likely to produce the unintended consequence of 
increasing the pretrial detention rates of lower-income defendants. Available 
evidence suggests that likelihood of flight risk is low, especially when compared 
to the frequency of nonappearance.28 
26   https://theappeal.org/the-failure-to-appear-fallacy/.
27   https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/7010402/.
28   Lauryn P. Gouldin, “Defining flight risk,” The University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 85 (2018).
A Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) report sheds light on the difference between 
nonappearance and flight risk (or remaining a fugitive from justice). Surveying 
40 of the 75 largest U.S. counties between 1990 and 2004, the BJS found 
that approximately 75% of defendants appeared in court on schedule. Of 
those defendants that missed at least one court hearing (failing to appear), 
94% appeared in court within a year of their missed court date. Only 6% 
remained fugitives from justice. This study suggests that the actual risk of flight 
is significantly overstated by the use of failure to appear statistics.29
Graph 11 presents data from the Virginia Pre-Trial Data Project regarding 
whether defendants were charged with failure to appear or were arrested 
for a new in-state offense punishable by incarceration. On average, 13% 
of defendants were charged with failure to appear, with the highest rates of 
charges being observed among those released with a secured bond only. 
However, the more relevant question is whether those released committed 
new crimes at different rates. Approximately 1 in 5 defendants released on 
personal recognizance or an unsecured bond were charged with a new in-
state offense that was punishable by incarceration. Among those released on 
more stringent types of bonds and supervision, almost 3 in 10 were arrested 
for a new in-state jailable offense. The argument that changing bail conditions 
would result in increases in criminal activity appears to be undermined by the 
data, which suggest that defendants released under some form of supervision 
were arrested at approximately the same rate.
From our perspective, cash bail reform would increase the number 
of defendants who miss court appointments. One way to address this 
potential problem is to divert some portion of savings from incarcerating 
low-risk defendants to helping these defendants keep (or reschedule) their 
court appearances. Developing tools and support systems to reduce the 
administrative burden on these defendants and the courts would be a boon to 
taxpayers also. Courts could then more keenly focus on those defendants who 
pose risks to public safety or who may flee justice.
29  https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf.
SECURING RELEASE: CASH BAIL IN HAMPTON ROADS 183
GRAPH 11
VSCC VIRGINIA PRE-TRIAL DATA PROJECT, 
PERCENT OF DEFENDANTS CHARGED WITH FAILURE TO APPEAR OR ARRESTED FOR NEW OFFENSE
Source: Virginia State Crime Commission’s Virginia Pre-trial Data Project (2021), statewide descriptive findings. (PR is personal recognizance and PSA is pretrial supervision.)
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Cash Bail In Hampton Roads
From 1990 to 2018, violent crimes and property crimes in Hampton Roads 
declined by 39.5% and 58.4%, respectively (Graph 12). Over the same 
period, the incarceration rate increased 80.3%, well above the national 
average of 36.9%. In 2018, an average of 425 inmates per 100,000 
Hampton Roads residents were in local jails, almost twice the national average 
of 226 per 100,000 Americans. On any given day in 2018, an average of 
209 pretrial inmates per 100,000 Hampton Roads residents were in local 
jails, a higher rate than that for Virginia (186.5 per 100,000) and the nation 
(146.2 per 100,000) (Graph 13).
Unfortunately, there are not enough reliable data to examine the use of cash 
bail at the local level. We can, however, examine the role of pretrial detention 
within Hampton Roads to better understand the potential impact of cash bail 
reform. To examine pretrial detention at the local level, we must first discuss 
Virginia’s system of local and regional jails. Responsibilities are spread across 
state and local agencies. While localities provide a majority of the funding for 
jails, the state’s share is not insignificant, accounting for roughly 40% of total 
funding for jails in the eastern region in 2019.30 Not all localities have their 
own jail, opting to use a regional jail. Other cities and counties have their own 
jail but also use a regional jail to house inmates. 
Table 1 lists the local and regional jails in Hampton Roads and the 
corresponding localities that house inmates at each jail in 2019. Of the 
16 cities and counties in the region, eight have their own local jail. For the 
most part, the distribution of inmates across jails was representative of the 
corresponding localities’ shares of the region’s total population. Virginia Beach 
City Jail (20.5%) and Norfolk City Jail (14.7%) housed the largest shares of 
Hampton Roads jail inmates. 
30   Virginia State Compensation Board, Jail Cost Report (2019). The eastern region includes Hampton Roads 
local and regional jails (Table 1) as well as Northampton, Sussex and Accomack county jails and Southside 
Regional Jail. 
In April 2021, the Virginia Board of Local and Regional Jails 
issued a recommendation to close Hampton Roads Regional 
Jail. The decision followed the deaths of at least 22 inmates 
since 2015 and a 2016 U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) 
investigation of the jail. The DOJ found the jail’s inadequate 
medical care and mental health care, and overuse of solitary 
confinement violated the prisoners’ constitutional rights. 
The primary purpose of local and regional jails is to house pretrial defendants, 
those with a misdemeanor sentence, felony sentence of 12 months or less, 
or local ordinance violation. These inmates accounted for 71% of the total 
Hampton Roads jail population in 2019. Federal prisoners and state-
responsible inmates comprise the other 29%; they are usually awaiting transfer 
to a prison or other state facility. On a typical day in 2019, approximately 
6,713 inmates were incarcerated in Hampton Roads local and regional jails, 
47% of whom had not yet been convicted of a crime. 
As illustrated in Graph 14, the pretrial inmate population in the region’s local 
jails ranged from 30.6% in Southampton County Jail to 59.7% in Newport 
News City Jail. It also appears that city jails have higher shares of pretrial 
inmates relative to county or regional jails. There are several factors, such as 
different rates in arrest or criminal activity across jurisdictions or differences in 
the use of secured bonds, that could influence the share of pretrial inmates. The 
mixing of inmates from multiple jurisdictions, however, makes it difficult to say 
much about the differences in pretrial practices across localities in the region. 
To examine pretrial detention at the county level, we can look at jurisdiction-
level jail data from the Vera Institute of Justice. On an average day in 2018, 
there were approximately 209 pretrial detainees for every 100,000 residents 
in the region (Table 2). The highest rate of pretrial detention in 2018 was 
in Portsmouth (768.2), followed by Mathews County (308.0) and Norfolk 
(259.8). From 2000 to 2018, the pretrial detention rate rose the fastest in 
James City County, increasing at an average annual rate of 5%. For the 
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majority of the region’s counties, the annual growth rate of pretrial detainees 
from 2000 to 2018 averaged above 3%, while in several of the region’s largest 
cities, pretrial detention declined over the same period. 
TABLE 1
HAMPTON ROADS LOCAL AND REGIONAL JAILS, 2019
Jail Name Jail Member Jurisdiction
Jail Share of Hampton Roads 
Inmate Population
Jurisdiction Share of Hampton 
Roads Resident Population
Chesapeake City Chesapeake 14.0% 14.2%
Gloucester County Gloucester County 0.6% 2.2%
Hampton City Hampton 4.1% 7.8%
Newport News City Newport News 7.0% 10.4%
Norfolk City Norfolk 14.7% 14.1%
Portsmouth City Portsmouth 3.6% 5.5%
Southampton County Southampton County 1.1% 1.0%
Virginia Beach City Virginia Beach 20.5% 26.2%
Hampton Roads Regional*
Chesapeake, Hampton, Newport 
News, Norfolk, Portsmouth
14.3% 52.1%
Middle Peninsula Regional Mathews County 2.4% 0.5%
Virginia Peninsula Regional
James City County, Williamsburg, 
Poquoson, York County
6.4% 10.0%
Western Tidewater Regional Suffolk, Franklin, Isle of Wight County 11.3% 8.0%
Sources: Virginia State Compensation Board, Local Inmate Data Systems, and the U.S. Census Bureau Intercensal Population Estimates, 2019. *As of April 2021, Chesapeake, Norfolk and Portsmouth had pulled their inmates out of the 
Hampton Roads Regional Jail.
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GRAPH 12
GROWTH IN VIOLENT CRIME, PROPERTY CRIME AND JAIL INCARCERATION RATE: 
HAMPTON ROADS, 1990-2018
Sources: Vera Institute of Justice, Incarceration Trends (2018), FBI Uniform Crime Reporting (2019) and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University 
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GRAPH 13
PRETRIAL INMATE POPULATION PER 100,000 RESIDENTS: 
HAMPTON ROADS, 1990-2018
Sources: Vera Institute of Justice, Incarceration Trends (2018), FBI Uniform Crime Reporting (2019) and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University 
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GRAPH 13 
Pretrial Inmate Population Per 100,000 Residents: 
ampton Roads, 1 90-2018 
 
 
Sources: Vera Institute of Justice, Incarceration Trends (2018), FBI Uniform Crime Reporting (2019) and the Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University  
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GRAPH 14
SHARE OF PRETRIAL INMATE POPULATION: 
HAMPTON ROADS LOCAL AND REGIONAL JAILS, 2019
Source: Virginia State Compensation Board, Local Inmate Data Systems
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GRAPH 14 
Share of Pretrial Inmate Population: 
Hampton Roads ocal and Regional Jails, 2019 
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TABLE 2
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH IN PRETRIAL INMATE POPULATION: 
HAMPTON ROADS CITIES AND COUNTIES, 2000-2018
2000 Pretrial Population Rate 
Per 100,000 Residents
2018 Pretrial Population Rate 
Per 100,000 Residents
Average Annual Growth Rate
Chesapeake 137.8 220.1 3.7%
Gloucester County 93.9 155.3 3.2%
Hampton 167.1 149.7 -1.1%
Isle of Wight County 157.8 82.6 -2.4%
James City County 94.9 146.1 5.0%
Mathews County 127.5 308.0 4.8%
Newport News 194.7 172.4 -0.7%
Norfolk 294.9 259.8 -0.5%
Poquoson 99.5 157.0 2.9%
Portsmouth 541.2 768.2 1.6%
Suffolk 154.1 84.6 -1.4%
Virginia Beach 165.8 148.4 -0.3%
Williamsburg 119.6 185.7 3.7%
York County 99.9 161.5 3.7%
Hampton Roads Total 201.4 209.0 1.6%
Sources: Vera Institute of Justice (2020) and Incarceration Trends Dataset, county- and jurisdiction-level jail data (1970-2018). Data for Franklin and Southampton County were not available. Average annual growth represents the 
compound annual growth rate.
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Cash Bail Reform: What 
Would It Look Like?
Cash bail reform can take many forms. As of April 2021, no state had 
implemented legislation to completely strip judges of the ability to issue secured 
bonds. Illinois passed legislation to this effect in 2021, but the reform will not 
go into effect until 2023. Other states have imposed restrictions on a judge’s 
ability to rely on secured bonds. These restrictions include amending court rules 
to set forth a presumption in favor of release on the least restrictive conditions, 
requiring judges to consider a defendant’s ability to pay, and expanding the 
types of offenses eligible for citations or summons. While Virginia already 
instructs judges to consider the financial means of the defendant, Attorney 
General Mark Herring and the Virginia Department of Criminal Justice 
Services have both recommended expanding the use of citations and adding 
a presumption favoring the least restrictive conditions as possible reforms to 
reduce the reliance on cash bail. 
New Jersey, for example, enacted similar legislation, largely eliminating cash 
bail in 2017. In the year following implementation, less than 1% of Criminal 
Justice Reform-eligible defendants31 were issued monetary bail, and 71% 
of defendants were issued a summons with or without pretrial monitoring, 
without first going to jail.32 New York eliminated cash bail for offenses covering 
90% of total arrests in January 2020 but has since expanded the number of 
offenses eligible for cash bail after the New York Police Department reported 
an increase in criminal activity. Besides putting limits on judicial decision-
making, another key aspect of recent legislative reforms to end cash bail is 
the statewide implementation of a pretrial risk assessment tool and pretrial 
services. Both reform tools are already in place in more than two-thirds of 
Virginia’s cities and counties.
31   A Criminal Justice Reform-eligible defendant is defined in statute as “a person for whom a complaint-warrant 
is issued for an initial charge involving an indictable offense or disorderly persons offense.” 
32   2018 Report to the Governor and the Legislature, New Jersey Judiciary, submitted by Glenn A. Grant, 
acting administrative director of the courts, available at: https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/
criminal/2018cjrannual.pdf.
Cash Bail Reform: What Are 
The Projected Benefits?
The potential benefits of cash bail reform are alluring. Proponents argue there 
is minimal risk to public safety or court appearance and that eliminating cash 
bail would lower costs for poor and minority defendants and taxpayers. Cities 
and counties in Hampton Roads spend an average of $90.32 per day to house 
one inmate. On any given day in 2019, 3,154 inmates were detained pretrial 
in the region, an estimated cost to taxpayers of more than $104 million per 
year, or about 45% of the $233 million spent on corrections and detentions in 
the region.33 
Advocates point to the potential cost savings of a risk-based system as a key 
benefit to reform. Herring noted, “It costs about $3 a day to keep someone on 
pretrial services, versus about $85 per day if they are jailed, so if we make 
smart reforms, we could be talking about millions in savings while still meeting 
our public safety goals.” Yet, with the preponderance of defendants released 
within 48 hours of arrest, the question is how much money could cash bail 
reform actually save?
The key question in the cash bail reform debate, we argue, is by how much 
would the pretrial population in Hampton Roads decline on a daily basis? 
When New Jersey reformed its cash bail system, the pretrial population 
declined by 19% in the first year of implementation.34 Assuming a similar 
impact of a 20% decline in Hampton Roads would reduce the average daily 
pretrial population by about 630 inmates. This daily decline in the pretrial 
population would save approximately $57,000 a day, or approximately $20 
million a year (Table 3). Given that cash bail reform could take a number of 
forms, we provide a range of estimates in Table 3.
One might argue that $20 million of savings a year from cash bail reform is 
not worth the increased risk to public safety. On the other hand, if the daily 
pretrial population were reduced by 630 inmates, there would be benefits 
33   Virginia State Compensation Board, Local Inmate Data Systems and Virginia State Compensation Board, FY 
2019 Jail Cost Report. Annual estimate = average daily population X cost of inmate per day X 365.
34   2018 Report to Governor and the Legislature, New Jersey Judiciary. https://njcourts.gov/courts/assets/
criminal/2018cjrannual.pdf?c=taP.
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in terms of alleviating crowding in local jails and conserving public safety 
resources. There are also the direct benefits to people who are not jailed. Every 
day in confinement is a potential day of lost wages for those who have not yet 
been convicted of a crime.
TABLE 3
HAMPTON ROADS LOCAL AND REGIONAL JAILS: 












Year from 5% 
Decline in Pretrial 
Population
Savings Per 
Year from 10% 
Decline in Pretrial 
Population
Savings Per 
Year from 20% 
Decline in Pretrial 
Population
Chesapeake City $90.80 458 $15,179,036 $758,952 $1,517,904 $3,035,807 
Gloucester County $141.06 15 $772,304 $38,615 $77,230 $154,461 
Hampton City $91.92 149 $4,999,069 $249,953 $499,907 $999,814 
Newport News City $78.81 280 $8,054,382 $402,719 $805,438 $1,610,876 
Norfolk City $68.09 466 $11,581,428 $579,071 $1,158,143 $2,316,286 
Portsmouth City $119.71 120 $5,243,298 $262,165 $524,330 $1,048,660 
Southampton County $119.50 22 $959,585 $47,979 $95,959 $191,917 
Virginia Beach City $80.76 731 $21,547,979 $1,077,399 $2,154,798 $4,309,596 
Virginia Peninsula 
Regional
$58.14 186 $3,947,125 $197,356 $394,712 $789,425 
Western Tidewater 
Regional
$56.73 235 $4,866,016 $243,301 $486,602 $973,203 
Hampton Roads 
Regional




$83.92 62 $1,899,110 $94,955 $189,911 $379,822 
Hampton Roads Total $90.35 3,154 $104,011,824 $5,200,591 $10,401,182 $20,802,365
Sources: Virginia State Compensation Board, Local Inmate Data Systems and the Virginia State Compensation Board, FY 2019 Jail Cost Report. Total expenditures per inmate per day represent operating expenditures minus capital 
account-operating and other jail indirect expenditures.
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In Table 4, we model the economic impact on Hampton Roads if cash bail 
reform were enacted and the daily pretrial population declined by 630 
inmates. To examine the potential (maximum) gains from this policy change, 
we assume that the defendants are employed in retail trade and estimate the 
annual economic impact of adding these jobs to the regional economy. We 
find that the potential gain to regional gross domestic product approaches 
$51 million annually, and that more than 880 jobs in total would be added 
to Hampton Roads. Of course, these benefits might also be reduced if reform 
were to result in increased criminal activity. However, we note (again) that 
data from the Virginia State Crime Commission support the conclusion that 
defendants on more stringent types of release (secured bonds, secured bonds 
with supervision) were arrested at the same rate as those released on personal 
recognizance or unsecured bond with supervision. In other words, criminals 
who are going to commit crimes are going to do so, regardless of how they 
obtain release from pretrial detention.
TABLE 4
PROJECTED ECONOMIC IMPACT: EMPLOYMENT GAIN OF 630 
INDIVIDUALS, HAMPTON ROADS
Direct Indirect Induced Total
Employment 630 129 124 883
Value Added (Millions) $29.3 $10.8 $10.8 $50.9
Compensation (Millions) $18.9 $7.1 $5.3 $31.4
Sources: Dragas Center for Economic Analysis and Policy, Old Dominion University, and IMPLAN Group. 
Estimates may not sum due to rounding.
Final Thoughts
The decision of whether to maintain the status quo, reduce or eliminate 
cash bail undoubtedly continues to be debated in Hampton Roads and in 
Virginia. Maintaining the status quo is a policy choice under increasing 
pressure at the state and local levels. The no cash bail policy implemented by 
the commonwealth’s attorney from Norfolk, and the calls from prosecutors 
in Newport News, Hampton and Portsmouth to end cash bail statewide, are 
signals that, much like marijuana decriminalization and then legalization, cash 
bail reform may be on the horizon.
If, as evidenced by the increasing number of states reducing or eliminating 
cash bail, change does come to Virginia and Hampton Roads, what would 
it mean? First, simply eliminating cash bail would not release 
all or even most pretrial inmates. New Jersey is the only state to 
successfully implement a policy, in 2017, that largely eliminated cash bail. 
After declining 20% in the first year, the number of pretrial inmates in 2020 
remained largely unchanged.35 Data show that many of those arrested in 
Virginia either receive a summons or, if transported to jail, are released within 
24 hours of confinement. 
Second, an efficient and just pretrial system would require 
more than just eliminating cash bail. Judges must still have an 
effective way to ensure court appearance and public safety, while at the same 
time identifying defendants eligible for release in a quick and efficient manner. 
While Virginia already has much of the necessary framework in place, it 
would require more than simply expanding pretrial services. The Virginia Pre-
trial Data Project review of court practices in pretrial services agency localities 
found in many instances that judges do not receive any information from 
pretrial services, and that several defendants are placed on pretrial supervision 
without first receiving a risk assessment. Any reform should ensure that 
sufficient resources are available and properly utilized. 
Third, eliminating cash bail would not result in the cost savings 
to local governments some might expect. More importantly, while 
35   New Jersey Courts Criminal Justice Reform Statistics, Jan. 1 to Dec. 31, 2020, https://njcourts.gov/courts/
assets/criminal/cjrreport2020.pdf?c=48I.
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the cost of pretrial services is significantly lower than detention, a wider 
implementation would almost certainly mean cost increases. The burden on 
localities to fund nearly half of the program could also lead to inequities in 
funding and outcomes. The state would almost certainly have to increase its 
aid to the cities and counties unable to finance the program on their own. Even 
the most optimistic estimates suggest the savings would constitute a fraction of 
public safety budgets.
Fourth, care must be taken to differentiate between defendants 
who do not pose a risk to the community and those who may 
engage in criminal behavior or flee justice. More than 3 in 10 
defendants released on more stringent conditions (supervision and/or secured 
bond) in the 2017 VPDP cohort were arrested on a new charge after being 
released from confinement while awaiting trial. Differentiating between these 
defendants and those who fail to appear because of scheduling conflicts, lack 
of transportation or other issues would be a continuing challenge. 
Lastly, shifting the pretrial system from wealth-based to risk-
based would likely be a more equitable form of pretrial justice; 
but the impact of eliminating cash bail on racial disparities 
remains to be determined. A 2019 report on the performance of New 
Jersey’s cash bail reform showed that in the two years since implementation, 
racial disparities in arrests and the jail population persist. Cash bail reform 
is not a panacea for all that ails the criminal justice system, 
but taking a risk-based approach that reduces subjectivity and 
potential bias, and applying patience and objective analysis, is 
a step in the right direction.
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